On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 07:27:32PM +0100, Michael Rogers wrote:
[...]
> If we decided not to use the key blinding trick, and just allowed both
> parties to know the private key, do you see any attacks?
[...]
If I'm understanding your proposal correctly, I believe it would leave
you vulnerable to
On Sat, May 02, 2015 at 08:37:17PM -0700, coderman wrote:
> a friend and i are working on a Tor router design that doesn't
> compromise anonymity for convenience. [0][1][2][3][4]
So, unlike a transparent tor router, this system is not intended to prevent
malicious software on client computers from
On Sat, Feb 28, 2015 at 02:40:29PM +0100, carlo von lynX wrote:
> Thanks "Angel", appreciate your effort.
>
> On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 09:29:05AM +0100, Andreas Krey wrote:
> > On Wed, 25 Feb 2015 13:51:59 +, carlo von lynX wrote:
> > ...
> > > What is useful here is if I can use existing $app
On Mon, Feb 16, 2015 at 03:47:07PM +, Yawning Angel wrote:
> On Mon, 16 Feb 2015 10:17:51 -0500
> David Goulet wrote:
> [snip]
> > A hidden service is created using the key and list of
> > port/targets, that will persist till configuration reload or the
> > termination of the tor process.
On Tue, Jan 06, 2015 at 05:51:53PM +, Andrea Shepard wrote:
> Here's a proposal Nick Mathewson and I just wrote for ticket #11157.
>
> --- Begin proposal body ---
> Filename: xxx-consensus-hash-chaining.txt
> Title: Consensus Hash Chaining
> Author: Nick Mathewson, Andrea Shepard
> Created: 06
On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 04:12:00PM +0200, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> for a very interesting deployment of GlobaLeaks in the are of Human
> Rights defense, we will have the need to distribute a customized Tor
> Browser Bundle to the sources.
>
> The "customization" requirement i
Looking at https://www.torproject.org/dist/torbrowser/3.6.4/ I see that there
is currently only one signature on sha256sums.txt for this release. As far as I
can remember, every other stable release in the 3.x series has had signatures
from at least 3 people.
Is this an aberation or should users n
Thanks for writing this, meejah! Awesome tool. I'm seeing some rather strange
things in its "monitor" output though, indicating either bugs in it, or in tor,
or that something is wrong with my system, or perhaps that Tor has some
behavior I don't know about :/
For instance:
Circuit 398 () is LAUN
I think the idea would be to have a web publishing app which doesn't
necessarily expose Tahoe-LAFS to users directly, but rather just has a
"Publish" button which uploads to it. The only user exposure to Tahoe-LAFS
would be that the URLs contain lengthy cryptographic idenitifers (read
capabilities)
On Mon, Oct 07, 2013 at 07:21:42PM +0200, Jurre van Bergen wrote:
> [...]
> *Is traffic send over Tor?*
> Yes, xmpp-client has support for sending all traffic over Tor, this
> includes connecting to onion's. When you connect to jabber.ccc.de or the
> riseup.net jabber service, you are automaticall
On Wed, Sep 11, 2013 at 11:20:59AM -0400, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 11, 2013 at 10:57 AM, Leif Ryge wrote:
> > Is the following statement correct?
> >
> > When a user connects to Tor from multiple locations where the network is
> > monitored by the same adve
Is the following statement correct?
When a user connects to Tor from multiple locations where the network is
monitored by the same adversary, their persistent use of the same set of entry
guards uniquely identifies them and reveals their location to the adversary.
Assuming this is an accurate ass
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