On Thu, Jul 29, 2021 at 04:46:37PM -0400, Cecylia Bocovich wrote:
> Hi everyone,
>
> We've been working on improving the usability of BridgeDB lately, and
> our CAPTCHAs have been a constant thorny problem. They are not
> accessible for blind users [0]. We've gotten many complaints over the
> year
Hi Holmes,
On Fri, Jul 23, 2021 at 05:46:47PM -0400, Holmes Wilson wrote:
> Hi everyone,
>
> A few disjointed questions that have come up recently in our work with Tor:
>
> 1. PERFORMANCE ON M1 / ARM64
>
> We just got a report from a user that the tor binary for Mac was using much
> more CPU o
Hello!
During the Hackweek, I spent a little time hacking support of
UDP-over-Tor. The goal of the project was supporting UDP onion services,
and leaving Exit support for another time.
I didn't have a working implementation by the end of the week, but life
moves one.
This is an initial mail abou
On Thu, Aug 20, 2020 at 11:30:09AM -0700, Philipp Winter wrote:
> We recently started experimenting with the Salmon social bridge
> distributor:
> https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/bridgedb/-/issues/31873
>
> We are now exploring the possibility of storing some Salmon-related data
On Mon, Aug 10, 2020 at 09:00:32AM -0400, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 29, 2020 at 1:15 AM Matthew Finkel wrote:
> >
> > Hello everyone,
>
> Hi, Matt!
>
> There's a part of this that I'm still trying to figure out:
>
> > The safest usage of
On Thu, Jul 30, 2020 at 01:18:33PM +0300, George Kadianakis wrote:
> Matthew Finkel writes:
>
> > Hello everyone,
> >
>
> Hello hello!
>
> These are all good questions and they become more and more important as
> the onionspace grows and more use cases appear.
Hello everyone,
Onion service version two (v2) key pairs were used for more purposes
than simply facilitating the establishment of rendezvous circuits, in
particular third-party applications used this key in numerous ways.
Similarly, version three (v3) onion service keys are being re-used in
simil
On Fri, Jul 17, 2020 at 02:56:08PM +0100, Andrew Clausen wrote:
> Hi everyone,
>
Hi,
Thanks for your interest in this.
> I propose distributing the Tor developer keys inside the Fedora package
> distribution-gpg-keys.[1] This would give most Linux users a trustworthy
> chain of signatures from
On Sun, Jun 14, 2020 at 08:19:13PM +0200, nusenu wrote:
> Georg Koppen:
> > nusenu:
> >> Hi,
> >>
> >> since Mozilla did tests [0] on DOH [1] in Firefox I was wondering
> >> if Torbrowser developers have put any thought into that as well?
> >
> > Actually, the study did not get done yet. The start
On Fri, Oct 11, 2019 at 6:30 AM Tom Ritter wrote:
>
> On Thu, 10 Oct 2019 at 10:37, George Kadianakis wrote:
> > So are you suggesting that we can still do SOCKS error codes? But as
> > David said, some of the errors we care about are after the descriptor
> > fetch, so how would we do those?
>
>
On Wed, Oct 2, 2019 at 5:46 PM Nick Mathewson wrote:
>
> On Fri, Sep 27, 2019 at 1:35 PM Tom Ritter wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, 5 Aug 2019 at 18:33, Tom Ritter wrote:
> > >
> > > On Tue, 2 Jul 2019 at 09:23, Tom Ritter wrote:
> > > > Or... something else? Very interested in what David/asn think sin
On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:50 AM Hans-Christoph Steiner
wrote:
>
>
> Hey all,
>
> I'm currently working on tor for Android as part of a Guardian Project
> project. One key goal is making a shareable, reproducible build process
> for the tor daemon for Android. Then this would be published to
> M
On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 7:51 AM Hans-Christoph Steiner
wrote:
>
>
>
> teor:
> > Hi,
> >
> >> On 12 Sep 2019, at 20:50, Hans-Christoph Steiner
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> Then that work
> >> will hopefully be extended into sharing tor between apps, e.g. letting
> >> Briar, Tor Browser, etc share the to
On Tue, May 7, 2019 at 5:35 PM juanjo wrote:
> Tor relays are public and easily blocked by IP. To connect to Tor
> network users where Tor is censored have to use bridges and even PTs.
> But, what happens on the exit? Many websites block Tor IPs so using it
> to access "clearweb" is not possible.
Attached is a script for building meek-server. I used this for
completing #29171. The newest version of Go is only available in Sid and
Buster[0], so this script creates a Buster environment and installs the
dependencies.
The script assumes debootstrap and sudo are installed (and you have
necessar
On Tue, Jul 24, 2018 at 01:37:10AM +, Matthew Finkel wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 16, 2018 at 01:32:19AM +0000, Matthew Finkel wrote:
> > Hi Everyone,
> >
> > We'll discuss this at a meeting next Tuesday, 24 July at 15:00 UTC in
> > #tor-meeting on OTFC.
>
&g
On Mon, Jul 16, 2018 at 01:32:19AM +, Matthew Finkel wrote:
> Hi Everyone,
>
> We'll discuss this at a meeting next Tuesday, 24 July at 15:00 UTC in
> #tor-meeting on OTFC.
Reminder!
>
> There was some discussion on the tbb-dev@ mailing list, but this meeting
&
Hi Everyone,
We'll discuss this at a meeting next Tuesday, 24 July at 15:00 UTC in
#tor-meeting on OTFC.
There was some discussion on the tbb-dev@ mailing list, but this meeting
will cover the details, implementation plan, roadmap, timeline, etc
(maybe we won't have enough time for all of these t
On Fri, Jul 13, 2018 at 11:02:53AM -0700, Keifer Bly wrote:
> Hello,
>
> So I am wondering, are there plans to develop a version of tor browser that
> will run on Chromebooks? I though that might be a good idea as those are
> getting somewhat popular in the US. Thanks.
Yes! And, not only are they
On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 08:21:38PM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 08:13:59PM -0400, Rob Jansen wrote:
> > I understand that the current bandwidth measurement system is far from
> > ideal, but I am wondering about how the current system works. Does each
> > bandwidth auth
On Sun, Oct 22, 2017 at 09:56:59PM +0530, Ankit Rathore wrote:
> Hello,
> I am currently working on a project where I require the resource which was
> originally present at this link
>
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/sponsors/SponsorD/June2011
>
> The contents of this page are no
On Sun, Nov 27, 2016 at 01:07:02PM -0500, chelsea komlo wrote:
> Hi,
>
> >> Yes, the onion-service-version and the version of the descriptor that tor
> >> publishes are now tightly coupled, comparing v2 and v3. However, this may
> >> not always be the case and, indeed, was not the case previously
On Sun, Nov 27, 2016 at 11:24:11AM -0500, David Goulet wrote:
> On 27 Nov (00:44:39), Matthew Finkel wrote:
> > On Sat, Nov 26, 2016 at 09:25:44PM +1100, teor wrote:
> > > > On 26 Nov. 2016, at 02:25, David Goulet wrote:
> > > >
> > > >>>
>
On Thu, Nov 24, 2016 at 08:14:55PM -0500, cko...@thoughtworks.com wrote:
> Hi,
>
> >
> > 2) It also means we create an option that will get deprecated once v2 is
> >phased out so we are adding a "temporary" option for users to "keep
> >creating v2 addresses" but then will be useless and we
On Sat, Nov 26, 2016 at 09:25:44PM +1100, teor wrote:
>
> > On 26 Nov. 2016, at 02:25, David Goulet wrote:
> >
> >>>
> >>> 2) It also means we create an option that will get deprecated once v2 is
> >>> phased out so we are adding a "temporary" option for users to "keep
> >>> creating v2 addre
On Sat, Jul 11, 2015 at 03:50:16PM +0300, s7r wrote:
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA256
>
> I find it better to add a new consensus flag called 'Vanguard' which
> will be assigned to relays with lower requirements than the 'Guard'
> (less bandwidth, just the Stable flag). We will
On Wed, Jun 03, 2015 at 01:33:11AM +1000, teor wrote:
>
> > Date: Fri, 29 May 2015 14:24:33 +0300
> > From: s7r
> >
> > Signed PGP part
> > Hi Matt,
> >
> > Nice to hear there's ongoing work for this proposal.
> >
> > I also see the NotDir flag as useful for migration, because for quite
> > so
.txt
Title: All relays are directory servers
Author: Matthew Finkel
Created: 29-Jul-2014
Status: Open
Target: 0.2.7.x
Overview:
This proposal aims at simplying how users learn about the relays
in the Tor network. This is accomplished by changing the default
functionality of relays
ctory servers
Author: Matthew Finkel
Created: 29-Jul-2014
Status: Open
Target: 0.2.7.x
Overview:
This proposal aims at simplying how users interact directly with
the Tor network by turning all relays into directory servers (also
known as directory caches), too. Currently an operator ha
Hi all,
I'd like some opinions. Currently authorities give relays the V2Dir if
they are useful directory servers. Clients don't actually care about
this flag in any way, but it's a useful visual indicator. With proposal
237 (All relays are directory servers) and #12538 as its implementation,
the c
On Tue, Nov 18, 2014 at 10:53:30PM -0500, grarpamp wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 18, 2014 at 12:55 PM, George Kadianakis
> wrote:
> > plans for any Tor modifications we want to do (for example, trusting
> > self-signed certs signed by the HS identity key seem like a generally
> > good idea).
>
> If the HS
On Tue, Nov 18, 2014 at 05:55:29PM +, George Kadianakis wrote:
> Tom Ritter writes:
>
> > There's been a spirited debate on irc, so I thought I would try and
> > capture my thoughts in long form. I think it's important to look at
> > the long-term goals rather than how to get there, so that's
On Mon, Nov 17, 2014 at 05:48:26PM -0500, grarpamp wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 14, 2014 at 12:08 PM, Tom Ritter wrote:
> > a) Eliminate self-signed certificate errors when browsing https:// on
> > an onion site
>
> No, please don't. Browsers throw cert errors for good reasons.
> If you don't want to dea
On Sun, Nov 09, 2014 at 07:25:39PM +, Fears No One wrote:
> In other news, the same guy runs a bot that records uptimes for various
> onions, and he gave me output related to up/down times for doxbin,
> Cloud9, and Silk Road 2.0.
>
> NOTE: Time zone is GMT+9:30 on all of these. He used sed to
On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 03:13:29PM -0400, py...@riseup.net wrote:
> Hello,
>
> I am would like to begin working on a distributed application
> sitting on top of TOR and am wondering if there are any existing
> guides providing a good starting point for this type of development.
> If not, what othe
On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 11:26:50AM +, Matthew Finkel wrote:
> On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 01:01:52PM +0200, Karsten Loesing wrote:
> > On 24/10/14 01:53, isis wrote:
> > > isis transcribed 6.6K bytes:
> > >>* The hashed fingerprint (as is the case for bridges in o
On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 01:01:52PM +0200, Karsten Loesing wrote:
> On 24/10/14 01:53, isis wrote:
> > isis transcribed 6.6K bytes:
> >>* The hashed fingerprint (as is the case for bridges in onionoo)
> >>* The hashed ip:port
> >
> > Actually, my apologies, I was quite tired when I wrote th
y comments/suggestions (the overall
proposal is unchanged). If not, I'll start implementing this
within the next few days.
Thanks!
Matt
[0] https://git.torproject.org/user/sysrqb/torspec.git
>From cc4e5afb83b7a5d34dc570f1f79a74e7ca000bf7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Finkel
Date: T
On Sat, Oct 04, 2014 at 06:27:22PM -0700, M. C. McGrath wrote:
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA256
>
> Hi,
> These were a few possibilities for visualization that we came up with
> at the OTF summit (I can send the full notes from that discussion if
> everyone is okay with it):
> -
On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 02:17:28PM -0400, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 13, 2014 at 11:53 AM, Matthew Finkel
> wrote:
> > Hi All,
> >
> > Below is the proposal for #12538 [0], with some changes after George's
> > review and some other revisions.
>
On Wed, Aug 13, 2014 at 03:47:43PM +0300, George Kadianakis wrote:
> Hello friends :)
>
> This is a post to discuss how Tor should treat its entry guards when
> its network goes down. This is part of ticket #12595 [0] which aims to
> design better interfaces and data structures for entry guards.
>
On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 02:05:49PM +0300, George Kadianakis wrote:
> One missing piece of rend-spec-ng.txt [0] is a section on how HSes
> should pick their Introduction Points (IPs). There are three main
> questions here:
> - How many IPs should an HS have?
> - Which relays can be IPs?
> - What's t
: xxx-directory-servers-for-all.txt
Title: All relays are directory servers
Author: Matthew Finkel
Created: 29-Jul-2014
Status:
Target: 0.2.6.x
Overview:
This proposal aims at removing part of the distinction between the
relay and the directory server. Currently operators have the options
of bein
On Thu, Jul 31, 2014 at 02:29:13PM +0300, George Kadianakis wrote:
> Matthew Finkel writes:
>
> > Hi All,
> >
> > Below is a draft proposal for making all relays also be directory
> > servers (by default). It's almost ready for a number, but it can use
> &g
On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 09:38:55AM -0400, Mark Smith wrote:
> On 7/29/14, 9:31 AM, Matthew Finkel wrote:
> >Did you start working on this again? Having something like this
> >is actually really important. It would be awesome to get this
> >functionality in Tor Browser again
On Tue, Jul 08, 2014 at 11:16:12PM +0200, Arlo Breault wrote:
> I started working on something like this a little while ago,
> https://github.com/arlolra/bulb
>
> but didn't manage to stir up much interest.
>
> I'm happy to continue with it if anyone wants to collaborate.
>
> Arlo
Hey Arlo,
Di
e.
Thanks!
===
Filename: directory-servers-for-all.txt
Title: All routers are directory servers
Author: Matthew Finkel
Created: 29-Jul-2014
Status: Draft
Target: 0.2.6.x
Overview:
(In practice we refer to the servers that mirror directory documents
as directory servers, directory mi
On Sat, Jul 26, 2014 at 09:42:04PM -0700, Ken Keys wrote:
> On 7/26/2014 1:54 AM, Matthew Finkel wrote:
> > We also do try to discard fake requests, isis actually added another
> > yesterday!
> Could you elaborate on this? I don't understand what you mean my fake
> reques
On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 07:32:42AM +, isis wrote:
> Lunar transcribed 2.1K bytes:
> > isis:
> > > > PS: why are we still shipping obfs2 bridges?!
> > >
> > >
> > > tl;dr: Because we have them.
> >
> > The protocol is known to be broken and fingerprintable. That's something
> > we know. Not u
On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 04:16:44PM +, harmony wrote:
> Nima Fatemi :
> >
> > I think "bridges" works just fine for "vanilla bridges" and I want to
> > take the opportunity to +1 Philipp's idea on looking for keywords
> > instead of commands, regardless of how they're phrased.
>
> Help desk fr
On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 04:01:34PM -0400, Israel Leiva wrote:
> Hi.
>
> I support what Philipp and Nima say about keywords. The given commands
> surely look simple for technical users, but what about non-technical users?
> If the purpose of the distributor is to give info, and you're already
> fil
On Sun, Jul 20, 2014 at 06:07:03PM -0400, Philipp Winter wrote:
> On Sun, Jul 20, 2014 at 06:52:44PM +0000, Matthew Finkel wrote:
> > So, the questions I am posing to those in the community who has an
> > opinion about this: What do you think? What problems do you currently
>
On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 10:19:40PM +, isis wrote:
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA512
>
> Yawning Angel transcribed 2.9K bytes:
> > On Fri, 25 Jul 2014 13:25:31 +0200
> > Lunar wrote:
> >
> > > isis:
> > > > > We can't just make Tor Browser stop accepting obfs2 because some
>
Hi everyone,
A short time ago BridgeDB learned how to accept some more commands via
email[0]. Below is an example of the current help/overview autoresponse
email[1] that users receive (in English, we do have translations).
These commands may not be optimal, so we'd love to be given feedback on
th
On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 05:21:26PM +0100, Philipp Winter wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 08:30:12AM -0500, Ian Goldberg wrote:
> > On Sat, Jan 18, 2014 at 01:40:43AM +, Matthew Finkel wrote:
> > > obfs3 is supposed to be fairly difficult to detect because entropy
> > &
On Wed, Jan 22, 2014 at 02:17:34AM +, Matthew Finkel wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 05:21:26PM +0100, Philipp Winter wrote:
> > On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 08:30:12AM -0500, Ian Goldberg wrote:
> > > On Sat, Jan 18, 2014 at 01:40:43AM +0000, Matthew Finkel wrote:
> > >
Hi everyone,
Over the last few days there were a few questions raised regarding the
current status of public bridges and their pluggable transports. I've
written a script to gather some data points using the sanitized bridge
descriptors and extrainfo documents provided on metrics.tp.o. If anyone
i
sports... fewer people using them.
>
>
> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 12:54 PM, Matthew Finkel
> wrote:
> > On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 09:16:20PM -0600, Jim Rucker wrote:
> >> Are there any projects in Tor being worked in to combat data correlation?
> >> For instance, rela
On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 09:16:20PM -0600, Jim Rucker wrote:
> Are there any projects in Tor being worked in to combat data correlation?
> For instance, relays the send/recv constant data rates continuously -
> capping data rates and padding partial or non-packets with random data to
> maintain the
On Thu, Dec 19, 2013 at 02:52:03AM +0100, Nicolas Vigier wrote:
> On Tue, 17 Dec 2013, isis agora lovecruft wrote:
>
> > Nicolas Vigier transcribed 1.4K bytes:
Hi Nicolas!
Thanks again for following up on this!
> >
> > Just in case you haven't seen it, Lunar made a wiki page which has quite a
On Thu, Nov 07, 2013 at 03:33:23PM -0500, m...@rndm.de wrote:
> >
> > If there isn't anything wrong, I will release it to the regular globe
> > url.
>
> I deployed the latest globe version on http://globe.rndm.de/ .
>
> The jshint code quality check was replaced with latest eslint version
> th
On Wed, Oct 30, 2013 at 08:11:16AM +, Matthew Finkel wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 08:49:46PM +, George Kadianakis wrote:
...
> > It seems to me that an IP+Client adversary is always able to find the
> > number and status of HS-nodes. The proposed ways to fix this is to a
On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 08:49:46PM +, George Kadianakis wrote:
> Christopher Baines writes:
>
> > On 28/10/13 13:19, Matthew Finkel wrote:
> >> This is a proposal I wrote to implement scalable hidden services. It's
> >> by no means finished (there are some
On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 07:40:12PM +, Christopher Baines wrote:
> On 28/10/13 13:19, Matthew Finkel wrote:
> > This is a proposal I wrote to implement scalable hidden services. It's
> > by no means finished (there are some slight inconsistencies which I will
> > be
On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 12:53:35PM -0400, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 9:19 AM, Matthew Finkel
> wrote:
> > Hi everyone,
> >
> > This is a proposal I wrote to implement scalable hidden services. It's
> > by no means finished (there are some
Hi everyone,
This is a proposal I wrote to implement scalable hidden services. It's
by no means finished (there are some slight inconsistencies which I will
be correcting later today or tomorrow) but I want to make it public in
the meantime. I'm also working on some additional security measures th
Hey George,
Thanks for sending this to the list.
On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 02:18:01AM +0100, George Kadianakis wrote:
> 3.3 What are other anonymous publishing protocols doing here? I2P seems
> to be weak here too, according to Grothoff's recent paper.
Do you have a link? I found [0] but wan
On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 10:22:29PM +0100, Christopher Baines wrote:
> On 09/10/13 18:05, Matthew Finkel wrote:
> >>>> These two changes combined should help with the two goals. Reliability
> >>>> is improved by having multiple OP's providing the service, and
On Wed, Oct 09, 2013 at 09:58:07AM +0100, Christopher Baines wrote:
> On 09/10/13 01:16, Matthew Finkel wrote:
> >> Then comes the second problem, following the above, the introduction
> >> point would then disconnect from any other connected OP using the same
> >&g
Hi Christopher,
It's great that you started thinking about a design (and the potential
obstacles). I will try not to reiterate what Nick already said, though.
On Tue, Oct 08, 2013 at 06:52:39AM +0100, Christopher Baines wrote:
> I have been looking at doing some work on Tor as part of my degree,
On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 05:39:30PM +0300, George Kadianakis wrote:
> Here is another HS proposal draft.
>
> Inlining:
>
> Filename: xxx-hs-id-keys-migration.txt
> Title: Migration to ed25519 HS identity keys and privacy-preserving directory
> documents
> Author: George Kadianakis
> Created: 13 Se
On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 08:28:21PM +0200, Karsten Loesing wrote:
> Hi everyone,
>
> some of you may already know our new approach to estimating daily Tor users:
>
> https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html#userstats
>
> This new approach is in beta since April, and I'm quite happy with it.
> I
Greetings Sir,
On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 05:31:33PM +0300, George Kadianakis wrote:
> Greetz,
>
> I'm posting the draft of a proposal that specifies how to hide HS
> descriptors and addresses from the hidden service directories.
>
> This proposal is supposed to go along with the proposal that spec
On Thu, Jun 27, 2013 at 05:39:08PM -0400, David Goulet wrote:
>
>
> Matthew Finkel:
> > On Thu, Jun 27, 2013 at 03:11:23PM -0400, David Goulet wrote:
> >> Ian Goldberg:
> >>> Are non-blocking sockets, select/poll/etc. (especially at connect()
> >>&
On Thu, Jun 27, 2013 at 03:11:23PM -0400, David Goulet wrote:
> Ian Goldberg:
> > Are non-blocking sockets, select/poll/etc. (especially at connect()
> > time), and optimistic data on the to-do list?
>
> Yes! Good point I should have put the todo list. So yes, non block socket
> support.
>
> For
On Mon, Mar 11, 2013 at 2:40 AM, Leo Unglaub wrote:
>
> I also have named my tool. It's called "Gibbs". I also created a github
> repository where i will push my local git repository the next couple of
> days. I also want to release some screenshots soon so you can see what is
> comming.
>
> http
On Sun, Jun 09, 2013 at 04:52:45PM -0400, David Goulet wrote:
> Hi everyone,
>
Hi David!
> I'm posting here the small design document I've made for the Torsocks locking
> mechanism.
>
> I'm looking for reviews, comments, improvements, ... well anything useful! :).
> (Even English mistakes since
On Fri, Jun 07, 2013 at 02:23:55AM -0400, grarpamp wrote:
> >> This has the side effect of promoting good onion upkeep.
>
> Which people might be loathe to do given the recent paper
> about deanon hidden services seeming to be relatively doable.
> At least until those issues are solved...
>
> > o
On Fri, May 17, 2013 at 06:23:28AM -0700, George Kadianakis wrote:
> Greetings,
>
> I'm supposed to write a Tor proposal for the migration of the
> long-term identity keys of Hidden Services. When I began writing the
> proposal, I realized that some of my choices might not be appreciated by
> Hidd
On Fri, May 17, 2013 at 03:44:27PM +0200, Jeroen Massar wrote:
> On 2013-05-17 15:23 , George Kadianakis wrote:
> [..]
> > That is, when we change the identity keys of a Hidden Service, its
> > onion also changes (since the onion is the truncated hash of its
> > public key). This will be quite prob
On Mon, May 20, 2013 at 12:25:03AM -0400, Tom Ritter wrote:
> On 17 May 2013 09:23, George Kadianakis wrote:
>
> > There are basically two ways to do this:
> >
>
> A third comes to mind, somewhat similar to Mike's.
>
> If we believe that 1024 RSA is not broken *now* (or at the very least, if
>
On Thu, Jun 06, 2013 at 12:48:42PM +, Matthew Finkel wrote:
> On Mon, May 20, 2013 at 12:11:37AM -0400, Griffin Boyce wrote:
> > Matthew Finkel wrote:
> Unless, are you talking about running I2P and Tor on the same
> computer/network and being able use the same naming schem
On Mon, May 20, 2013 at 12:11:37AM -0400, Griffin Boyce wrote:
> Matthew Finkel wrote:
>
> > So I think we should make some terms clear (just for the sake of
> > clarity). We have, I guess, three different naming-system ideas
> > floating here: petnames, (disti
On Tue, May 28, 2013 at 02:33:40PM -0400, Tom Ritter wrote:
> I have another idea. (Not "another" in the sense of "do this instead", but
> "another" in the sense of "maybe do this additionally").
>
> Can a country block SSH? Surely state-sponsored network operations take
> place over SSH, so I s
On Fri, May 24, 2013 at 12:32:20AM -0400, Jon Smithe wrote:
> Hi,
>
> > As for the deanonymization attack, I think it is pretty novel in that it
> > uses a custom traffic signature to make the attack from
> > http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/hs-attack06.pdf more reliable, but
> > otherwise that
I liked the new subject, so I'm sticking with it. :)
On Sun, May 19, 2013 at 04:37:22AM -0700, George Kadianakis wrote:
> > adrelanos:
> >> George Kadianakis:
> >> I don't know if the petname system is an completely orthogonal issue or
> >> if it could be considered when you decide this one.
> >>
On Tue, May 14, 2013 at 09:42:47AM +0200, Karsten Loesing wrote:
> On 5/14/13 8:08 AM, Matthew Finkel wrote:
> > Hi all,
> >
> > Over the last few weeks I've been working with George and Aaron on
> > updating BridgeDB's code with respect to how it handles plug
Hi all,
Over the last few weeks I've been working with George and Aaron on
updating BridgeDB's code with respect to how it handles pluggable
transports. I've made some decent progress, but there are some
questions that I'd like to ask (because I'm not sure I should be the
one making the decision).
On Sun, May 05, 2013 at 04:18:56PM +0300, George Kadianakis wrote:
> tor-admin writes:
>
> > On Sunday 05 May 2013 14:50:51 George Kadianakis wrote:
> >> It would be interesting to learn which ports they currently whitelist,
> >> except from the usual HTTP/HTTPS.
> >>
> >> I also wonder if they
On Sun, Apr 28, 2013 at 04:39:55PM -0300, Ulises Cuñé wrote:
> I send you a new Security Report.
>
> Regards,
> U
>
>
> 2013/4/27 Nick Mathewson
>
> > On Sat, Apr 27, 2013 at 7:16 PM, Ulises Cuñé wrote:
> > > I want colaborate with Tor project.
> > >
> > > I send a document of analys source c
On Tue, Apr 16, 2013 at 10:49:38PM -0400, Paul Syverson wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 17, 2013 at 12:46:17AM +0000, Matthew Finkel wrote:
> >
> > 4) Who do you trust? With this remote-proxy, it really depends on what
> > you're looking to gain from using the Tor netw
On Wed, Apr 17, 2013 at 12:04:52AM +0530, mahesh wrote:
> Hi, I am a third year undergraduate student of Information Technology at
> PICT, Pune, India. I'm dying to contribute to tor community as I use it
> a lot. There's an opportunity for me in GSOC-2013. I read tor's idea
> page and came to k
On Tue, Apr 16, 2013 at 04:11:37PM -0400, Paul Syverson wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 16, 2013 at 07:35:45PM +, adrelanos wrote:
> > > I think that having a web server to handle Tor requests would defeat the
> > > purpose of obfuscation because the server's IP address would be public and
> > > censors
On Jan 29, 2013 10:11 PM, "grarpamp" wrote:
>
> > Thus, I am declaring the following tar.gz to be the final RC for 1.3:
>
> Though I don't actually use it on FreeBSD RELENG_4 anymore,
> it doesn't compile there. If someone has old routers or something
> based on that they should speak up.
Do you
On 12/02/2012 01:27 AM, grarpamp wrote:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torsocks.git/shortlog/refs/heads/dlerror
It seems to fix the issues on my Ubuntu system. I could use some testing
>
>> https://code.google.com/p/torsocks/issues/detail?id=3#c47
>
> These compile on freebsd 8.x:
> ee
On 11/25/2012 10:13 AM, Sean Robinson wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 4, 2012 at 4:03 PM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
>>
>> I've pushed my first branch to fix the dlopen bugs:
>>
>> https://gitweb.torproject.org/torsocks.git/shortlog/refs/heads/dlerror
>>
>> It seems to fix the issues on my Ubuntu system. I cou
On 11/25/2012 10:13 AM, Sean Robinson wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 4, 2012 at 4:03 PM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
>>
>> I've pushed my first branch to fix the dlopen bugs:
>>
>> https://gitweb.torproject.org/torsocks.git/shortlog/refs/heads/dlerror
>>
>> It seems to fix the issues on my Ubuntu system. I cou
On Sun, Aug 26, 2012 at 5:35 PM, julian wrote:
> 13 Aug 00:28 Matthew Finkel:
>> 4) Given 3), is there a reason Tor is not at least an optional
>> RDEPEND for torbrowser via a USE flag (or another way)?
>
> There are no optional runtime-only dependencies in gentoo, this cou
On Sun, Aug 12, 2012 at 1:21 PM, Alessandro Di Federico
wrote:
> Hi, I'm trying to put up an ebuild for the Tor Browser Bundle for
> Gentoo. As you may know an ebuild is a script which automates the build
> of a certain application. We already have something in Portage [2] (the
> official ebuild
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