>
> (Aside: I think this thread is unrelated enough to tor-dev at this point
> that I'm going to make this my last reply.)
>
That's too bad - I was only answering questions you posed yourself. Happy
to continue debating off list. Still, I think discussion of features that
could increase usage are
>
> Regardless of the moral arguments you put forward, which I will not
> comment on, it seems like this idea would never be implemented because
> none of the Tor developers have a desire to implement such a dangerous
> feature.
>
I can argue that the lack of it is also dangerous, actually. It amo
>
> > As I recall, you are also the person who raised the idea of coin
> > tinting or a similar concept in the bitcoin community to identify
> > "suspect" coins and that backfired spectacularly on you.
>
> Yes, that is the person. Though the term is known as 'taint'. One of
> many discussions from
>
> This isn't about 'acceptable usage of Tor', this is necessary compromise
> to limit exit operators' exposure to ISP harrassment.
>
Even if we accept your premise that no exit operator cares about internet
abuse, it's still the same thing. ISP's define what is acceptable usage of
their internet
>
> One of my first concerns would be that this would build in a very easy
> way for a government (probably the US government) to compel Tor to add
> in a line of code that says "If it's this hidden service key, block
> access."
>
And people who run Tor could easily take it out again, what with it
Hello,
As we know, hidden services can be useful for all kinds of legitimate
things (Pond's usage is particularly interesting), however they do also
sometimes get used by botnets and other problematic things.
Tor provides exit policies to let exit relay operators restrict traffic
they consider to
