Iain Learmonth:
> Hi,
>
> On 20/03/2020 15:30, sajolida wrote:
>>> In Tails' threat model it is assumed that adversaries monitor the default
>>> bridges provided by the Tor Browser, and that our users want to avoid
>>> detection of that, so we are not interested in adding the default bridges
>>
David Fifield:
> On Fri, Mar 20, 2020 at 11:51:41AM +0100, anonym wrote:
>> tl;dr: if Tails makes it too easy to use Meek bridges, could it overload the
>> current set of Meek bridges?
>
> The default meek bridge is already overloaded, unfortunately.
Ack. Tails will then *
Hi,
tl;dr: if Tails makes it too easy to use Meek bridges, could it overload the
current set of Meek bridges?
First some background: during startup Tails can be told to start Tor Launcher
so users can e.g. configure any bridges they want. So far we have not provided
any pre-configured bridges,
George Kadianakis:
> An unfortunate exception here is v3 onion services: v3 onion services
> only tolerate skews of maximum ±3 hours [1] but in most cases even
> tighter than that. This is to assure that v3 clients and services have a
> recent and accurate view of the network. In theory all of Tor
Hi (yet) again,
It turns out there's a serious problem with Tails 3.2~alpha1 so it actually
depends on *when* you build it -- the longer you wait, the more it will diverge
from the "canonical" 3.2 that was built yesterday (in short: I forgot to freeze
which APT repo snapshot to use when buildin
anonym:
> ### ... and the checksums differ (i.e. reproduction failed).
> [...]
> sudo apt -o APT::Install-Suggests="true" \
> -o APT::Install-Recommends="true" \
> install diffoscope -t stretch-backports
It was reported to us th
anonym:
> git checkout 3.2~alpha1
Oops! That should be:
git checkout 3.2-alpha1
In other words, the "~" (tilde) should be a "-" (dash).
Sorry for the inconvenience!
Cheers!
signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Dear Tails and Tor contributors,
dear Reproducible Builds community,
We have sent out a first call [1] for testing to build Tails 3.1 reproducibly
and we have received some build reports. Thank you very much for your help! We
have since then tried t
Nick Mathewson:
> Hi!
>
> As you may know, the Tor control port assumes that if you can
> authenticate to it, you are completely trusted with respect to the Tor
> instance you have authenticated to. But there are a few programs and
> tools that filter access to the Tor control port, in an attempt
Georg Koppen:
> David Fifield:
>> On Sun, Mar 26, 2017 at 02:28:00PM +0000, anonym wrote:
>>> Tails uses the Tor Launcher shipped in Tor Browser, but it's run as a
>>> stand-alone XUL application (`firefox --app ...`), so the *web*
>>> browser isn't st
irykoon:
> Currently, the Tor Launcher is shipped with the Tor Browser Bundle and
> heavily relies on the Tor Browser for its implementation. These facts
> cause using Tor Launcher without having the Tor Browser impossible. I
> agree with the whonix core developer Patrick Schleizer that "the Tor
>
George Kadianakis:
> Hello segfault,
>
> someone linked me to this today:
>
> https://nonconformity.net/2016/06/10/onionboat-using-docker-for-easy-tor-hidden-services/
>https://github.com/jheretic/onionboat
>
> Forwarding it because of being potential relevant to your GSoC project (Tails
On 05/28/2015 03:11 PM, Yawning Angel wrote:
> Ah, this is a matter of "the feature is explained in a simple manner in
> the abbreviated changelog".
>
> What the flag actually does is:
> * Username set to 'torsocks-' PID ':' unixTime
Thanks for the clarification! This indeed sounds a lot better.
On 05/27/2015 09:19 PM, David Goulet wrote:
> - IsolatePID is a new option that will make torsocks set the SOCKS5
> username and password automatically to provide isolation on Tor side.
>
> You can use this with the -i,--isolate command added or
> TORSOCKS_ISOLATE_PID env. variable.
Perhaps
23/04/14 16:51, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 23, 2014 at 10:28 AM, anonym wrote:
>> 21/04/14 12:27, Nusenu wrote:
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> the code to blacklist heartbleed affected tor directory authority keys
>>> has been merged about a week ago [1
21/04/14 12:27, Nusenu wrote:
> Hi,
>
> the code to blacklist heartbleed affected tor directory authority keys
> has been merged about a week ago [1].
>
> Do you have an ETA on when you are going to release it (tor and TBB
> packages)?
As the release manager for the Tails 1.0 release I'm also in
07/11/12 18:41, intrigeri wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Damian Johnson wrote (06 Nov 2012 23:31:02 GMT) :
>> Runa A. Sandvik wrote (06 Nov 2012 22:44:03 GMT) :
>>> Actually, both Tails and the Tor Browser Bundle could benefit from
>>> a usability study.
>
> Thank you, Runa, for mentioning Tails here.
Seconde
01/27/2012 02:18 PM, anonym:
> I'm taking this off-list since it isn't strictly Tor-related.
Woops, seems like I forgot about this. Ah well, I hope no one minds if
we're taking this on-list. However, it might be more suitable for you to
respond to the Tails development m
Hi,
I'm taking this off-list since it isn't strictly Tor-related.
01/20/2012 11:55 AM, Adam Katz:
> Well, I myself didn't have anything specific in mind but i have some
> experience with the linux tc utility as well as with generating
> realistic background traffic. I was wondering whether I coul
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