Re: [tor-dev] PQ crypto updates

2017-09-02 Thread Peter Schwabe
Yawning Angel wrote: Hi Yawning, hi all, > Note, I'm not hating on Farfalle, I need to look at it more, and the > last time I gave serious thought to this question in a Tor context was > back around the time Prop 261 was being drafted. > > The answer to this from my point of view is "not slow

Re: [tor-dev] PQ crypto updates

2017-08-22 Thread Peter Schwabe
Yawning Angel wrote: Hi Yawning, hi all, > Ultimately none of this matters because Prop. 261 is dead in the > water. Assuming people want the new cell crypto to be both fragile and > to resist tagging attacks, Farfalle may be a better choice, assuming > there's a Keccak-p parameterization such

Re: [tor-dev] [proposal] Post-Quantum Secure Hybrid Handshake Based on NewHope

2016-05-25 Thread Peter Schwabe
Zhenfei Zhang wrote: > Hi Peter, Hi Zhenfei, hi all, > We are working on a constant-time implementation of NTRU. We expect to > release the source code this summer. That's great news! Any thoughts on the license? Can you place it into public domain? > However, as far as I know, timing attacks

Re: [tor-dev] [proposal] Post-Quantum Secure Hybrid Handshake Based on NewHope

2016-05-24 Thread Peter Schwabe
ban...@openmailbox.org wrote: Hi all, > Some great developments in lattice-based crypto. DJB just released a paper > on NTRU Prime: Let me just also throw in my 2 cents: As far as I can tell, there are now 5 approaches to post-quantum key exchange that are discussed (or at least have surfaced)

Re: [tor-dev] [proposal] Post-Quantum Secure Hybrid Handshake Based on NewHope

2016-05-20 Thread Peter Schwabe
lukep wrote: Hi lukep, hi all, > You may want to get more drinks in - there's a new eprint on IACR archive > that's claiming a faster generation of 'a' using the 5q / 16 bit trick: > https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/467.pdf I know, I have been in contact with the authors and I think that we will wa

Re: [tor-dev] [proposal] Post-Quantum Secure Hybrid Handshake Based on NewHope

2016-05-12 Thread Peter Schwabe
Yawning Angel wrote: Hi Yawning, Thanks for the more detailed description; I think I understand now what you're saying. I also agree that the cost is small (only some extra symmetric stuff happening). I don't like the use of AES-GCM as an authenticated-encryption algorithm, but as far as I und

Re: [tor-dev] [proposal] Post-Quantum Secure Hybrid Handshake Based on NewHope

2016-05-08 Thread Peter Schwabe
isis wrote: Hi all, > Nope, it would still not work to fix the timing attack. Although, luckily, we > already wrote some constant time code for my sorting-network idea, and then, > with some coffee, Peter made it faster. (Give us something stronger to drink, > and we'll probably come up with a

Re: [tor-dev] [proposal] Post-Quantum Secure Hybrid Handshake Based on NewHope

2016-05-08 Thread Peter Schwabe
isis wrote: Hi all, > I haven't given it much thought yet, but the performance cost to making > polynomial initialisation constant time may not actually be so bad. My naïve, > I'm-still-finishing-my-breakfast solution would be to oversample (say 2048 > uint16_ts) from SHAKE-128, shove them into