d we start
> sampling randomly till we hit a guard that satisfies us, or should we sample
> directly from the correct set (e.g. only from the set of IPv6 guards). I'm
> still not sure about this.
I'm much more in favor of sampling in general, rather than trying to
hit the specific thing. I
might appear more frequently than we would like.
I'm not sure we can do this - a lot of the filters will be based on
backwards compatibility with the existing Tor configuration options,
things such as ReachableAddresses - I'm not sure how to reasonably
enumerate all possibilities in a
entuality. However, it seems you don't like that idea - there seems
to be some dissent among the Tor devs which approach is best for this situation.
Cheers
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the guards in the EntryNodes list. This is for people who want to hardcode
> their guard. It's used a lot by people currently.
Yeah. Is the guard picked randomly from this list, or using something
more complicated?
> > - UseEntryGuardsAsDirGuards
> > I don't understand exactl
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Sounds good to me, Iván and company?
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t; network evolves, but might also cause unpredictable behaviors if we suddently
> get too many guards or too many of them disappear.
>
> I don't have a strong opinion here.
Me neither. I think a percentage is a good starting point - it feels
easier to tweak in different ways.
> It seems to me that the value 20 here could get reduced to something like 5 or
> even less. Of course 5 is also an arbitrary value and to actually find out the
> "best" number here we should test the algorithm ourselves in various network
> types.
Arbitrarily changed to 5. =)
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Great, lots of good comments. I'll respond in depth once the fever has
left my brain! =D
On Thu, Mar 03, 2016 at 03:15:26PM +0100, George Kadianakis wrote:
> Ola Bini writes:
>
> > Hi,
>
> Here are some more comments to the latest version of the proposal, as seen
>
t if we are in STATE_RETRY_ONLY and
> we manage to connect to a non-primary guard, we hang up the connection, and go
> back into STATE_PRIMARY_GUARDS.
Maybe. Should we do this only in STATE_RETRY_ONLY or for the UTOPIC
and DYSTOPIC states as well?
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&
t thoughts.
- We might be able to start implementing this in tor proper tomorrow
- or wednesday hopefully.
From now, the team will take over most communication.
Cheers
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Hi again,
Here is the newest version of the algorithm:
https://gist.github.com/olabini/343da01de8e01491bf5c
The biggest change is the addition of the state
STATE_TRY_ONLY_TRIED. Once it enters this state, it will never exit it
again.
Cheers
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ns to dystopic
conditions. IF we are in dystopic conditions, then this heuristic will
make it more likely we will faster find a guard to connect to.
> > ALGO_CHOOSE_ENTRY_GUARD_END:
> > If circuit is set up correctly, let algorithm know
> > Algorithm marks t
Hi,
Here is the next version of the algorithm - put it in a gist to make
it easier to look at:
https://gist.github.com/olabini/343da01de8e01491bf5c
Cheers
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Ah, good point. So, it seems N_PRIMARY_GUARDS is an argument to the algorithm.
Cheers
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first circuit
> * Time till we manage to recover from flaky network
>
> and I can also think of security related stats like:
>
> * Number of guards we tried before succeeding first circuit
> * Number of guards we exposed ourselves to after time t
Haven't thought abou
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