Your email client, I presume, is rewriting links to first go through
e.as207960.net.
I'm curious why that is.
Matt
On 9/25/24 04:23, Q Misell via tor-dev wrote:
Moin,
I've posted my thoughts on a potential solution to this in GitLab:
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/torspe
users?
I'm not sure what the best way forward is here, but I'm hoping that
actual Tor developers might have a useful opinion on the matter, or
at least be able to point me in the right direction.
Thanks for your time,
Cheers,
Matt
___
tor-de
ng the basics, but I'll point you
towards how flashflow configures and launches a tor client in case you
will find it more useful than confusing[5]. Remember, this requires the
standard tor binary to exist on the host.
Matt
[0]: https://github.com/torpyorg/torpy/
[1]: https://stem.torproject
r for free access to uncensored
information, and doing big port scanning the Internet or irresponsibly
scraping webpages causes exit operators trouble.
Rent a cheap VPS or something. Bonus: it will be way faster, support all
transport protocols, AND you don't have to deal with proxying over T
Hi all
I polished up the FlashFlow proposal based on the feedback provided by
Teor, Nick, and Mike. I converted it to markdown, and pasted the new
text at the bottom of this email. The updated proposal is also in my
fork of torspec is on gitlab [0]; the branch with the changes is
"flashflow-revisi
On 6/2/20 3:01 PM, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 23, 2020 at 2:48 PM Matt Traudt wrote:
>>
>
> Hi! I've got some comments on the FlashFlow proposal; I'll start with
> the ones that I think are most important, so that we can try to get
> them out
riod independently given only inputs
present in the consensus (e.g. the shared random value). I believe the
under-specified section *5.2 Measurement Scheduling* is the primary
source of your concern here.
>> On 24 Apr 2020, at 04:48, Matt Traudt wrote:
>>
>> ...
>>
>>
Filename: xxx-flashflow.txt
Title: FlashFlow: A Secure Speed Test for Tor (Parent Proposal)
Author: Matthew Traudt, Aaron Johnson, Rob Jansen, Mike Perry
Created: 23 April 2020
Status: Draft
1. Introduction
FlashFlow is a new distributed bandwidth measurement system for Tor that
consists of a sin
easy for you to "bookmark" your
v3 onion addresses without actually using the bookmark functionality of
Tor Browser. So what if people know v3xyz.onion exists; they can't
connect to it!
I'll admit it's a rather weak use-case: if you can remember/save the
client auth
no public Tor testnet, but you can easily run your own on your
own machine with Chutney[0] (easy, but less powerful) or Shadow[1]
(harder, but very powerful). Chutney is more than enough for what it
sounds like you want to do.
I did not mean to suggest curious users should not poke around code
**sa
On 7/29/19 08:08, Matt Traudt wrote:
> On 7/29/19 07:44, clive.jen...@tutanota.com wrote:
>> I built tor from source and am running it as a relay (not exit node) and
>> also as a directory server. It is my understanding that after a while I
>> should experience V2 hidden serv
that receives the
> announcements)?
>
Onion services will use your relay to store descriptors once it has the
HSDir flag. You can't determine which onion services or how many onion
services are using you without code changes.
Doing this is considered being a malic
e sbws-admins github team
- Removed myself from the default CC list on trac
- #28559 to revoke my push power to gitweb.tpo/sbws.git
You should feel free to CC me on tickets or grab my attention for
specific issues.
Matt
signature.asc
Description: OpenP
;
Why wouldn't it be just as easy for censors to identify the small set of
registered domains that Tor relays use and block TLS connections that
involve them?
I don't see how changing the domain a relay uses from aa.foo.com to
bb.foo.com helps. The ce
hen you connect to OFTC, you will only need to do
/msg nickserv identify YourPassword YourNick
Matt
On 8/20/18 12:54, KUSHAL BORKAR wrote:
> Greetings All,
> This is to inform you that, I, Kushal Borkar, IRC
> Alias 'Lashuk', am unable to access t
results from someone running torflow.
I fear sbws is doomed to die the death of the new bandwidth scanners
before it if we don't start seriously verifying sbws is "good" or if I
personally slowly stop working/coordinating work on it.
Thanks
Matt
[0]: https://trac.torproject.org/pro
; that much work and it is a great protection for many users.
>
Then put forward the time and effort to maintain it.
Matt
___
tor-dev mailing list
tor-dev@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
/download/download.html.en
You're looking for the "Expert Bundle," and the current direct download
link is
https://www.torproject.org/dist/torbrowser/7.5.5/tor-win32-0.3.2.10.zip
Unzip it and inside you'll find tor.exe. This can be configured the
usual way to run a r
On May 30, 2018 6:28:55 PM PDT, abhinav chowdary
wrote:
>Iam in or out
You've sent 5 nonsense emails to many hundreds of people today. Please stop.
Please learn how mailing lists work.
It seems like you've successfully subscribed to this list. Please enjoy
responsibly.
Matt_
Next meeting is 10 May 2018 at 1200 UTC for 30 minutes... maybe. While
we should find a standard time, next week is a special case for pastly
and teor.
Notes are https://pad.riseup.net/p/ioYq89yZSx1t and copy/pasted below.
-
Thi
Next meeting is 3 May 2018 at 0930 UTC.
http://meetbot.debian.net/tor-meeting/2018/tor-meeting.2018-04-26-09.59.html
https://pad.riseup.net/p/6292yqhUOuHC (copy/pasted below)
Simple Bandwidth Scanner Meeting 25 April 2018
==
This pad:
https://pad.rise
tHub other than I like GitHub's issue tracking,
milestones, Travis CI integration, and readthedocs integration. So it
might move ... or it might not.
Cheers
Matt
[0]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torflow.git
[1]: https://github.com/pastly/simple-bw-scanner/milestone/3
[2]: https://sbws.re
Next meeting is scheduled 26 April 2018 at 2200 UTC in #tor-meeting,
**BUT** we are probably going to look into finding a time that works
better across three halves of the globe.
Pad is here, and is copy/pasted below. https://pad.riseup.net/p/BenwGdgpz0uS
Meeting IRC log
http://meetbot.debian.net
On 4/13/18 12:26, Damian Johnson wrote:
>> https://github.com/pastly/simple-bw-scanner/blob/master/docs/source/specification.rst
>> (ask Pastly for access)
>
> Hi Matt, why is this repo read restricted? I was idly curious to see
> the code of sbws and was surprised it's
obtaining torflow data recently.
Matt
On 4/12/18 21:50, Tom Ritter wrote:
> I'm happy to run a sbws alongside my torflow. It will let us compare bw
> numbers apples to apples too. My only difficulty is being unable to
> spend significant time to diagnose why it doesn't work, if it
See below for the pad notes. Next meeting is scheduled 19 April 2018 at
2200 UTC in #tor-meeting. (This one was held in #tor-dev, but we should
use meetbot).
-
Simple Bandwidth Scanner meeting 12 April 2018
Updates/Status messages
pastly:
What's on my plate? <- doesn'
d being told I'm wrong about this step being
necessary.
3. Find all the places that hint at consensus weight being directly
comparable to bandwidth (such as [3]) and change the wording.
Matt
[0]: https://paste.debian.net/1015409/
[1]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/
see the list of the fastest Tor relays[0] in the real
network. IPredator has likely done some heavy kernel tweaking, but the
remaining relays are all rather close to 700 Mbps.
Thank you for your interest in Tor.
Matt
[0]: https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#toprelays
ty to graph many things you
might be interested in. And if you will be interested in simulating
large networks, it should do so better than Chutney.
Hoping I don't sound too much like a fanboy.
Matt
[1]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/chutney.git
_
Isabela / Core Tor
I'd love to help. I use 99% Linux and will be able help with everything
you listed.
I'm pastly on trac and oftc.
Matt
isab...@riseup.net:
>
> What we are asking volunteers:
>
> * Validate release signature/checksum
>
> * Does it build with
Noel David Torres Taño:
> Hi all
>
> What would happen if a Tor node changes behaviour and uses four or five
> relay steps instead of three?
>
Hi Noel,
Does https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#ChoosePathLength answer your
question?
Matt
signature.asc
Description:
>>
>> COMMANDs: (combine COMMANDs to specify multiple options simultaneously)
>> get bridgesRequest vanilla bridges.
>> get transport [TYPE] Request a Pluggable Transport by TYPE.
>> get help Displays this message.
>> get keyGet a copy of Bridge
n the directory
consensus). This line will be treated akin to the ContactInfo field.
An address may not contain a colon, comma, or nonprintable ASCII.
--
Matt Pagan
m...@pagan.io
PGP: 0xE9284418E360583C
signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
___
Please see the image file for what I have in mind here.
http://oi62.tinypic.com/10x80ok.jpg
I hope this tool, when completed, can help reduce the barrier for
people seeking to set up hidden services.
I anticipate this tool being able to connect to a running tor and write
to that tor's torrc fil
On Fri, 07 Feb 2014 09:54:35 +0400
meejah wrote:
> What I would suggest:
>
> 1. change ConnectDialog so that it always uses not-yet-looked-up
>QHostAddresses (perhaps only if a proxy is enabled). This still
> won't help Tor, since they're sending UDP.
>
> 2. change Cert.cpp so it doesn't ha
On Thu, 30 Jan 2014 22:01:18 +
Matt wrote:
Here is one of the Mumble developers' take on the issue:
> I don't know where @zanethomas's post went, but I just want to clarify
> what needs to be done here, and what's wrong.
>
> By default, Qt's proxy
On Fri, 31 Jan 2014 22:17:54 +
Andrew F wrote:
> Matt, have you gotten any response?
>
On IRC, Yawning provided me some useful recommendations for further
investigation. Any progress I make on this issue will be slow-going
though, and getting a fresh set of eyes on this issue would h
If you're into C++ or Qt, we could use some help. Mumble[0] is a free
software VoIP application that various people have had success
using with Tor. One problem using Mumble with Tor is that Mumble
doesn't abide by the native proxy settings when looking up Mumble
servers[1]. When using a Tor router
what should be better.
>
Thanks for setting up the development calendar. I expect that is going to help
me keep better track of scheduled meetings. I only found out about the calendar
on IRC yesterday when you mentioned it, Was there an email I missed w
I wanted to give another update as to the status of patching Mumble to support
native Tor proxification.
Mumble uses its own connection protocol to make external connections, a protocol
which is defined in a 30-page pdf file which comprises most of Mumble's
documentation (the comments in the code
On Mon, 30 Sep 2013 19:13:37 -0700
Tom Lowenthal wrote:
> Today, at 1100 Pacific, we spent more than 90 minutes discussing
> [Sponsor F][]. Here's the summary.
>
> **READ THIS**: The next Sponsor F meeting will be held in a mere two
> weeks on **2013-10-14, at 1100h Pacific in #tor-dev**.
>
> T
On Mon, 23 Sep 2013 17:59:23 -0400
Roger Dingledine wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 23, 2013 at 05:45:36PM -0400, Sukhbir Singh wrote:
> > > I am starting to work on a small GUI tool for file verification
> > > because I find guiding users through the verification process on
> > > Windows/Mac through the co
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