On 04/03/2017 05:01 PM, Jeremy Rand wrote:
> Maybe this topic has already been brought up, but in case it hasn't,
> I'll do so. I notice that Prop279 (onion naming API) defines its own
> API rather than using DNS. I guess that this is because of security
> concerns about the centralization of the
Hi everyone,
I would like some clarification on ClientRejectInternalAddresses. The
manual says:
> "If true, Tor does not try to fulfill requests to connect to an
internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or 192.168.0.1) unless a exit node is
specifically requested (for example, via a .exit hostname, or a
c
On 03/21/2017 10:54 AM, Pickfire wrote:
> I am Ivan Tham. Currently studying in Computer Science in APIIT Malaysia. I am
> interested particapate in Google Summer of Code 2017 under tor organization. I
> am interested to see Proposal 224 coming along but I would really like to see
> [Proposal 272][
On 12/06/2016 11:27 AM, David Goulet wrote:
> We had little discussion but some of us agree for sure on having bits for the
> version number. That will tell a tor client to fetch the right descriptor
> instead of trying all version that have the same type of public key (.onion
> address). We curren
On 12/06/2016 11:24 AM, George Kadianakis wrote:
> I'd be interested in both a version field and a checksum to be part of
> the encoding of the onion address. I also don't mind extending the
> encoding by a character or two if that will make it more useful (there
> is little difference between 54 a
Hello all,
I've been closely following the other Proposal 224 threads regarding the
next-generation of onion services. I'm glad to see that we have a
timeline and plan for migrating the network. One unresolved point is
what to do with the remaining 4 bits in the longer addresses. Section
1.2 in th
On 11/26/2016 07:50 AM, ban...@openmailbox.org wrote:
>
> While an error in the calculations has been pointed out and the paper
> will be withdrawn, this isn't reassuring since a revised version where
> this still holds is probable.
Where was this discussed or announced? I'm curious what the issu
On 11/23/2016 07:04 PM, Yawning Angel wrote:
> Our fix: "Add another command, that does essentially the same thing,
> because people picked the wrong options, then later deal with the
> fallout from people getting used to the temporary command, and crying
> when it's deprecated."
>
> I say "they s
On 11/18/2016 10:30 AM, ban...@openmailbox.org wrote:
> New research on Distributed RNGs is published: "Scalable Bias-Resistant
> Distributed Randomness"
>
> eprint.iacr.org/2016/1067
Nice! There's also https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1015.pdf, which shows
that you can extract at least 32 bits of en
On 11/23/2016 09:39 AM, David Goulet wrote:
> I agree with you on the fact that ADD_ONION is nice and also crucial to hidden
> service as well. That will be addressed with the control port implementation
> of next generation. It's still an undecided part of the engineering work which
> is how we ar
On 11/14/2016 07:58 AM, Iain R. Learmonth wrote:
> If the software is stable, and reproducibly built, I would aim for placing
> it into the Debian archives. I maintain ooniprobe on deb.torproject.org, but
> primarily for Ubuntu users and I would prefer that Debian users are using
> the version from
On 10/11/2016 12:53 AM, Jeremy Rand wrote:
> It's also worth noting that it's been hard enough to get IETF to accept
> .bit (that effort stalled) -- adding a bunch of other TLD's would
> probably annoy IETF significantly (and destroy whatever good will exists
> at IETF right now), and I fully under
On 10/08/2016 08:50 AM, 61wxg...@vfemail.net wrote:
> How about specifying whether the Namecoin domain should point to .onion
> or clearnet in the domain? We can require that TLDs for such service
> must end in either:
>
> o o: The name points to a .onion name.
>
> o i: The name points to an IP
On 10/04/2016 03:54 PM, George Kadianakis wrote:
> Hello Jesse,
>
> glad to hear you are still working on the OnioNS project, and happy to
> hear that the paper got accepted in PoPETS. We have great plans for
> hidden service naming layers, and it's great to see more people working
> on this topic
On 09/30/2016 07:02 AM, Ali Clark wrote:
> For my master's thesis this summer I looked into the performance impact from
> using QUIC instead of TCP/TLS as the relay transport. Results from the
> experiments look quite promising.
>
> For more details and the thesis, please see my blog post:
> https
On 09/27/2016 11:15 AM, Jeff Burdges wrote:
> There were a couple reasons I stopped the work on integrating
> GNS with Tor, which Christian asked me to do : First, I did not like
> that users could confirm that a particular subdomain exists if they know
> the base domain's public key. Second, I d
On 09/28/2016 11:35 AM, Philipp Winter wrote:
> My colleagues and I published a (not yet peer-reviewed) research paper
> on how DNS affects Tor's anonymity. The key parts of our work are:
>
> - We measure the DNS setup of exit relays over time, showing that at
> times Google got to see almost 4
he client will then randomly select address1.onion or address2.onion
and will round-robin until one of them connects. It's a very simple
scheme. Right now it looks like this:
https://github.com/Jesse-V/OnioNS-common/blob/8217c47bce76d87d056f1bab671c44e13f1e9d69/src/records/Record.cpp#L58
Oni
er
criticism so I have removed it.
Since you're checking factual accuracy of the items in the wiki, you can
find the OnioNS pre-print here:
https://github.com/Jesse-V/OnioNS-literature/raw/master/conference/conference.pdf
> PS: Happy to see that OnioNS is still being worked on -- I th
On 09/27/2016 02:39 AM, Jeremy Rand wrote:
> Relatedly -- I had some trouble summarizing some of the items in the
> Namecoin section because the security, privacy, and scalability
> properties of Namecoin are somewhat different depending on whether the
> user is using a full node (downloads the ent
roper release, my overall goal is to improve the
maturity, trust, usability of the OnioNS software. Please let me know
how I can accomplish the above tasks.
Recent commits:
https://github.com/Jesse-V/OnioNS-common/tree/json-rpc
https://github.com/Jesse-V/OnioNS-server/tree/json-rpc
https://github.
On 09/09/2016 10:15 PM, dawuud wrote:
> right. it shouldn't be necessary at all to modify the torrc... for most
> features.
You need to modify the torrc in order to enable the ControlPort.
https://github.com/Jesse-V/OnioNS-server/tree/json-rpc#setup
>> > and an authenticatio
her resources on it. I would start with the
Wikipedia article on HMAC and go from there. If you really want to dig
into the topic, look into Argon2.
--
Jesse V
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tion is improved because it separates responsibility. In
Linux, the tor binary runs under a separate user and sets up permissions
to protect sensitive data. My OnioNS software can run as a separate user
as well. This way, data is isolated to its respective software and I'm
not mixing everythin
documented
in tor-spec, and I don't see much about it online, but maybe I missed
something. What is the typical value? I see that 0.95 is the cutoff, but
how high will prevent a client from bootstrapping?
--
Jesse V
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ned RSA private key. It's easy
enough to add that same key back into Tor whenever I want. There are
several main advantages with this route, including isolating my
software's data from Tor's and requiring fewer modifications to torrc.
It just seems cleaner in general.
--
Jesse
ubmit a patch as they have a tool for
that. Otherwise, I am not certain how they accept git patches.
Per convention, please reply below the original message instead of above it.
--
Jesse V
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sider enabling
the "Block all unencrypted requests" option, but then don't be surprised
when your favorite news site no longer loads. The situation is really
improving thanks to Let's Encrypt. :)
--
Jesse V
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ecure manner and they can each run as a separate user.
> (p.s. I can't reach http://onions55e7yam27n.onion/)
Nothing is online at the moment. I'll make a separate post once
everything is ready.
--
Jesse V
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software needs to know the HS address so that it can distribute it to
other nodes in the OnioNS network. My to-do list is quickly diminishing
but I did run into this snag and I wasn't able to fix it.
--
Jesse V
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pect that the option is under GETINFO
instead. However, the documentation mostly describes how to query
information about other onion services. I need to know about my service
though, if that's possible. Please advise.
--
Jesse V
I look forward to seeing everyone again in July at Minneapolis
G) or whatever else the resolver says.
Tim, to answer your question, here is my Python script that does the
circuit interception and lookup rewrite:
https://github.com/Jesse-V/OnioNS-client/blob/master/src/assets/onions-stem.py
The network is down so the code won't fully run, but I'm pos
could encrypt it with LUKS/dmcrypt, then send
a SHA-256 sum and the decryption key over SecureDrop.
https://what-if.xkcd.com/31/
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Jesse V
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16/229 and the full paper can be
found here: https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/229.pdf
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Jesse V
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wasn't able to confirm where the ~200ms number came from. Thanks for
throwing out specific numbers on Ring-LWE, I wasn't aware that it was so
fast.
--
Jesse V
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ably fast, it uses the smallest bandwidth, and it
offers perfect forward secrecy. It seems to me that SIDH actually has
more potential for making it into Tor than any other post-quantum
cryptosystem.
--
Jesse V
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f a traffic
analysis setup, who knows.
As have probably concluded from your table, Tor directory authorities
allow up to two Tor nodes per IP address.
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Jesse V
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stance? I'm just thinking about the implications if there
were donations for meek.
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Jesse V
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m inside a censored country, it's possible that users try the
various bridge options using the built-in bridges (which are likely
blocked) before discovering that meek works, so they use that. I wonder
how we could encourage users to use other transports that are likely
faster, then use meek as a l
m inside a censored country, it's possible that users try the
various bridge options using the built-in bridges (which are likely
blocked) before discovering that meek works, so they use that. I wonder
how we could encourage users to use other transports that are likely
faster, then use meek as a l
f the respective post-quantum cryptosystem.
That being said, I'd like to thank Schanck, Whyte, and Zhang for their
work, their paper, and their reference implementation.
--
Jesse V
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ost-quantum cryptography, and I'm sure most of the authors
like to provide a reference implementation of their idea.
For next time, please bottom-post and be sure to replace the subject
line to reflect the thread's name. You only have to replace the subject
line if you receive posts in a dige
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> tor-dev mailing list
> tor-dev@lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
>
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Jesse V
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aining disk space. I don't know if I missed a cleanup step somewhere or
if the issue was fixed since then, but it's something to be aware of.
-- Jesse V.
On 11/03/2015 07:29 PM, Tom Ritter wrote:
> A 10GB network connection is not a requirement, 1GB would be fine,
> 500MB would al
the majority requirement as that is the assumption
made during consensus generation, but I think your argument for the new
conflict resolution make sense. I'm excited that the implementation is nearly
complete and I look forward to seeing it in Tor infrastructure!
Jesse V.
On 10/28/2015 10:26 AM,
ent | grep RPATH
RPATH/usr/lib/onions-common
$
I'm pretty sure that the issue affected all flavours of Linux, so I pushed out
a quick update to the PPA and to Github. Hopefully it shouldn't be a problem
anymore.
Jesse V.
On 09/30/2015 05:25 PM, Jesse V wrote:
> Af
sure. The issue doesn't occur on my computer, but if it also applies to
Ubuntu or Mint, please let me know. It's always possible to compile from source
and run the software from the build directory, but I would really like to
identify the scope of this issue and then properly fix it.
r" is live and new registrations should
be available client-side about 20 seconds after upload.
As usual, the code, pre-built binaries, and instructions are available in the
four OnioNS repositories at https://github.com/Jesse-V?tab=repositories
Please star them if they work well for you. M
ware over there, please talk to me about
that.
* I have full intentions of continuing to maintain the OnioNS project. Please
keep an eye on https://github.com/Jesse-V?tab=repositories and I will post here
when I push out releases. I'm very close to the next beta test.
* Once the OnioNS softw
the offline identity key.
As we come closer to the end of the Summer of Privacy timeline, I'm going to
concentrate on addressing the bugs that s7r identified, finish implementing
some security protocol, and try to move to a fully decentralized setup.
Jesse V.
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> Jacek Wielemborek writes:
>
>> George Kadianakis pisze:
>>> Some real UX research needs to be done here, before we decide something
>>> terrible.
>>
>> Just curious, has anybody seen any cognitive studies on the SSH
>> randomart visualisation? I always found them impossible to remember.
>> Per
tem script, thus this approach is fully compatible with
Tor bridges.
Jesse V.
> Subject:
> Re: [tor-dev] First release of OnioNS for beta testing
> From:
> Xinwen Fu
> Date:
> 08/08/2015 04:25 AM
>
> To:
> "tor-dev@lists.torproject.org"
>
>
> Fantas
d ARM systems. If possible, please use the repository.
Please see the READMEs in the following repositories for more information,
including installation, initialization, and configuration procedures. Manpages
are also included for your convenience.
https://github.com/Jesse-V/OnioNS-common
tten
commit-reveal-consensus proposal. As he stated in his introduction, I certainly
need that in order to integrate OnioNS with the Tor network.
Jesse V.
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from launching
automatically with the Tor Browser. (George, this bug was why I had to launch
Stem manually when I showed the software to you.) The error thrown for this bug
was large and unhelpful, but the fix was amusingly simple:
https://github.com/Jesse-V/OnioNS-client/commit
prototype
that everyone can beta test. The packaging and integration into the Tor Browser
should make this very straightforward, but I need to have all the
configurations in place and a few more bugs worked out before then.
Jesse V.
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