On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 11:11:12AM +0200, Jeff Burdges wrote:
> Ignoring the nasty political realities, there are cute mixnet tricks for
> contact tracing apps:
Sounds like a neat approach, Jeff.
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On Tue, Jan 31, 2017 at 04:53:20AM -0500, grarpamp wrote:
> [ ! "$var" ]
Thank you. That was one of the constructs why I never took
bourne shell seriously.. ;) but this looks a lot more acceptable.
In the spirit of sharing, here's one more privacy-oriented
git script:
#!/bin/sh
#
# working habi
Hi, here it is.
Style may be crude as I usually write perl.
#!/bin/sh
#
# A variant of git pull which operates over Tor and
# - figures out when 'torify' needs to be used
# - shows the changes that were made to the repository
# - before attempting to merge
# --lynX & heldensaga, 2017
Hola!
Documentation says if I do not set a CircuitStreamTimeout
manually, then some internal logic will come to play. I
presumed the timeout measurement protocol would influence
that value, so performance of circuits would adapt to the
radically different network conditions... but then I thought
=== remoTor is a whole lot smarter than last time now. ===
When remoTor is running on the same machine as tor, it can
now also monitor the hostnames the tor process is building
circuits for. You may want to do this if you have devices in
your house that you don't trust, for example. The regular To
Hi there. Here's a fine new little console-based perl script
that lets you control your Tor, monitor circuits as they
happen, issue commands like changing your identity etc, and
forward critical events to a chatroom using the PSYC protocol.
I found vidalia too heavy and arm too confusing and didn'
On Fri, Jun 10, 2016 at 04:22:04PM +0200, ban...@openmailbox.org wrote:
> In light of the technical obstacles that prevent packaging Tor
> Browser (see below), I propose operating a repository that relies on
> The Update Framework (TUF) [0]. TUF is a secure updater system
> designed to resist many
Thanks "Angel", appreciate your effort.
On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 09:29:05AM +0100, Andreas Krey wrote:
> On Wed, 25 Feb 2015 13:51:59 +0000, carlo von lynX wrote:
> ...
> > What is useful here is if I can use existing $app with existing
> > tor router and just have
On Wed, Feb 25, 2015 at 07:41:01AM +0100, Andreas Krey wrote:
> The AF_TOR listener would go away with closing the listener socket
> as well (and thus is bound to the lifetime of the process); so binding
> a hidden service to the control connection is the obvious analogy.
Yes, but as it stands AF_
> > Concerning the "ephemerality" of it, I can imagine services
> > being configured en passant by a cat >> socket from a shell
> > script or so, [..]
>
On Tue, Feb 24, 2015 at 09:05:38PM +0400, meejah wrote:
> You still need to authenticate. I do like the simplicity, but it will be
> a little mo
Let me chime in on saying that this looks to me like a great
development. I even imagine that in a couple of years most
end-to-end encrypted services on the Internet may be using
this interface, so for the sake of accessibility for future
devs, I would suggest something totally superficial:
On Sa
On Tue, Apr 15, 2014 at 02:28:17PM -0400, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 15, 2014 at 2:27 PM, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 14, 2014 at 5:32 AM, carlo von lynX
> > wrote:
> > [...]
> >> So the question is, would it be okay to catch ESPIPE in
> >
Hiya. Been around the tor dev community a bit, but
today is my first day on the legendary tor-dev
mailing list. I am asking if it makes sense to apply
a minor patch to Tor source, but first, the use case:
tor is very adamant at scrubbing the addresses that
are being connected to in the logs, but I
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