Well onioncat is not "arbitrary node" but is a set up one.
Yet some timing differentiations can be divined by
selectively constructing the "circuit" to test,
looking at setup timings, pushing characterizing
traffic through them and your own nodes,
polling existing services, etc.
Please publish your
> Right now we're exploring latency-based attacks but are having trouble
> achieving a particular goal: a way to “ping” an arbitrary node in a
> client’s already-built (“live”) circuit. One-way timing is ideal but round
> trip time would suffice. We can glean this information during circuit
> const
> mpan:
>> Is there any data available that sheds light on
>> why operators run outdated versions
Besides latent OS packages, or being busy, or simply not
updating things, those are natures of computing world anyway...
or having no network operations crypto-monetization model as
some nextgen p2p o
On that, and regardless of what TPO Inc says re...
tor is a bit decentralized, and freely licensed, as such...
DirAuths, HSDirs, Relays are all free to choose to continue signing
over and running older versions in order to support the community of
tor clients that are happily using useful feature
>> https://gitlab.torproject.org/woswos/CAPTCHA-Monitor/-/wikis/GSoC-2021
>> tpo/community/support/#40013
>
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/projects/DontBlockMe
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/doc/ListOfServicesBlockingTor
Beyond talk (and dev) there was tor
> https://gitlab.torproject.org/woswos/CAPTCHA-Monitor/-/wikis/GSoC-2021
> tpo/community/support/#40013
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/projects/DontBlockMe
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/doc/ListOfServicesBlockingTor
The importance due to negative utility and
signal NEWNYM exit bucketing - Make circuit isolation isolate exits?
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6256
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> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13184 .
Perhaps not only "which local network", as in customary
127.0.0.0/8, but may be useful to some as being flexibly
narrow to "which IP and port", as in 127.201.52.38:843,
for IPv6 as well. Some OS / VM may utilize beyond
concept of just 127.0
> libc.so.0 => ...
> ld64-uClibc.so.0 => ...
Samples from systems for developing pattern matches
should not be truncated... if the data is sensitive or very long,
it can be obfuscated or have its char class substrings shortened.
Some forums and mail can mangle chars classes outside isalnum(3),
ta
On 9/10/19, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31687
> needs testing; please let me know if it works for you.
Works. The second hunk for fp.c is below.
> Is it possible that
> a new compiler version or new headers in FreeBSD is what has made them
> start appe
On 9/6/19, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> What version of Tor?
Oops, here it is: 0.4.1.5
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freebsd 12 x64 gcc 8.3.0
src/core/or/connection_edge.c:2563:5: warning: potential null pointer
dereference [-Wnull-dereference]
src/lib/math/fp.c:106:16: warning: conversion from 'double' to 'float'
may change value [-Wfloat-conversion]
src/lib/math/fp.c:111:18: warning: conversion from 'double' t
On 8/14/19, Pop Chunhapanya wrote:
> When deploying an onion service ... the ip address
> of my machine ... is exposed to the Tor network...
> DDoS ... if someone knows my ip address.
Only your tor client, and your guard, knows your ip.
Unless you're up against a malicious guard, that's
not a pro
> And this is really off topic for this list.
General Tor energy bits moved here...
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2019-June/045256.html
re 305 etc
It wouldn't be unusual for an app to pop up some form
of captcha, challenge, or data exchange where needed.
Some of that model exi
(from tor-dev: PoW DoS defenses Prop 305: INTRO Cell)
On 6/16/19, Chelsea Holland Komlo wrote:
> Given the significant environmental impact of POW in other distributed
> systems (blockchain), we should not implement schemes that solve a
> problem for Tor but create problems for people elsewhere (
This should make sure these errors are synchronized with that from
controller events HS_DESC HS_DESC_CONTENT HSFETCH HSPOST
and other semantics and logging.
I submitted a bunch of bugs and enhance on HS* controller command
and event failures that can be trac searched and integrated
with this. Some
On 5/7/19, nusenu wrote:
>
> juanjo:
>> Tor relays are public and easily blocked by IP. To connect to Tor
>> network users where Tor is censored have to use bridges and even PTs.
>> But, what happens on the exit? Many websites block Tor IPs so using
>> it to access "clearweb" is not possible. Shou
Speaking of MIBs and management, was SNMP ever seriously
looked at back when desire for a control mechanism evolved?
If I recall, agent libs and clients weren't wished as middleware,
thus demurring to a text connection shell interface.
Though commercial routers have both, the shell connection is
us
On 5/7/19, Suphanat Chunhapanya wrote:
> That's cool. But according to what dgoulet proposed, if we use both
> ONION_CLIENT_AUTH_ADD
> and ONION_SERVICE_AUTH_ADD. The latter will sound like it's an
> authentication of the service not the client. At least for me :)
And or maybe that seem more like
On namespaces...
Like MIBs, APIs, file systems, most anything, it's usually...
least specific left to most specific right
... DNS also maintains hier but in reverse direction.
add_foo_thing1
add_thing1
add_thing2
see_bar_thing1
string_assorted_junk_this
...
gives you hierarchies of *add* filled
On 4/3/19, Iain Learmonth wrote:
>> When line wrapping, implementations MUST wrap lines
>> at 64 characters. Upon decoding, implementations MUST
>> ignore and discard all linefeed characters.
The sectiion quoted is here...
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n193
> I c
On 3/4/19, Kevin Gallagher wrote:
> Recently I've been
> working on creating a "Tor Friendliness Scanner" (TFS), or a scanner
> that will measure what features of a given website are broken
> (non-functional) when accessed on the Tor Browser (TB), along with
> actionable suggestions to improve it.
All sorts of statistical counters could be useful to graph
from some API... a control port stats dump in something
like var=value, a BSD sysctl text format, and even up to
a proper SNMP port which many graphers already speak.
Logging isn't really the right place for such things,
unless they've rea
> https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/53
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/27491
> https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/566
> https://github.com/torproject/torspec/tree/master/proposals
The subject would make use of the folllowing RFC...
Happy Eyeballs Version 2: Better C
> rewriting onion proxies
Though it should be noted that if users already
can't get their own simple human link and
bookmark usage right... they're probably not
going to get any higher level naming or
authority config and usage right either.
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> sign a
> self-signed tls certificate with your Onion Service's hs_ed25519_secret_key
> and Tor Browser trusting the tls certificate based on this signature
- In unlikely case tor crypto fails or breaks, e2e TLS
is good there.
- An admin might terminate onions on one box, and
forward the plaintex
Regarding mobile, dormant, battery, etc...
There may still be a ticket for phone, mobile, laptop, wifi users...
if an interface change happens, typically interface
down event or IP change, then tor should tear down
all internet associated state, to not expose traveling user
to identifying IP traff
> /TorRelayGuide
> /TorRelayGuide/DebianUbuntu
The former, in context wiith the latter, cannot be
treated as both a file and a directory (hier) by web
mirror / archvers such as wget onto disk.
And wiki / trac exports aren't available either :(
So instead push the page down into the hier,
thus ensu
> I am not sure where I should start with getting feedback as it is quite hard
> to find users of ProxAllium.
People can't be forced to use or comment.
Yet if it's a tool that interacts with tor or the ecosystem
of tor tools, post up an announce and feedback request
to tor-talk and see.
When yo
> https://proxallium.org/
> adding references to it in places like the wiki and the "projects" list on
> the website.
People are free to create their own wiki account and add descriptions
and links to their tools / projects on the relavant wiki pages.
https://trac.torproject.org/
You probably w
Thanks for your work.
You may also consider Africa and South America, Canada, Russia, etc.
And locations interior to all such that contacts within an RTT
are not as likely to be across a pond or other border,
vs as at some edge IX or landing. Cable maps may assist.
_
On Sat, Jun 30, 2018 at 5:22 PM, nusenu wrote:
> tor's man page for OutboundBindAddress* options say:
>
>> IPv6 addresses should be wrapped in square brackets
>
> since it does not throw an error without square brackets:
> does it make any difference?
>
> Previously I forgot the square brackets wh
> for v3 support, HSFETCH won't be ncessary...
N...
HSFETCH
is an absolutely necessary control function now critical to operation of a
variety of onionland search / index / status / webhosting / research services,
and any other basic commandline checks that have zero wish to be
spawning hea
On Fri, Apr 27, 2018 at 6:44 AM, Jonathan Marquardt wrote:
> v3 onion services just seem like a way worse deal to the average user and
> the unknowledgeable admin. Mainly because the addresses are way too long.
Then it's analyzing whether shifting the default to v3 for the clueless and the
perhap
On Fri, Apr 27, 2018 at 8:01 AM, Alec Muffett wrote:
> OnionBalance
Forgot to include this in the former list of
common / useful onion tools, thanks.
If anyone knows of others, feel free to add to thread.
> OTOH, I have been performance testing simultaneous regular-expression
> matching of v2/3
On Wed, Apr 25, 2018 at 2:22 PM, nusenu wrote:
> even though you are probably years away from deprecating onion v2 services
> it is certainly good to have a clear plan.
>
> I'm asking because the sooner onion v2 are deprecated the sooner some
> people can stop worrying about malicious HSDirs.
The
You may also be interested in
- newnym exit bucketing (in trac somewhere),
this guarantees cycling through all exits before reusing one
- openvpn exit termination (in tor-relays somewhere),
this gives non-tor IP to clients that initiate a termination
___
It seems that each function in a network app that
- listens to the net, should have an independantly
configurable inbound ip and port.
- talks out to the net, should have an independantly
configurable source ip and port.
And when there are multiple interfaces / NAT,
address metadata and metainfo a
On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 1:13 PM, Mike Perry wrote:
> I strongly disagree. Dumping more traffic onto an already existing,
> otherwise in-use connection is not the same as the ability to force a
> new connection that is only used for a single request at a very specific
> time. These are completely d
On Fri, Mar 9, 2018 at 11:20 PM, teor wrote:
> Can you tell us what compiler and version, and what system?
Was gcc 4.2.1 modded by whatever freebsd did
in its 8.x series. Any extant bugs... ok, but don't bother
porting for those releases as they're EOL / moot.
Test from an older system before it was updated,
unlikely to be prevalent, so don't bother fixing unless obvious.
src/common/confline.c:135: warning: 'include_list' may be used
uninitialized in this function
src/common/confline.c:135: warning: 'include_list' may be used
uninitialized in this funct
On Mon, Feb 26, 2018 at 12:26 AM, procmem wrote:
> Any way to do this?
See 'firefox -h'.
Then see if 'torbrowser -h' and args work the same way.
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On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 5:44 PM, teor wrote:
> This thread is off-topic
> This list is used for developing new features, bug fixes, and
> removing old features.
Here are three easily found and directly quoted charters
for this list, none of which are strictly constrained to only
the feature and b
> I'm interested in helping you guys with Tor development. I don't really care
> what I work on, except I do not support .onion websites (though I am willing
> to be convinced otherwise) so I would prefer not to participate directly in
> their development. I have plenty of experience with writing c
On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 8:29 AM, teor wrote:
>> On 22 Dec 2017, at 11:23, Robin Descamps wrote:
>> May I ask you advices/feedback about this master thesis plan?
>> The master thesis plan:
>> https://drive.google.com/open?id=1XEOSS29owavKJ_cJJAVaPiJe34Ez6XXx
>> The poster:
>> https://drive.google
> Recently, I spent some time in China
> and it made me realize the importance of a project like TOR.
Consider speaking of your experience
on the cypherpunks and/or liberation-tech lists,
anonymously if need be. Your contribution
is valued.
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On Sat, Dec 23, 2017 at 12:49 AM, Harshavardhan Reddy
wrote:
> How does the Tor Project deal with the malicious exit relays. Do you still
> run exitmap or something better?
As with dirauths, the effort is distributed and not
necessarily a function of the tor project proper.
Users report them when
>> Detecting exit nodes is error prone, as you point out. Some exit nodes
>> have their traffic exit a different address than their listening
>> port. Hey does Exonerator handle these?
>
> Right. It's not trivial for tor to figure out what exit relays are
> multi-homed -- at least not without actu
> https://www.torproject.org/docs/documentation.html.en#DesignDoc
> https://spec.torproject.org/
> https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/
> https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/report/12
> https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail
On Mon, Nov 6, 2017 at 12:56 AM, ng0 wrote:
> I think videos should be a separate issue, we selfhost them
> already as far as I know but integrating them into git is
> no (good) solution.
Don't think I would propose committing the actual videos / papers
to git... too much bloat... just the bib /
On Sat, Nov 4, 2017 at 8:05 PM, Scfith Riseup wrote:
> I wonder if there is an option to start to use ipfs ( https://ipfs.io/ ) or
> something like it to permanently and resiliently store items for posterity?
Bib users would need a client to avoid abusing inproxy.
Though a client would offload fr
> With mentioned problems of
- Broken links, not founds, redirects covered by a single monthly
crawl thus being regular and benefitting all projects at once.
- Size, could apply common compression such as xz or even ZSTD
to entire mirrorable local archive. Similar for video materials.
http://open
> Saves a lot of duplicative work at the projects, is easily mirrored,
> imported into web pages, etc.
With mentioned problems of
- Google threat covered by community hosting and replication.
- Separate / overlapping project / topic focus covered by a
flexible tagging and views system.
- Not easi
On Sat, Nov 4, 2017 at 2:54 PM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 03, 2017 at 09:58:35PM +, ng0 wrote:
>> our plan with the bibliography collection of GNUnet is to
https://gnunet.org/bibliography
>> implement something similar to your/freehaven's anonbib.
https://www.freehaven.net/anonb
At some time in the past I noticed that the anonbib did
not have links to local copies of some of the materials.
If that's still the case, I'd definitely suggest creating them
at this oppurtunity.
And though rare and more curation work, some papers do
receive content / errata updates.
_
On Sun, May 14, 2017 at 9:35 AM, harshit tandon
wrote:
> I would like to contribute to tor browser how can I help
Start by filling out the "^Subject: ' lines of your emails
with a relavant "Subject" so people know what you're
talking about instead of leaving them blank.
You can learn more details
re: "tcp_tracing_internet.pdf"
This appears to describe an active network modulation attack (node DoS).
Either hammer tree on nodes of the expected path and trace the modulation,
or on all but the expected path to find unmodulated.
It generally requires GPA, deploying nodes, or being one end of th
These recent naming proposals on list,
for forward naming 'string --> onion, 1:1', I think.
Is anyone working on doing reverse naming,
'onion --> string, 1:1' ? With links to such work?
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Anything going to blow up if set anywhere from 1k to 1M?
CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE
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New members are very welcome and valued whether
through gradual accretion or project influx such as GSOC's.
In order to ensure messaging efficiency and clarity...
- Reply *below* what others have written. Do not "top post".
- Trim out and *delete* irrelavant portions of what others
have written, s
On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 11:31 AM, Donncha O'Cearbhaill
wrote:
> The Tor bad-relay team regularly detects malicious exit relays which are
> actively manipulating Tor traffic. These attackers appear financial
> motivated and have primarily been observed modifying Bitcoin and onion
> address which ar
On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 3:38 PM, Felipe Dau wrote:
> Thanks for the suggestion. It should be possible to support multiple
> kinds of transport, but we still need to do some research on that
> because it might make some attacks
> possible/easier (e.g., partitioning attacks)? It would be great to
>
You may want to link unmessage into the I2P network as well.
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> [1] Maybe from tor-talk or linked to your idea from the wiki page.
You also see some discussions here
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-access/
and here
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/
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On Fri, Mar 10, 2017 at 12:35 PM, Boter42 wrote:
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/doc/ListOfServicesBlockingTor
> It would be great to have an updated records of this kind of websites so that
> we can push website owners to make the Tor user-experience as smooth as
> possible
Are these the current / recommended paper refs for
eyeballing things on this to date?
torspec/proposals/251-netflow-padding.txt
torspec/proposals/254-padding-negotiation.txt
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Tor could ship with a tool to offline generate all the
various keys, encrypt and sign with them, for debug, test, and
use with other apps that tie to tor.
And a tool to translate strings between different encodings in use.
Or at least provide howto and links in the docs to third party tools
that us
> test x"$url" = x
Some users may be a bit unfamiliar with this longform
'test' construct having trended from that in say
their distro's example rc scripts over recent posix
and bugfixed decades, easier visual delimited parsing,
4 chars of line width saved, to form of...
[ ! "$var" ]
http://pubs
It was a test compile on a very old 8.x i386 box, warnings
would be no surprise there, hardly worth addressing unless
exposed a bug, since 11.x runs on most all hw 8.x does.
gcc version 4.2.1 20070831 patched [FreeBSD]
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Skimming thread...
Version or not is fine, provided if you want versions you
know you must store the bits somewhere, or ensure regex
parser rules to recognize and match an intrinsic version
represented by entire address format specification itself.
Note onion search spiders rely on such address r
Ancient gcc says
src/or/connection.c:1843: warning: passing argument 1 of 'TO_OR_CONN'
discards qualifiers from pointer target type
src/or/connection.c:1843: warning: passing argument 1 of 'TO_OR_CONN'
discards qualifiers from pointer target type
src/test/test_dir.c:3700: warning: assuming signed
On Wed, Jan 18, 2017 at 3:31 AM, George Kadianakis wrote:
> What do you mean by "develop an IPv6 layer"?
prop224 destroys the one to one bidirectional binary mapping that
makes onioncat possible, and fails to provide a replacement for it :-(
Any "human naming" layer (whether under prop224 or curr
Always wondered how naming is relevant,
for example, IPv6 with OnionCat as a deterministic
form of naming. So now we propose a 'naming' layer.
Which should not also support IPv6 addressing?
Is not IPv6, subsequent to the 80bit scheme,
merely a name on top of onions? ie: If we develop
a 'naming' lay
You may encounter special justification to
extend support for last branch that still supports
pre-prop224 onions. There is a *lot* of code / community
built on those. Darknet fora have mentioned possible
maintenance forks as such if need be.
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> On 2016-09-26 00:54, teor wrote:
>> The one concern I have about this is that Tor-over-Tor would stick out more,
>> as it would look like Tor coming out the OutboundBindAddressExit IP.
>> But we don't encourage Tor-over-Tor anyway.
ToT is technically not some special tor aware / tunneled relay f
On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 3:51 PM, grarpamp wrote:
> Freenet has talk on their lists of adding 100 new onioncat nodes
> to tor and i2p as linked to in this thread...
>
> https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2016-June/011108.html
More folks blogging related to the ab
On Wed, Oct 5, 2016 at 4:09 PM, Philipp Winter wrote:
> Also, Tor Browser MUST abort the ERP procedure if the HTTPS
> certificate is not signed by a trusted authority.
This is a problem for independant sites that choose not to pay
the CA cabal, deal with what free CA will be around tomorrow,
or
Many wrote, in subthread started by dawuud 5 days ago:
> talk: internet of things, security / exploit / nsa, crypto via tor,
> everything over tor, exits
This subthread does not concern the subject made for curating /
supporting / tracking / developing "Onioncat and Prop224" [1].
Please a) end it,
On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 11:30 AM, dawuud wrote:
> Are you aware of Tahoe-LAFS?
Don't know if they are, or if they are here, all we have is their short post.
If they just need an insert and retrieve filestore for small user
bases, there are lots of choices. If they need the more global
and random
https://www.reddit.com/r/TOR/comments/54rpil/dht_syncthing_bitsync_over_tor/
Hi we would like to integrate DHT Bittorrent Syncing over Tor for our
open source encrypted obfuscated media rich notepad app.
This app will have for main objective to provide a secure information
gathering and sharing t
There is VM's, and
Multiple X server can isolate on up to all available vty's.
There is also program shipped by X11 called Xnest.
But the more concern than apps and keyboards above,
is probably the driver / kernel portion of security surface.
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On Wed, Sep 21, 2016 at 5:33 AM, Yawning Angel wrote:
> Where: https://git.schwanenlied.me/yawning/sandboxed-tor-browser
> X11 is a huge mess of utter fail. Since the sandboxed processes get direct
> access to the host X server, this is an exploitation vector.
Is anyone actually actively throwi
On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 10:32 AM, teor wrote:
> But I also think we should warn when Tor guesses between multiple addresses,
> because some operators are going to find that Tor guesses one they don't want:
Might help to emit a simple table on startup with
- explicitly configured addrs / ports
-
On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 5:36 PM, René Mayrhofer wrote:
> That is exactly what we have patched our local Tor node to do, although
> with a different (slightly hacky, so the patch will be an RFC type)
> approach by marking real exit traffic with a ToS flag to leave the
> decision of what to do with
On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 9:14 AM, René Mayrhofer wrote:
> Setup: Please note that our setup is a bit particular for reasons that
> we will explain in more detail in a later message (including a proposed
> patch to the current source which has been pending also because of the
> holiday situation...)
On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 9:14 AM, René Mayrhofer wrote:
> Sep 19 11:37:41.000 [warn] I have no descriptor for the router named
> "ins1" in my declared family; I'll use the nickname as is, but this may
> confuse clients.
> Sep 19 11:37:41.000 [warn] I have no descriptor for the router named
> "ins2"
On Fri, Sep 16, 2016 at 6:10 PM, Alex Elsayed wrote:
>> (Yes, there is a typo in the last IPv6 address as well.
>> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20153 )
Yes Tor is making some quite bad text representation issues
so I added summary of them to this ticket.
> - [FC00]/8 is _reser
On Fri, Sep 16, 2016 at 5:13 AM, Alex Elsayed wrote:
> Hi, I'm using Tor in transparent mode, and I'm running into a rather
> inconvenient behavior.
>
> VirtualAddrNetworkIPv6 refuses to parse unless the network address given
> is a /40 or broader. However, IPv6 ULA, which makes it very easy to gi
> On Fri, Aug 26, 2016 at 01:42:38AM +, Liu, Zhuotao wrote:
>> We hope to have an estimate about computation capacity of Tor relays. For
>> instance, how many circuits a relay can maintain when its CPU is driven to
>> about 100%? On average, how many circuits are maintained by a busy guard
>> a
Add your projects here...
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ListOfTorImplementations
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And 10 years down when 20 bits is easy, you're going
want shrinking it again, or along any interim update cycle.
This is going to upset downstream parsers such as
web indexers that expect matching fixed length / pattern.
or that have to write zero [de]fillers.
ex: [a-z2-7]{16}\.onion, we now see s
Hi Jeremy.
In regard your post 'Tor and Namecoin' here...
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2016-July/011245.html
In this thread prefixed 'Onioncat and Prop224' started and
spanning from here through now...
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2016-April/010847.html
Onionc
> Nathan Freitas writes:
>> Any thoughts on a format? torhs://clientname:authcookie@foo.onion looks
>> decent.
You probably want to coordinate with ricochet if it
doesn't already have such QR sharing feature.
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I remember a survey list of torsocks workalikes
somewhere (where?). This one's for windows and
I don't remember it. Whoever maintains that list can
add it for reference.
https://github.com/cpatulea/TorCap2
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On 6/23/16, grarpamp wrote:
> Don't forget to add around 1000+ ms latency.
Should say that on average tor's not that high, but
as to prudently setting somewhat higher timeouts,
especially for initial setup where the '+' may indeed
apply.
On 6/24/16, konst...@mail2tor.com wrote:
> Chinese users can reach Freenet again with Tor. China blocks Freenet with
> DPI for a long time.
This use case is nice to hear. Compared to other networks and
attack vectors it's not the best at, Tor has put good effort into
and is rather strong at gett
Freenet has talk on their lists of adding 100 new onioncat nodes
to tor and i2p as linked to in this thread...
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2016-June/011108.html
Is anyone working on resurrecting the onioncat
mailing list and archives?
___
On 6/22/16, konst...@mail2tor.com wrote:
> I want to be clear about a couple of things. I am not looking to defy the
> wishes of Tor developers and relay contributors. I hope to get their views
> on the matter. Should they explicitly refuse, I will look at I2P.
When I ran, donated, managed relays
On 6/22/16, konst...@mail2tor.com wrote:
> I posted steps on how to connect Freenet nodes over Onioncat and Garlicat
> for Tor/I2P. I am looking to scale it into an Opennet inside Tor with a
> lot of peers:
>
> https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/devl/2016-June/039056.html
> https://emu.freen
Thanks for your work david.
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