On Tue, Apr 08, 2025 at 08:32:24AM -0400, Nick Mathewson via tor-dev wrote:
> > Is tor able to use secondary groups?
>
> Hm. In src/lib/process.setuid.c, it looks like we're only calling
> setgroups() with a single gid from the password database, not with any
> additional groups. So I don't think
On Wed, Sep 11, 2024 at 09:12:26AM -0400, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> > It would be useful to have a way of controlling access to the SOCKS port
> > so that untrusted applications running on the same device as a Tor
> > client can't use the Tor client's SOCKS proxy. This is something that
> > people au
Here are seven papers that I think our community will find interesting
from the upcoming Usenix Security conference, August 14-16.
Many of them are written by our very own university relay operators,
too. :)
--Roger
"Snowflake, a censorship circumvention system using temporary WebRTC proxies"
Ce
On Sat, Feb 10, 2024 at 12:15:05AM -0700, David Fifield wrote:
> The Snowflake paper has been conditionally accepted to Usenix Security
> and we are now working on final revisions.
Congrats! This is great!
> If possible, we'd still like confirmation of (1) whether this is a good
> characterizatio
On Mon, Feb 12, 2024 at 10:34:21AM -0800, Micah Elizabeth Scott wrote:
> The "normal process" of sending traffic through tor does not directly
> involve TCP or TCP headers, nor are there boundaries preserved which would
> correspond to TCP segments. Individual streams are encapsulated within
> mult
On Fri, Sep 02, 2022 at 12:10:35AM +, Holmes Wilson wrote:
> At some point I got an error message that indicated that it was giving up but
> that I had enough information to connect to onion addresses. I can't
> reproduce the problem now on a normal network, and I just went through the
> Tor
On Mon, Jul 25, 2022 at 03:05:16PM -0400, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> Filename: 341-better-oos.md
> Title: A better algorithm for out-of-sockets eviction
> Author: Nick Mathewson
> Created: 25 July 2022
> Status: Open
Looks good to me!
You included the one thought that I had while reading through it:
On Mon, Jul 11, 2022 at 01:05:55AM +0300, ValdikSS via tor-dev wrote:
> I'm experimenting with Tor network and wanted to build a circuit via
> unpublished relay (PublishServerDescriptor 0). To do so, I set up a relay,
> got its authority descriptor, imported it with +POSTDESCRIPTOR in the client
>
On Fri, Oct 22, 2021 at 05:38:27PM -0400, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> In this circumstance, we _could_ say that we only build circuits to G1,
> wait for them to succeed or fail, and only try G2 if we see that the
> circuits to G1 have failed completely. But that delays in the case that
> G1 is down.
>
On Fri, Oct 22, 2021 at 05:36:48PM -0400, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> Title: Randomized schedule for guard retries
> Author: Nick Mathewson
> Created: 2021-10-22
> Status: Open
Looks great. It's an obvious improvement, and I don't see any downsides.
--Roger
__
On Sun, Sep 12, 2021 at 12:17:37PM -0700, Neel Chauhan wrote:
> If a relay has the MiddleOnly flag, we do not allow it to be used for the
> following purposes:
>
> * Entry Guard
While we're trying to be exhaustive here, "Directory Guard" might be a
good addition to this list. (But trying to be
On Thu, Jul 29, 2021 at 04:46:37PM -0400, Cecylia Bocovich wrote:
> I would like to propose that we remove the CAPTCHAs from BridgeDB
> entirely, but I'd like to know whether there is research out there
> *specifically that fits with the anti-censorship context* showing that
> these CAPTCHAs are ac
On Sun, May 16, 2021 at 06:05:59PM +, sysmanager7 wrote:
> crotab -l root returns 0
> crontab -l user returns 0
Modern cron jobs don't just live in the crontab. See also your /etc/cron*
directories, which is where various packages might put cron things.
For example, in my case I have an /etc/
On Sat, May 15, 2021 at 10:04:28AM +0200, nusenu wrote:
> thanks for your reply and confirming that there is no event for this,
> so the best option is to make a simple loop and test every few seconds if the
> download is completed I guess.
What are you actually trying to do?
I ask because Tor w
On Fri, May 14, 2021 at 06:02:50PM +, sysmanager7 wrote:
> Why does a network status fetch cause a signal hup and my system to reset?
>
> x 00:00:07 [NOTICE] Received reload signal (hup). Reloading config and
> resetting internal state.
It probably isn't the networkstatus fetch that did it.
On Wed, May 05, 2021 at 06:39:11PM -0400, Holmes Wilson wrote:
> For the messaging app we???re building on Tor (not Tor browser) what???s the
> best way for us to be alerted when there are critical updates to Tor, so that
> we can prepare a new release as quickly as possible?
Signing up to the t
Hi folks! The FOCI workshop is happening again this year, organized by
our friends Eric Wustrow (Tapdance, Conjure) and Dave Levin (Geneva).
The deadline for submissions is May 13.
Cecylia, Arturo, me, Alberto from IODA, Tariq, Rob, phw, etc are all on
the program committee:
https://conferences.s
On Thu, Feb 18, 2021 at 10:59:34AM -0500, Holmes Wilson wrote:
> We???re building a Ricochet-inspired chat app, and there are situations where
> we want to create a new hidden service URL. On macOS and Linux we can send a
> SIGHUP to make Tor reload its config. What???s the best way to do this on
On Sat, Jan 16, 2021 at 01:56:02AM +0300, James wrote:
> In any case, it seems to me that if there was some high-level description of
> logic for official tor client, it would be very useful.
Hi James! Thanks for starting this discussion.
While I was looking at moria1's directory activity during
On Tue, Sep 29, 2020 at 09:08:18PM -0700, xpath...@secmail.pro wrote:
>
> Package: tor
> Version: 0.4.2.7-1~d10.buster+1
>
>
> deb.torproject.org/torproject.org/dists/buster/main/binary-amd64/Packages
>
> Package: tor
> Version: 0.4.4.5-1~d10.buster+1
>
> > deb https://deb.torproject.org/torpr
Forwarding with permission from Nick, since he sent it to only a sekrit
list, and it should go to a public list.
Onward and upward,
--Roger
- Forwarded message from Nick Mathewson -
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2020 13:52:02 -0400
From: Nick Mathewson
To: network-team
Subject: [network-team] Han
On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 12:34:17PM -0400, David Goulet wrote:
> 1) September 15th, 2020
> 0.4.4.x: Tor will start warning onion service operators and clients that
> v2 is deprecated and will be obsolete in version 0.4.6
Thanks David. "Late 2020" is also a good timeframe for To
On Fri, May 15, 2020 at 05:39:23PM +0200, Christian Hofer wrote:
> Final remarks. When I started, I didn't expect it to get this big, and
> frankly, if I had known before, I might not have even started. However,
> I learned a lot about DNS, DNSSEC, SOCKS, and Tor. So even if you
> decide not to mer
On Tue, May 05, 2020 at 08:05:36PM +0300, Eli Vakrat wrote:
> As of writing this, I can send and receive the proper RELAY_BEGIN and
> RELAY_CONNECTED to and from my exit node, but I'm not quite sure what to do
> next...
Great. Now you have a socket open, and you talk to the remote server
(e.g. web
On Mon, Oct 14, 2019 at 07:56:29AM +, Florentin Rochet wrote:
> In short, Prop 271 causes guards to
> be selected with probabilities different than their weights due to the
> way it samples many guards and then chooses primary guards from that
> sample.
Agreed. As you say, Paul identified
On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 04:52:10PM +0800, liuyihen wrote:
> Hi tor-dev@mailing list,
> I want to know is there somebody has been re-writing tor in golang? or is
> there a repo have been opened?
Check out this trac page for a list of alternative Tor implementations:
https://trac.torproject.org/proj
On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 07:53:54AM +1000, teor wrote:
> And you're right, Tor Browser can use lots more than 8 circuits, so
> I wouldn't worry about it.
>
> Do you know how much load Bitcoin places on the Tor network?
>
> If it's a lot, one good answer is to encourage users to run relays,
> or to
On Sun, Jun 02, 2019 at 10:11:46PM +1000, teor wrote:
> The relay's recent history is a bit more complicated. This fingerprint has
> only been around since October 2018.
Actually, no, it's been around since something like 2006. But it looks
like it was a small relay in recent years, until it becam
On Sun, Jun 02, 2019 at 10:43:14PM +1000, teor wrote:
> Let's deploy sbws to half the bandwidth authorities, wait 2 weeks, and
> see if exit bandwidths improve.
>
> We should measure the impact of this change using the tor-scaling
> measurement criteria. (And we should make sure it doesn't conflic
On Sun, Jun 02, 2019 at 01:30:18PM +1000, teor wrote:
> Which bandwidth authorities are limiting the consensus weight of these
> relays? Where are they located?
The one in question is in Sweden:
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/D5F2C65F4131A1468D5B67A8838A9B7ED8C049E2
It has votes o
Hi folks,
I've been talking to a longtime exit relay operator, who is in the
odd position of having a good 1gbit network connection, but only one
IP address.
He used to push an average of 500mbit on his exit relay, but then the
HSDir DoS flatlined his relay for a while (!), and now, perhaps due t
On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 09:03:40PM +0200, juanjo wrote:
> And just came to my mind reading this, that to stop these attacks we could
> implement some authentication based on Proof of Work or something like that.
> This means that to launch such an attack the attacker (client level) should
> compute
On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 08:15:16PM +0200, juanjo wrote:
> As far as I understand INTRODUCE2 cells are sent by Introduction Points
> directly to the Hidden Service. But this only happens after a Client sends
> the INTRODUCE1 cell to the Introduction Point.
>
> Now the question is, do we allow more
The submission deadline for this year's Free and Open Communications
on the Internet (FOCI) workshop is coming up in ten days.
The workshop will be co-located with Usenix Security in Santa Clara
in August.
https://www.usenix.org/conference/foci19
Here's the blurb:
"The Free and Open Communicati
On Mon, Mar 04, 2019 at 03:58:58PM -0500, Kevin Gallagher wrote:
> To generate a method of determining ground-truth, we decided to modify* the
> Firefox (FF) browser to log all of the steps of the creation of the Content
> Tree (also called the DOM tree)
>[...]
> We have moved ahead with developmen
On Sat, Nov 24, 2018 at 09:22:48PM +, Ziad Marghany wrote:
> Hi,
> I would like to participate in Tor summer of privacy, and I would like how I
> can start preparing from now on. Also, I would like to ask about if I want to
> propose a project idea, how I should present my idea and should I m
On Tue, Nov 06, 2018 at 11:38:33AM +1000, teor wrote:
> > so if we could ask the guard for
> > regular keepalives, we might be able to promise that the CPU will wake
> > once every keepalive interval, unless the guard connection's lost, in
> > which case it will wake once every 15 minutes. But kee
On Thu, Sep 27, 2018 at 06:49:37PM +, alex_y...@yahoo.ca wrote:
> It seems that your idea can basically be summarized as "implement
> circuit resumption". This is likely not inherently difficult to
> implement, except for the problem of knowing when to expire old
> sessions. If you just use the
On Wed, May 30, 2018 at 05:19:26PM -0700, Nick Mathewson wrote:
>In proposal 275, we give reasons for dropping the published-on
>field from consensus documents, to improve the performance of
>consensus diffs. We've already changed Tor (as of 0.2.9.11) to
>allow us to set those fiel
On Wed, Jul 04, 2018 at 11:20:31PM -0700, Keifer Bly wrote:
> So tor will automatically use port 80 or 443 if Those are the only ones open?
Tor will choose Guard relays at random until one of them works(*).
It looks like around 844 Guard relays are listening on port 443 right now,
out of the 1858
On Wed, Jul 04, 2018 at 03:24:08PM +0200, Jonathan Marquardt wrote:
> Oh, you're right! That's weird! Was this done on purpose or is it a bug?
It was an intentional simplification of the interface. You can read the
reasoning here:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11405#comment:7
O
On Thu, Jun 14, 2018 at 04:22:00PM +, nusenu wrote:
> imagine you have two tabs in Tor Browser:
>
> 1: torproject.org (circuit A)
> embeds some youtube.com content
>
> 2: google.com (circuit B)
> embeds some youtube.com content
>
> it will route the TCP connection via two distinct circu
On Tue, Jun 05, 2018 at 01:19:00PM +, President Camacho wrote:
> Debug or a high level of logging still present in
> /var/log/tor/log - when using obf4 (or whatever) bridges
>[...]
> The logging is crazy and consumes several MB per session.
>
> ** I have not tested this with plain Tor and/or T
On Wed, Apr 11, 2018 at 11:15:44AM +, Mike Perry wrote:
> > To be clear, the design I've been considering here is simply allowing
> > reuse between the guard hop and the final hop, when it can't be avoided. I
> > don't mean to allow the guard (or its family) to show up as all four
> > hops in t
On Sat, Mar 31, 2018 at 06:52:51AM +, Mike Perry wrote:
> The main argument for switching to two guards is that because of Tor's
> path restrictions, we're already using two guards, but we're using them
> in a suboptimal and potentially dangerous way.
>
> Tor's path restrictions enforc
On Sat, Mar 24, 2018 at 08:50:18AM -0400, Rob Jansen wrote:
> I was concerned because bastet and moria1 both stopped voting anything
>for each of two of my >2 year old relays during distinct time intervals
>yesterday. I mean there were missing votes, rather than votes of no or
>low bandwidth.
I've
On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at 10:57:13AM -0400, Rob Jansen wrote:
> Is this a feature, like some of them only respond to users in certain parts
> of the world? Or is this a bug, like the default list of bridges refers to
> old bridges that are no longer available? Or am I misunderstanding
> functional
On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 08:13:59PM -0400, Rob Jansen wrote:
> I understand that the current bandwidth measurement system is far from ideal,
> but I am wondering about how the current system works. Does each bandwidth
> authority also run a bandwidth scanner? Or is it possible that the results
>
On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 02:55:12AM +, dawuud wrote:
> Out of 9900 possible two hop tor circuits among the top 100 tor relays
> only 935 circuit builds have succeeded. This is way worse than the last
> time I sent a report 6 months ago during the Montreal tor dev meeting.
The next step here wou
On Wed, Feb 21, 2018 at 12:02:51PM -0500, Nick Mathewson wrote:
>For example, the current oldest LTS series is 0.2.5.x. The first
>stable release in that series was 0.2.5.10. The highest consensus
>method listed by 0.2.5.10 is 18. Therefore, we should currently
>consider ourselve
On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 08:31:13AM -0800, Damian Johnson wrote:
> Nope, it is deployed (if by 'deployed' you mean DocTor is presently
> performing this check). From David's reply about moria1 it sounds like
> any check of this sort may be a red herring since they experiment with
> moria1, but I'll
On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 03:09:00PM +, nusenu wrote:
> >>> NOTICE: moria1 had 756 HSDir flags in its vote but
> >>> the consensus had 2583
>
> I tried to find it on trac, I guess this is:
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/19162
Yes, correct. moria1 runs all sorts of experimental
Filename: xxx-authenticated-sendmes.txt
Title: Authenticating sendme cells to mitigate bandwidth attacks
Author: Rob Jansen, Roger Dingledine
Created: 2016-12-01
Status: open
1. Overview and Motivation
In Rob's "Sniper attack", a malicious Tor client builds a circuit,
fetch
On Tue, Jan 30, 2018 at 11:03:26AM +1100, teor wrote:
> >> Ok, so you trust your friend with your IP and onion address in this use
> >> case.
> >>
> >> But do you also trust the entire Tor network?
> >
> > I opened a ticket for the OnionShare single onion service use case:
> > https://trac.torpro
On Tue, Jan 23, 2018 at 08:53:00AM +, nusenu wrote:
> It is probably worth mentioning that
> node.moneroworld.com resolves to 32 A records,
> node.xmr.be resolve to 55 A records,
> which might be the problem here?
When you do a "host node.moneroworld.com", its answer starts with:
;; Truncated
On Fri, Jan 19, 2018 at 11:22:00PM +, iry wrote:
> However, it seems when DisableNetwork is set to 1,
> /var/run/tor/control does not exist anymore making us cannot get a
> controller from socket file.
>[...]
> I searched on Tor-trac but did not find any similar report. Therefore,
> would you p
On Sun, Dec 24, 2017 at 11:15:00AM +, nusenu wrote:
> Hi,
> in the last few days trac says occasionally "Service Unavailable" and right
> now trac times out.
>
> Since we are currently (attempting to) work on a wiki page, this is somewhat
> blocking our edits.
>
> Has trac some known issue
On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 03:57:04PM -0400, David Goulet wrote:
> 2. DESTROY cells handling
>ยท
> Within a circuitmux object, there is a "destroy cell queue" on which a DESTROY
> cell is put in for one of the circuit on the cmux. An important thing for tor
> is that when it needs to send a DESTROY, it
On Fri, Nov 10, 2017 at 09:55:28PM +, ng0 wrote:
> > and after that the two "Eight key design changes" blog posts.
Actually, there's a bonus third of those blog posts. I just added it to
https://www.torproject.org/docs/documentation.html.en#DesignDoc
> A summary of the currenty (late 2017)
On Fri, Nov 03, 2017 at 09:58:35PM +, ng0 wrote:
> our plan with the bibliography collection of GNUnet is to
> implement something similar to your/freehaven's anonbib.
Great.
See also the censorbib, for another example.
> While running the build and cache update of it from
> current git HEAD
On Wed, Aug 09, 2017 at 11:36:27PM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/9695DFC35FFEB861329B9F1AB04C46397020CE31
> https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/F2044413DAC2E02E3D6BCF4735A19BCA1DE97281
> https://atlas.torproject.org
On Thu, Aug 17, 2017 at 07:57:53PM +, iry wrote:
> Btw, Collateral Freedom seems to be one of the most effective ways to
> circumvent Internet censorship in China. Circumvention tools that
> depend on Collateral Freedom usually works fine, including meek,
> lantern, psiphon3 etc. Therefore, I s
https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/9695DFC35FFEB861329B9F1AB04C46397020CE31
https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/F2044413DAC2E02E3D6BCF4735A19BCA1DE97281
https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/BD6A829255CB08E66FBE7D3748363586E46B3810
https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/74A910646BCEEFBCD2E874FC
On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 02:08:53PM -0400, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> With proposal 227 in 0.2.6.3-alpha, we added a way for authorities to
> vote on e.g. the latest versions of the torbrowser package.
>
> It appears we aren't actually using that, though. Are we planning to
> use it in the future?
L
Hi folks,
Like I did for prop#271, I've done some fixes to prop#247 when
I did my recent reread. Here were the easy fixes:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-commits/2017-June/123303.html
And below are the parts that I shouldn't just unilaterally fix without
the authors of the proposal be
On Wed, May 17, 2017 at 02:51:48PM +0300, George Kadianakis wrote:
> Design topics
>
> * Optimize proposal parameters
> ** Optimize guardset sizes
> ** Optimize guardset lifetimes and prob distributions (minXX/maxXX/uniform?)
> ** To take informed decision
Hi folks!
I'm catching up on my proposals, and I really like guard-spec.txt.
Nicely done!
I made some fixes that I hope are straightforward:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-commits/2017-May/122942.html
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-commits/2017-May/122948.html
https://list
On Mon, May 08, 2017 at 06:00:18PM +, ni...@torproject.org wrote:
> commit d5a151a06788c28ac1c50398c6e571d484774f47
> Author: Mike Perry
> Date: Tue Feb 21 21:28:00 2017 -0500
[...]
> + - Increase the intial circuit build timeout testing frequency, to help
> + ensure that ReducedConnec
On Fri, May 05, 2017 at 04:30:52PM -0700, David Fifield wrote:
> But if it's the case that an unreachable ORPort causes descriptors not
> to be uploaded, then why do the default obfs4 bridges appear in Atlas?
Tor relays (and bridges) test their reachability by making circuits
that loop back to the
Hi Prateek, Yixin, (and please involve your other authors as you like),
(I'm including tor-dev here too so other Tor people can follow along,
and maybe even get involved in the research or the discussion.)
I looked through "Counter-RAPTOR: Safeguarding Tor Against Active
Routing Attacks":
https:/
On Mon, Apr 03, 2017 at 10:48:26AM -0400, Ian Goldberg wrote:
> The other thing to remember is that didn't we already say that
>
> facebookgbiyeqv3ebtjnlntwyvjoa2n7rvpnnaryd4a.onion
>
> and
>
> face-book-gbiy-eqv3-ebtj-nlnt-wyvj-oa2n-7rvp-nnar-yd4a.onion
>
> will mean the same thing?
Did we? I
On Sun, Mar 26, 2017 at 03:06:00PM -0400, Jesse V wrote:
> In other words, if I disable this flag and I open 127.0.0.1:8080 in the
> Tor Browser, will the browser or the tor binary attempt to connect to
> the client's 127.0.0.1:8080?
No, Tor Browser will pass the request to Tor, and Tor will try t
On Wed, Feb 22, 2017 at 03:48:56PM +0100, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) - lists
wrote:
> is the list of Tor Exit IP addresses available from Tor Control Port or
> only from https://check.torproject.org/exit-addresses via TorDNSEL ?
The list from check.tp.o is built by active measurement -- it builds a
On Sun, Feb 12, 2017 at 08:03:32PM +0530, Jaskaran Singh wrote:
> As of writing this mail, I can't access the Tor-Dev channel on OFTC
> neither using my registered nick on desktop client nor through the web
> interface. Looks like the channel has turned invite only. Would be great
> if someone coul
On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 12:40:00PM +, segfault wrote:
> But maybe it would help to separate them into groups of 4 characters,
> separated maybe by a dash, which would make them look like this:
>
>
> tbi5-tdxb-osio-tpha-wjyu-7f5p-w5tl-nvbv-fjrj-7mes-kbsn-wr2b-qbu2-t4gg.onion
Check out htt
On Sat, Dec 10, 2016 at 08:52:47PM +, Yawning Angel wrote:
> I tagged sandboxed-tor-browser 0.0.2 (0.0.1 is also tagged, but it has
> a few issues), so this is the obligatory release announcement.
>
> Official binaries should be available sometime next week, so I strongly
> suggest that people
On Wed, Nov 02, 2016 at 02:52:50PM +1100, teor wrote:
> You could also run Tor 0.2.7 or earlier, where the fingerprint is never
> checked, as long as you use the DirPort.
I don't think this is true?
1) bridge lines in your torrc do not say a DirPort, so how would the
client accidentally try to us
On Tue, Nov 01, 2016 at 06:23:55PM -0700, David Fifield wrote:
> The claim is that if tor has already cached a descriptor with
> fingerprint 3C3A6134E4B5B7D1C18AD4E86EE23FAC63866554, then it will make
> a direct connection for the purpose of making a one-hop circuit. "it's
> about one hop tunnel wh
On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 07:02:19PM -0400, Aaron Johnson wrote:
> A concern with this proposal that I have not seen mentioned is that exit
>pinning would cause the Tor path itself to leak more information about
>the intended destination. For example, a destination could (possibly
>without malicious
On Wed, Oct 05, 2016 at 04:09:15PM -0400, Philipp Winter wrote:
> Filename: 273-exit-relay-pinning.txt
> Title: Exit relay pinning for web services
Good topic! I'm glad people are still working on this one.
>Web servers support ERP by advertising it in the "Tor-Exit-Pins" HTTP
>header. T
On Mon, Jun 13, 2016 at 03:48:39PM +0300, George Kadianakis wrote:
> The main issue for me right now is that I can't recall how this helps with
> clock skewed clients, even though that was a big part of our discussion in
> Montreal.
>
> Specifically, I think that clients (and HSes) should determi
On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 04:22:48PM -0400, Zack Weinberg wrote:
> I'm working on an exitmap module that wants to feed order of 5000
> short-lived streams through each exit relay. I think this is running
> foul of some sort of upper limit (in STEM, or in Tor itself, not sure)
> on the number of stre
On Sun, May 08, 2016 at 02:04:23AM -0400, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote:
> > ??? Each client will have a cache-microdesc-consensus file with 4
> > relays in it. relay 0, 1 and 2 will always be there and the last one
> > changes each time I start the network.
Are all your relays on just a few
On Fri, May 06, 2016 at 07:13:04PM +1000, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote:
> On 6 May 2016, at 09:34, Xiaofan Li wrote:
> > ??? However, our real issue is when I restrict the path selection to 3
> > pre-determined nodes for all exit circuits, the client will not reach 100%
> > anymore and keep
On Sat, Apr 30, 2016 at 01:50:38PM -0700, Damian Johnson wrote:
> if we'll be running SoP again this year
We have no plans to run a separate "Summer of Privacy" this year. We're
back in Google Summer of Code, and we have seven fine students. That
should keep us busy I think. But that said, yes, th
On Fri, Apr 29, 2016 at 02:24:20PM +1000, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote:
> > Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
> > 0x555c02d6 in rend_client_get_random_intro_impl (
> >entry=0x555bf1bf , strict=0,
> > warnings=0)
> >at src/or/rendclient.c:1353
> > 1353 s
On Fri, Mar 25, 2016 at 01:51:53PM +0200, George Kadianakis wrote:
> In the future we should make it so that all Guards are both Stable and Fast,
> so that this stupid check does not need to happen [TODO: I should open a
> ticket for this if it doesn't already exist].
https://trac.torproject
On Sun, Mar 20, 2016 at 05:18:16PM +, Rusty Bird wrote:
> - moria1 (source 128.31.0.39vs. consensus 128.31.0.34)
> - longclaw (source 199.254.238.52 vs. consensus 199.254.238.53)
Yes, this is intentional.
In the past, this approach has caused governments who tried to censor
connections
I made some hopefully uncontroversial changes to the proposal in
git, but here are the comments that you might want to think about or
disagree with before acting on. :)
On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 01:54:50AM +1100, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote:
>Rendezvous single onion services have a few benefit
On Wed, Sep 30, 2015 at 05:27:28PM +0200, Tom van der Woerdt wrote:
> I'd like your thoughts and comments on this proposal.
>
> Tom
Hi Tom!
I am slowly turning back into a Tor developer. I like this proposal.
Here are some thoughts:
- The INTRODUCE event should happen independent of the value
On Sat, Jan 23, 2016 at 11:38:00PM +0200, s7r wrote:
> The attacker is also a Sybil (holds an unknown % of the bandwidth in
> the Tor network). By making the hidden service server build many
> circuits to his evil rendezvous points, the attacker gets a high
> probability that the hidden service ser
On Sat, Nov 07, 2015 at 12:13:45AM +, bo...@torproject.org wrote:
> commit 7a1c6fd121dd001eb999ef03ebbbed264da37026
> Author: Nicolas Vigier
> Date: Sat Nov 7 00:45:48 2015 +0100
>
> Bug 17492: Include default bridges configuration
>
> However, we exclude meek from the bridges
On Tue, Nov 03, 2015 at 09:32:26PM -0800, Jesse V wrote:
> Yep, I've run Mike Perry's code before. It's all in torflow. I was also on a
> 1 gbits link, but as I recall it wasn't that saturated so you might be able
> to get away with a 500 mbits.
I've been running it on a 100mbit link, and it see
On Tue, Oct 27, 2015 at 12:48:11PM +0100, Jens Kubieziel wrote:
> Tor has a SVN with several repositories in it. The ticket #4929 deals
> with migrating them to git
> (https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4929>). I made a
> table within the ticket to track the current status. Most of the
On Mon, Sep 28, 2015 at 03:20:47PM +0200, Jeff Burdges wrote:
> I proposed that Tor implement NameService rules using UNIX domain
> sockets, or ports, since that's how GNUNet works, but maybe Tor should
> instead launch a helper application it communicates with via stdin and
> stdout. I donno if t
On Wed, Sep 23, 2015 at 06:18:58AM +, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> Exit nodes seem a nice place to start concretizing what's meant when we say
> we want relay diversity. Comments immensely appreciated because as-is I
> don't know the answers to these questions.
Hi Virgil,
I've been pondering the
On Wed, Sep 23, 2015 at 06:26:47AM +, Yawning Angel wrote:
> On Wed, 23 Sep 2015 06:18:58 +
> Virgil Griffith wrote:
> > * Would the number of exit nodes constitute exactly 1/3 of all Tor
> > nodes? Would the total exit node bandwidth constitute 1/3 of all Tor
> > bandwidth?
>
> No. There
On Sun, Sep 13, 2015 at 11:20:11PM +0200, Tom van der Woerdt wrote:
> I agree, and this one in particular is important to some operators: by
> allowing a relay to specify itself in the family, one can just have a single
> configuration file for all relays in a family.
Maybe somebody wants to ma
On Sat, Aug 08, 2015 at 11:36:35AM +, Alec Muffett wrote:
> 5) taking a cue from World War Two cryptography, breaking this into banks of
> five characters which provide the eyeball a point upon which to rest, might
> help:
>
> a1uik-0w1gm-fq3i5-ievxd-m9ceu-27e88-g6o7p-e0rff-dw9jm-ntw
On Tue, Jul 21, 2015 at 06:31:41AM +, isis wrote:
> Thanks for the heads up! I've added unittests to BridgeDB to test how its
> parsers handle the HSDir flag (and make-believe flags like "Unicorn" for good
> measure). [0]
Great.
> Does this mean that, if I were a client using Bridges, and I
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