[tor-dev] CompCert C compiler

2015-08-03 Thread Mansour Moufid
Hi everyone, This is just to let you know that Tor compiles without modification using the CompCert C compiler. This week I'll run it in the "C interpreter" to see what happens. http://compcert.inria.fr/man/manual004.html#cinterp Mansour ___ tor-dev

Re: [tor-dev] packaging advice needed

2015-07-14 Thread Mansour Moufid
On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 10:35 PM, Magnus Hedemark wrote: > Hello, > > I have set up a Jenkins CI server and have it tracking the Tor project's git > repository. I'm going to be building packages for the OmniOS platform, which > is not yet supported. I tried searching the site for advice for packa

[tor-dev] high latency hidden services

2014-11-09 Thread Mansour Moufid
Hi everyone, Operation Onymous, the anecdotes about it (I don't think the DoS was a DoS), the wording of the related legal documents, and the previous CMU research... make me think that traffic confirmation attacks are now widely used in practice. Other, cat-and-mouse implemetation vulnerabilitie

Re: [tor-dev] yes hello, internet supervillain here

2014-11-08 Thread Mansour Moufid
On Sat, 08 Nov 2014 22:10:23 + Fears No One wrote: > BEGIN TINFOIL > > Upon scrolling through the .xz files (I personally use xzless), you'll > find a bunch of stuff like: > > 1 > /%5C%22http://www.hackforums.net/code/fail/code/code/code/code/code/ > ... > > All of the requests were

Re: [tor-dev] Sybil attack detection

2014-08-06 Thread Mansour Moufid
On Tue, 05 Aug 2014 18:00:32 +0200 Karsten Loesing wrote: > On 05/08/14 17:24, Philipp Winter wrote: > > On Tue, Aug 05, 2014 at 11:37:45AM +0200, Karsten Loesing wrote: > >> Started looking into better algorithms to detect Sybil attacks on the > >> Tor network. Current thinking is that we shoul

Re: [tor-dev] Traffic Obfuscation

2013-09-04 Thread Mansour Moufid
On 2013-09-04, at 8:09 PM, josef.win...@email.de wrote: > Can a developer please explain to me why something like the > following obfuscation of 'torified traffic' is exploitable? > > Suppose a scenario where a collective of authorities is able > to observe large parts of the www. Then observing

Re: [tor-dev] TBB Gentoo ebuild

2012-08-27 Thread Mansour Moufid
On 2012-08-26, at 5:35 PM, julian wrote: > 12 Aug 22:56 Mansour Moufid: >> Even with webrsync you still have to trust the mirror(s), and then >> the Gentoo release infrastructure... > > Forgive me my bluntness, but how is that different from trusting you? I have nothing t

Re: [tor-dev] TBB Gentoo ebuild

2012-08-12 Thread Mansour Moufid
On 2012-08-12, at 3:36 PM, Alessandro Di Federico wrote: > On Sun, 2012-08-12 at 15:11 -0400, Mansour Moufid wrote: >> Portage offers no authentication and no confidentiality. > > Each file has a SHA-256, SHA-512 and Whirlpool hash associated. This > hashes are in Portag

Re: [tor-dev] TBB Gentoo ebuild

2012-08-12 Thread Mansour Moufid
On 2012-08-12, at 1:21 PM, Alessandro Di Federico wrote: > Hi, I'm trying to put up an ebuild for the Tor Browser Bundle for > Gentoo. As you may know an ebuild is a script which automates the build > of a certain application. We already have something in Portage [2] (the > official ebuild reposit

Re: [tor-dev] Building an automatic censorship-detection system for Tor

2011-09-17 Thread Mansour Moufid
Apologies for breaking the thread, I didn't have the original message. >From the mentioned paper (which I've only skimmed): ``The deployed model considers a time interval of seven (7) days to model connection rates (i.e. $t_i - t_{i−1} = 7$ days).'' If I understand correctly, this means trends o