-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On 15-03-03 10:10 AM, David Fifield wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 02, 2015 at 07:10:55PM -0800, Dan Cristian Octavian
> wrote:
>> If I understand correctly, you are arguing that my assumption
>> that bittorrent is unlikely to be blocked is faulty. I don't have
Hi Karsten,
Thanks for your feedback. I will try to address your comments inline
below. What follows is terse, and will require referring back to the
tech report.
On 14-06-16 04:40 PM, Karsten Loesing wrote:
Just one question from taking a quick look over the report: how
resilient are the two
tl;dr: We propose collecting data from exit nodes to improve the Tor
network, using differential privacy and secure multiparty computation to
do it in a privacy-sensitive manner.
Hi tor-dev,
In the ongoing effort to make Tor faster, secure and more resilient, network
data plays an important ro
On 05-Mar-14 5:19 PM, George Kadianakis wrote:
OK, let's get back to this. This subthread is blocking us from writing
a proposal for this project, so we should resolve it soon.
There is one very important performance factor that I can't figure out
how to measure well, and that's the impact on t
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Hey George,
Glad to see that guard questions are still being asked.
Some thoughts from your plots.
On 24-Feb-14 9:06 PM, George Kadianakis wrote:
>
> And because release-early-release-often, here is a graph:
> https://people.torproject.org/~asn/guar
On 2013-05-29 5:48 AM, Philipp Winter wrote:
On Tue, May 28, 2013 at 07:55:45PM -0400, Tariq Elahi wrote:
2. Can manipulate (add, delete, change) said traffic in time and data
dimensions.
The challenge is to predict what can actually be done with these three simple
atoms. Be it terminating
On 2013-05-28 4:42 PM, adrelanos wrote:
The more pluggable transports, the better.
Maybe if there are enough transports, the other side just gives up.
My interest is piqued by this statement and similar sounding ones that I
hear, and myself also think, when talking about censorship.
I suspect
