On 03/27/2014 03:25 PM, Helder Ribeiro wrote:
> Hi Qingping, thanks for the help! Answer below:
>
>
> On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 2:44 AM, Qingping Hou wrote:
>
>> If you decided to work on profiling hidden service, I would suggest you
>> take a
>> look at chutney
On 03/27/2014 03:36 PM, Christopher Baines wrote:
> On 27/03/14 19:25, Helder Ribeiro wrote:
>> Great! Do you know what kinds of things are most useful to measure first?
>> Is it more useful at this point to:
>> 1. measure time spent on functions within a process, to see if there's
>> anything taki
If you decided to work on profiling hidden service, I would suggest you take a
look at chutney[1] and shadow[2]. Torperf is not under active maintenance
anymore and it can be easily replaced by chutney.
A fully automated hidden service profiling tool will be very handy. As the
community is current
Hi Punit,
Unit test for individual functions are written in C (see src/test in
Tor repo). Chutney + Stem is probably more suitable for integration
test.
--
QP
On Sun 09 Mar 2014 03:48:03 PM EDT, Punit wrote:
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA1
>
> Hello,
>
> I am Punit Singh, and
On Thu 20 Feb 2014 05:41:53 PM EST, grarpamp wrote:
> Would be nice to be able to fetch and print out the HS descriptor from the
> controller. I posted/ticketed a rough proposed command operation spec
> for that maybe 6mo ago that we had some mutual review/interest/code
> on this list. Don't know i
On Tue 11 Feb 2014 01:53:54 PM EST, George Kadianakis wrote:
> Qingping Hou writes:
>> 5. Hazards
>>
>> a) How to design the scheme for mapping a random number to the same node
>>between client and server?
>>
>> This will be trivia if it&
On 02/12/2014 01:20 AM, grarpamp wrote:
> Note that Phantom allows both the service and the
> client to choose the number of hops under their
> respective control. I believe this applies in part to
> I2P as well. There is thus no force to accept
> any globally enforced maximum hopcount there.
> Thi
On 02/12/2014 05:06 PM, Zack Weinberg wrote:
> Do Tor clients actually have identity keys, as relays do? Perhaps not
> *persistent* identity keys, and even if they did, an adversarial client
> could just rotate them whenever it felt like, but still I'd like to know
> if Fc is even a thing. I trie
On 02/11/2014 04:51 PM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 11:55:05AM -0500, Qingping Hou wrote:
>> (0) client fetches descriptor for a hidden service.
>> (1) client connects to introduction point.
>> (2) since client and HS are connected via introdu
On 02/11/2014 01:53 PM, George Kadianakis wrote:
>> 2. Negotiate random numbers between two nodes [RAND_NEGO]
>>
>> H(a) here means digest of message a.
>>
>> (1) client generates a random number R_a and sends the digest H(R_a) to
>> HS
>> (2) HS remembers H(R_a), generates a random nu
Hi all,
We are a university research group and following is a proposal for possible
optimization on Tor's rendezvous circuit design. It's not written as a formal
Tor proposal yet because I want to have a discussion with the community first,
get some feedbacks and make sure it does not introduce ne
BTW, we might be able reduce number of hops to 4 or even 3 if entry
guard is not required. Because entry guard is basically not negotiable.
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On 11/29/2013 08:27 PM, Nick Mathewson wrote:> Hi, all!
>
> 36 -- RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS1
>
> Sent from introduction point to rendezvous point;
> attempts to join introduction point's circuit to
> client's circuit. Discussed in [JOIN_REND]
>
> 37 --
On Tue 03 Sep 2013 01:25:55 PM EDT, George Kadianakis wrote:
> I'm nitpicking a bit below just to give you a taste of some of the
> things that you should think about when you start editing torspec.
>
Thanks for all the feedback!
>>
>> # Asynchronous events for hs descriptors:
>>
>> HS_DESC SP RE
On 09/03/2013 10:02 AM, Damian Johnson wrote:
> Hi Qingping. I'll largely leave this to Nick, but here's a ticket
> concerning this exact topic...
>
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8891
>
Thanks for pointing me to the ticket :)
> Personally I'm a little interested in it since
On 09/02/2013 05:01 AM, grarpamp wrote:
> On 9/2/13, grarpamp wrote:
>>> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8510
>
>> 'fetchfail' or 'fetchok'
>
>> These two status need extended fields
>> fetchfail
>> fetchok
>
> 'fromcache' also needs
>
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Hi all,
I am currently working on ticket 8510:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8510
However, I notice that in the control spec, there is no event related to
hidden service descriptors. Should we add a new event in the spec?
For example, we can have something like the following:
H
On 08/31/2013 09:28 AM, George Kadianakis wrote:
> We all know that Hidden Services need lots of attention. The crypto
> needs to improve (upgrade keys to other cryptosystems, fix hybrid
> encryption, etc.) and the protocol needs to improve (make hidden
> services scale, oblivious transfer for HS
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