On 24 Nov 2014, at 18:54, Tom Ritter wrote:
> Attached is a document written in the specification format for one
> aspect of CA-signed .onion addresses - specifically a "What is a safe
> way to sign (or not sign) a statement using the .onion key" It
> presents a couple options - I'd love to get
On 11 Oct 2014, at 01:14, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> Will a longer version of this paper be coming out, particularly one for
> developers?
I don’t have any immediate plans to do so, as my current thinking is it would
end up being a queuing theory tutorial with the current paper appended, and
pl
I’ve just published a new paper on selecting the node selection probabilities
(consensus weights) in Tor. It takes a queuing-theory approach and shows that
what Tor used to do (distributing traffic to nodes in proportion to their
contribution to network capacity) is not the best approach.
Count
Hi Nick,
This sounds related to an old idea I presented at PETS 2006:
http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/07/13/protecting-software-distribution-with-a-cryptographic-build-process/
However there's an important difference. The proposal below is how the
directory authorities advertise "good"
Hi Chang,
Thanks for the update. BOSH certainly looks like a promising basis, though of
course it makes no attempt at obfuscation or scanning resistance.
I've added this to the design document:
https://github.com/sjmurdoch/http-transport/blob/master/design.md
I was thinking about this being a
On 11 Jun 2013, at 12:49, Steven Murdoch wrote:
> There certainly are quite a few open questions, so it would be good to start
> planning early. Implementing HTTP is a deceptively difficult project.
I've started a design document
https://github.com/sjmurdoch/http-transport/
Hi Chang,
On 29 May 2013, at 06:22, Chang Lan wrote:
> Given that ScrambleSuite is being deployed, improving protocol obfuscation
> will be my main focus. HTTP impersonation is really useful, since there are
> numerous HTTP proxy outside the censored region, while the number of bridges
> is qu
Hi Chang,
We've been discussing how to build better pluggable transports for Tor as part
of your application to Google Summer of Code. Now that you've been accepted, I
thought it would be good to bring this discussion to tor-dev so that others can
contribute.
The basic idea behind the project
Hi,
Thanks for considering this project and posting your proposal to the list.
On 1 Apr 2012, at 11:24, drake01 wrote:
> After initial shortlisting of transport protocols to be integrated with tor, I
> am left with sctp and udp.
Do you mean utp (or µtp with appropriate mail client :-))
> So if
On 12 Feb 2012, at 03:28, Nick Mathewson wrote:
>> 2. In comparison assertions, the general convention seems to be to place the
>> expected value first ("test_eq(0, functioncall(...))" rather than
>> "test_eq(functioncall(...), 0)"). I have modified the assertions not
>> following that convention,
Hi Adam,
On 20 Jan 2012, at 10:55, Adam Katz wrote:
> Well, I myself didn't have anything specific in mind but i have some
> experience with the linux tc utility as well as with generating
> realistic background traffic. I was wondering whether I could help on
> any of the existing projects or he
On 15 Jan 2012, at 20:47, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> Another thing to try: recent gccs and their toolchains have a trick where
> they can stick every function in its own segment, then tell the linker to
> dump the unused ones. I believe it's called "gc-segments" or something. I
> have no idea if it
Hi Adam,
What were you thinking about doing on this project? I'd be happy to help out
where I can.
Steven.
On 11 Jan 2012, at 20:36, Adam Katz wrote:
> Hi all
>
> I've noticed the "Simulator for slow Internet connections " project on
> the volunteer page and I have relevant experience. Who ca
Hi Jacob
On 17 Dec 2011, at 01:14, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
> A nym will expire if either the HS goes offline for longer than a
> given time
> threshold or if he explicitly requests removal of the association to that
> particualr nym. This allows dynamic reallocation of nyms and avoids nym
> squ
>From a first look at 176 it looks good. Some comments and suggestions inline:
>Terminological note: I use "client" below to mean the Tor
>instance (a client or a bridge or a relay) that initiates a TLS
>connection, and "server" to mean the Tor instance (a bridge or a
>relay) that
Hi Karsten,
On 14 Sep 2011, at 07:17, Karsten Loesing wrote:
> However, as one can see, George's script also detects quite a few false
> positives. Whenever there's a red or blue dot, the script would have
> issued a warning for a human to check. It would be neat to reduce these
> false warnings
Hi Karsten, David,
On 29 Jul 2011, at 05:00, Karsten Loesing wrote:
> Hmm, for some reason I don't get those errors (or warnings) about unused
> variables. But I think you're right in that these variables can go away.
>
> This is Steven's code, so I'd like to hear his opinion before applying
> t
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