On Thu, May 14, 2020 at 12:46:42AM +1000, teor wrote:
> Hi Nick,
>
> > On 14 May 2020, at 00:09, David Goulet wrote:
> >
> > On 11 May (16:47:53), Nick Mathewson wrote:
> >
> >> ```
> >> Filename: 320-tap-out-again.md
> >> Title: Removing TAP usage from v2 onion services
> >> Author: Nick Math
On Tue, Feb 04, 2020 at 04:15:23PM -0500, David Goulet wrote:
> On 04 Feb (19:03:38), juanjo wrote:
>
[snip]
>
> And the reason for private nodes is probably because this way you eliminate
> noise from other tor traffic so _anything_ connecting back to your ORPort is
> related to the onion servic
Hi Nick,
This is awesome. We at NRL discussed a very similar concept starting
about a year and half ago after going over the PIR-Tor paper in a
reading group. We've left it mostly backburnered since then, though I
thought we had talked about it a few times to people at the Tor Dev
meetings.
Anywa
re several reasons the name changed, if it is helpful to share
> more about that lmk.
>
> >
> > Is this a sensible way of prioritising things?
> >
> > On 26 Apr 2018, at 16:42, Paul Syverson > <mailto:paul.syver...@nrl.navy.mil>> wrote:
> >
> >&g
On Wed, Apr 25, 2018 at 05:18:32PM -0700, Damian Johnson wrote:
> Hi all, teor suggested engaging the list with #25918 so here we go!
> Ticket #25918 has a couple goals...
>
> 1. Provide a tracking ticket for the rename effort.
> 2. Come to a consensus on if we should move forward with "onion
> se
On Wed, Mar 23, 2016 at 12:33:15PM -0400, Adam Shostack wrote:
> Nice!
>
> Random thought: rather than "unreachable from Tor", "unreachable when
> using the internet safely." This is really about people wanting
> security, and these companies not wanting to grapple with what their
> customers wan
Hi George,
Crap. I missed this buried at the bottom of Nick's general
announcement last Thursday about reviewing Tor Proposals (which was
in my big backlog of threads to get to, and I did not notice its specific
relevance to guards and onion services till I saw here).
When is the next one of thes
On Wed, Jan 06, 2016 at 10:21:31PM +1100, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote:
>
> > On 6 Jan 2016, at 21:26, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> >
> > Tom, to ensure I understand you clearly, is your argument that
> > relays that export only unencrypted shouldn't get the Exit Flag
> > because insecure/unecrypte
Hi Virgil,
On Thu, Dec 24, 2015 at 06:08:51AM +, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> I've been looking into simple graph-theoretic metrics for Roster to
> quantifying Tor's susceptibility to traffic correlation attacks, mostly
> using BGPStream, https://bgpstream.caida.org/ .
>
> All of the academic lit
On Mon, Nov 02, 2015 at 09:05:26PM +0200, George Kadianakis wrote:
> Hello,
>
> as you might know, the IETF recently decided to formally recognize .onion
> names
> as special-use domain names [0].
>
> This means that normal browsers like Chrome and Firefox can now
> handle onion domains in a spe
On Wed, Sep 30, 2015 at 05:12:53PM +0200, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote:
> Hi All,
>
> Do you know a use case which needs Single Onion Services and NAT punching?
>
> We’re wondering if there are mobile or desktop applications /
> services that would use a single onion service for the performance
On Wed, Sep 23, 2015 at 11:34:54AM +, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> > because "the right distribution" is a function of which adversary you're
> > considering, and once you consider k adversaries at once, no single
> > distribution will be optimal for all of them.)
>
I agree with Roger that ideall
On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 02:25:16PM -0400, Paul Syverson wrote:
> If onion keys could be themselves linked in a PGP-like web of trust,
Gah! Too many already used technical terms. By "onion key" I meant
here private authentication key associated with the .onion address not
pr
Hi Alec, Seth, Peter, Mike, all,
I'm enthused about the progress Alec reported about the Onion RFC for
certs for onion addresses in recent tor-dev posts and elsewhere.
I wanted to further discuss a design for binding .onion addresses with
registered (route-insecure) addresses. This ties in to in-
Hi Leeroy,
On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 08:09:13AM -0400, l.m wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I'm curious what analysis has been done against a gateway adversary.
> In particular dealing with the effectiveness of entry guards against
> such an adversary. There's a part of me that thinks it doesn't work at
> all for
Hi Alec,
On Sat, Aug 08, 2015 at 11:36:35AM +, Alec Muffett wrote:
> Hi All,
>
> Having Beer with Donncha, Yan and others in Berlin a few days ago,
> discussion moved to Onion-Address Human Factors.
>
> Summary points:
>
> 1) it’s all very well to go an mine something like
> “facebookcoreww
On Tue, Aug 04, 2015 at 12:39:50AM +1000, teor wrote:
>
> > On 4 Aug 2015, at 00:32 , Ian Goldberg wrote:
> >
> > Nice work! A couple of minor comments:
> >
> > On Mon, Aug 03, 2015 at 05:03:38PM +0300, George Kadianakis wrote:
> >> A shared random document requires 50% + 1 authority signatu
On Fri, May 22, 2015 at 04:33:39PM -0600, Kenneth Freeman wrote:
>
>
> On 05/22/2015 04:27 PM, l.m wrote:
> >
> > So...wouldn't the torified traffic sound like...white noise? I can
> > fall asleep to that.
>
> In and of itself a sufficient condition.
>
Safe data gathering nonwithstanding, it
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 03:18:06PM -0400, A. Johnson wrote:
> > I think new users might not appreciate the difference between similarly
> > named terms and then choose the wrong one to their detriment. It seems
> > better that they should later learn of shared technology that's not clear
> > fr
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 01:05:16PM -0400, A. Johnson wrote:
> > The problem with "fast", "direct", and maybe "bare" is that they
> > describe some property we're trying to provide with these. Like
> > hidden, I think the chance that they will evolve or be applied in some
> > way for which these ter
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 08:51:59AM -0400, A. Johnson wrote:
> >>
> >> Why not simply "onion service"?
> >
> > Because we have already started using "onion service" to cover what we
> > previously called "hidden services”
>
> Right.
>
> > My latest thinking about the terminology is that we shoul
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 12:04:24AM +0200, Moritz Bartl wrote:
> Thanks George!
>
> On 04/09/2015 08:58 PM, George Kadianakis wrote:
> > - We really really need a better name for this feature. I decided to
> > go with "Direct Onion Services" which is the one [...]
>
> Why not simply "onion servi
Hi George,
Thanks for taking up the challenge I raised to you of coming up with
use cases where leaking popularity is a threat.
Perhaps others have suggested that we don't worry about popularity at
all, but for the arguments I had been trying to make these are straw
men. I don't suggest that we c
On Fri, Mar 27, 2015 at 06:47:19PM -0700, Damian Johnson wrote:
> > Did some searching this morning and found another I like almost just
> > as well, and might be more fitting: Erebus.
>
> Actually, I'm warming up to Nyx too, which has the advantage of being
> shorter. Surprisingly it too doesn't
Only glanced through it, but it looks amazingly comprehensive for a 32
page paper (plus references). I haven't read it yet, but a glance
suggests it could be a go-to reference to give to people wanting to
get up to speed on Tor and its current research questions. Congrats!
aloha,
Paul
On Fri, Mar
Hi Gautham,
On Thu, Feb 19, 2015 at 03:53:00PM +0530, Gautham Nekkanti wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I am Gautham (icodemachine from IRC and TRAC). I am willing to
> participate in GSoC 2015. I was brainstorming for project ideas and thought
> of this useful project idea.
>
> I want to put forward a proj
On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 01:36:35PM -0500, A. Johnson wrote:
[snip]
>
> >>> I have heard someone (forget who) propose that 'Dark Web' be
> >>> dropped in favour of CipherSpace which could include all of these
> >>> privacy perserving protocols, leaving terms like "OnionSpace" for
> >>> Tor, "I2P
On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 11:52:37AM +, str4d wrote:
>
> Erik de Castro Lopo wrote:
> > A. Johnson wrote:
> >
> >> Several of us [0] working on hidden services have been talking
> >> about adopting better terminology.
> >
> > In general, I am in agreement with this, but I wonder if now might
On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 01:41:35PM -0500, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 01:13:26PM -0500, A. Johnson wrote:
> > 1. '''onion service''' should be preferred to refer to what is now
> > called a "hidden service". If other flavors of onion services develop in
> > the future, t
On Sun, Feb 08, 2015 at 11:49:57PM +0200, s7r wrote:
[snip]
> >
> > On this topic you might also enjoy the paper "Sleeping dogs lie on
> > a bed of onions but wake when mixed" by Paul Syverson:
> > https://petsymposium.org/2011/papers/hotpets11-final10Syverso
On Sun, Nov 09, 2014 at 07:25:39PM +, Fears No One wrote:
> I have some news to report, along with more data.
>
> The August DoS attempt appears to have been a crawler bot after all. An
> old friend came forward after reading tor-dev and we laughed about his
> dumb crawler bot vs my dumb "must
Hi all,
NRL is effectively partnered with the Tor Project Inc. for the
SponsorR efforts. Our (NRL's) tasking is largely overlapping and
somewhat complementary to that of TPI. As such I thought it would be
good to mention the basics of what we are working on to better inform
and coordinate the pla
On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 06:43:10AM +1100, teor wrote:
>
> On 11 Oct 2014, at 23:00 , tor-dev-requ...@lists.torproject.org wrote:
>
> > Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2014 14:33:52 +0100
> > From: Steven Murdoch
> >
> > I?ve just published a new paper on selecting the node selection
> > probabilities (consen
Sorry. I thought I was seeing the full message on my screen but
didn't notice there were a few more lines. I'll check out your thesis.
-Paul
On Fri, Sep 19, 2014 at 09:25:02AM -0400, Paul Syverson wrote:
> Hi Otto,
>
> This looks cool and complements nicely research that I h
Hi Otto,
This looks cool and complements nicely research that I have
back-burnered for a long time now around what middle relays can
observe from guards and how this is affected by the number of guards,
amongst other things. The plans to move to a single guard are indeed
well underway, so your wor
On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 08:31:05AM -0400, Ian Goldberg wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 01:44:36PM +0300, George Kadianakis wrote:
> > Hey Nick,
> >
> > this mail is about the schemes we were discussing during the dev
> > meeting on how to protect HSes against guard discovery attacks (#9001).
> >
On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 05:43:10PM -0500, Zack Weinberg wrote:
> On 02/11/2014 11:53 PM, Paul Syverson wrote:
> > The biggest concern is that no matter how you handle the commitment
> > and the size of the flexible set, you make it fairly easy for a HS
> > simply following th
Hi all,
Apologies for top-posting. I'm making a brief comment about general
concerns in this design. Additional apologies if something already
said obviates my comments. I have purposely not looked at most of the
developments in HS design changes because they are _too_ interesting
to me and I have
stated.
aloha,
Paul
On Wed, Nov 20, 2013 at 07:03:37PM +0100, Esfandiar Mohammadi wrote:
> Am 20.11.2013 um 18:19 schrieb Paul Syverson :
>
> > These authors found a
> > vulnerability in that protocol, improved on it, and proved their
> > protocol secure.
>
> A
On Wed, Nov 20, 2013 at 08:36:30AM -0800, Watson Ladd wrote:
> Is it just me, or is this protocol MQV with the client generating a
> fake long term key?
Well yeah sort of, but the "details" are crucial. In "Improving
efficiency and simplicity of Tor circuit establishment and hidden
services" (avai
On Wed, Oct 09, 2013 at 03:02:47PM +0100, Christopher Baines wrote:
> On 09/10/13 11:41, Paul Syverson wrote:
> >>>> These two changes combined should help with the two goals. Reliability
> >>>> is improved by having multiple OP's providing the service, and
On Wed, Oct 09, 2013 at 09:58:07AM +0100, Christopher Baines wrote:
> On 09/10/13 01:16, Matthew Finkel wrote:
> >> Then comes the second problem, following the above, the introduction
> >> point would then disconnect from any other connected OP using the same
> >> public key (unsure why as a reas
On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 03:45:31AM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 09:19:32AM +0200, Paul-Olivier Dehaye wrote:
> > The short summary of the weakness of Tor here:
> > - We would like the whole protocol to be mixing (to an observer, the
> > probability of exiting at any node
On Wed, Apr 17, 2013 at 12:46:17AM +, Matthew Finkel wrote:
>
> 4) Who do you trust? With this remote-proxy, it really depends on what
> you're looking to gain from using the Tor network. Are you looking for a
> censorship circumvention tool? Then you probably don't want to use a
> remote-prox
On Tue, Apr 16, 2013 at 07:35:45PM +, adrelanos wrote:
> > I think that having a web server to handle Tor requests would defeat the
> > purpose of obfuscation because the server's IP address would be public and
> > censors could easily block any connections to it rendering it useless.
>
> It
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 05:22:55PM -0700, Damian Johnson wrote:
>
> * Sumana and Rob from Wikimedia
>
> Unsurprisingly Wikipedia occasionally has issues with spammers using
> Tor. We talked about some possible options, such as requiring accounts
> for Tor users to edit with a sort of proof of wor
Minor typo noted.
-Paul
On Fri, Sep 07, 2012 at 12:09:30PM -0400, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> Hi, all!
>
> Last year, I announced a tenative schedule for 0.2.3.x. We didn't
> stick to it, and things have gone a little pear-shaped with getting
> 0.2.3.x stabilized, but I think with a few tweaks we ca
On Thu, Aug 09, 2012 at 08:29:25AM +0200, Karsten Loesing wrote:
> Hi Mike,
>
> On 8/8/12 8:13 PM, Mike Perry wrote:
> >
> > Since HotPETS doesn't count as "publishing" perhaps this should be
> > listed as a tech report:
> > http://fscked.org/talks/TorFlow-HotPETS-final.pdf
>
> I agree. If it c
On Wed, Aug 08, 2012 at 06:19:16PM +, Robert Ransom wrote:
> On 8/8/12, SiNA Rabbani wrote:
> > I have been running private bridges for my VIP contacts for a long time.
> > I use PublishServerDescriptor 0 to keep my bridges private.
> >
> > Is it possible to also run a private Exit node?
>
>
nezis [2]
> and others. However, a close look at figure 5(a) of [3] shows it to be
> empirically correct[4].
>
> Recently, Paul Syverson and I got into a disagreement over the
> effectiveness of crypto-tagging attacks such as [5].
I just wanted to let you know that I'm neither ignor
Dave is correct. This attack will not work for the reaseons he said.
Just a minor quibble: Dave is not quite correct about the origins of
'onion routing'. We called it that because of a data structure that we
used in the original system (and shared by our second generation
system and also ZKS Free
On Wed, Nov 02, 2011 at 01:19:52PM -0500, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 2, 2011 at 11:45 AM, Robert Ransom wrote:
> > On 2011-11-02, Watson Ladd wrote:
> >> Dear All,
> >[...omitted..]
> >
> >> Right now Tor encrypts the streams of data from a client to a OR with
> >> AES-CTR and no integrity
This is just a headsup message that the discussion and progress on
this topic is great, but should not be viewed as the whole picture for
a circuit protocol.
I was just talking to Ian and noting that, despite calling it
"culminating" in their paper, the fourth protocol that Lasse and I did
was not
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