g/projects/tor/ticket/5749
[7] https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/HEAD:/src/or/config.c
[8] http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/magazine/laura-poitras-snowden.html
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Maxim Kammerer
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tor-d
https://github.com/grugq/portal
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] is
rather scarce on details of what actually goes on inside the proxy,
however.
[1] http://www.i2p2.de/socks.html
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Maxim Kammerer
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hosts.
Not strongly related to the proposal, but authenticated (autokey) NTP
is not really secure.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ntp-network-time-security
http://www.innovationslab.net/~brian/NTP/autokey-analysis.pdf
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Maxim Kammerer
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discussed to death (and
I was not aware): why not go with something established like P-521 that
would apparently be a drop-in replacement with OpenSSL? Are the benefits
really worth it?
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Maxim Kammerer
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ace), resulting in an offer to
confirm the eepSite public key (which is shown) to be added to
hosts.txt (or just the current session).
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