On 2014-12-22 18:25, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> See https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13988 .
>
> Karsten suggests that I should announce this on tor-dev before
> merging/deploying it, and he's probably right. Will this break
> anything you know about?
It would primarily 'smooth out'
On 2014-12-15 16:51, Hollow Quincy wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> I would like to write a C# application (IRC client) that is using TOR.
> I read a lot, but I still don't know how can I run TOR proxy in
> transparent way (from my c# code).
>
> I see that Tor Stem (https://stem.torproject.org/) can be used
On 2014-09-18 07:42, Andreas Krey wrote:
> On Wed, 17 Sep 2014 21:05:39 +, Tom Ritter wrote:
> ...
>> A horrible idea Isis and I came up with was standing up two or more
>> tor servers with the same keys, on an anycast-ed IP address.
>
> I don't think anycasted IPs work well with TCP, consider
On 2014-09-14 01:17, Griffin Boyce wrote:
> Hello all!
>
> I am wondering whether to force-uninstall Debian's popularity-contest
> package as part of Stormy's installation process. It would be good to
> have an idea how popular Stormy is, but on the other hand, I'm not sure
> how anonymous the r
On 2014-07-08 12:47, Yan Zhu wrote:
> (resending to tor-dev with tp.o email address)
>
> On 07/08/2014 03:42 AM, Yan Zhu wrote:
>> On 07/08/2014 12:07 AM, Jeroen Massar wrote:
>>> On 2014-07-07 20:40, Red wrote:
>>> [.. lots of cool work being worked on ..]
>&
On 2014-07-07 20:40, Red wrote:
[.. lots of cool work being worked on ..]
Hi Zack,
Seems you are doing lots of cool stuff ;)
But I am one of those strange people who really hate it that every
separate tool has their own updater (which can be used for tracking a
user, as the set of updater tools
On 2014-03-15 06:08, Jacek Wielemborek wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I know there's not much time to apply, but I figured that it's worth asking
> anyway. I recently gave Tails a try and I have to admit that I wasn't exactly
> happy with how it routes the traffic through Tor. I basically wanted a
> ready-to
On 2014-02-26 13:46, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
> I think this is a fine idea - if no one objects, I'll purge it.
No objection per-se, but a recommendation/check-up: check how google
handles removal and if it allows a new project of the same name to be
created there. This as it would otherwise be easy
On 2014-02-22 21:36, David Fifield wrote:
>> 2. Run a second browser, apart from Tor Browser, that receives commands
>> from a client PT program and makes the HTTPS requests it is
>> commanded to.
[..]
If all is well, there should be a paper at PETS2014 which solves exactly
th
On 2013-12-31 12:07, Ximin Luo wrote:
> Hey all,
>
> Flashproxy[1] helps to bypass entry-node blocks. But we could apply
> the general idea to exit-nodes as well - have the exit-node connect
> to the destination via an ephemeral proxy.
If an exit node is blocked towards a certain site, that exit
On 2013-09-30 13:01 , Ian Goldberg wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 01:03:14AM -0700, Rohit wrote:
>> This should satisfy most goals.
>> - A passive attacker wouldn't be able to distinguish between HTTPS->HTTPS
>> traffic and Tor->Bridge. (Both use TLS)
>
> This seems false to me; it's not too ha
Hi,
I don't know what the current status/discussion for this is, hence this
email, a reply to a ticket # or mail thread would be fine too ;)
Is there currently a plan or way to state for a site:
"you can find us as hidden service X" ?
In DNS we could use something like:
www NAPTR
On 2013-09-12 22:00 , Kevin Butler wrote:
[..]
> I should have made my assumptions clearer. I am assuming the CA is
> compromised in this idea. I have assumed it is easy to make a
> counterfeit and valid cert from the root but it is hard(read infeasible)
> to generate one with the same fingerprint
On 2013-09-12 09:25 , Kevin Butler wrote:
[generic 203 proposal (and similar http scheme) comments]
- HTTPS requires certificates, self-signed ones can easily be blocked
as they are self-signed and thus likely not important.
If the certs are all 'similar' (same CA, formatting etc) they can
On 2013-07-01 16:59 , André Nunes Batista wrote:
> Sorry, to bump in, I know you are busy, but being a tor-node I had to
> ask:
>
> Some guy just posted on mailing list an conceptual attack on tor, which
> certainly would require the corruption of great deal of tor-nodes and
> data analysis, but s
On 2013-06-18 11:52 , Vmon wrote:
> Hey Zack,
>
> I'm not sure if you were following Iranian filtering few days leading to
> the election. It was basically http white-list. Psipohn was sending few 'GET
> / HTTP 1.1' before start sending any real data and it was able to fool
> the box . But the fil
On 2013-05-23 14:46 , Petter Solberg wrote:
> Hi.
>
> We are two master thesis students at the Norwegian University of Science
> and Technology (NTNU) which is looking into the performance of hidden
> services. We have already set up 19 physical Linux servers connected by
> gigabit Ethernet to be
On 2013-05-17 15:23 , George Kadianakis wrote:
[..]
> That is, when we change the identity keys of a Hidden Service, its
> onion also changes (since the onion is the truncated hash of its
> public key). This will be quite problematic for Hidden Services that
> have a well-established onion address.
On 2013-05-15 08:49 , Mike Perry wrote:
> Over the past couple weeks I've been redoing the TBB build system to use
> Gitian to produce alpha TBBs using Tor Launcher instead of Vidalia. I
> have succeeded in producing deterministic, localized builds of TBB for
> Linux and Windows.
>
> This means th
On 2013-05-06 19:45 , wac wrote:
>
> Hi folks:
>
> For all those interested I made an Initial release of the
> modification that transforms Tor into a library. The former libTor
> renamed to libOnionRoute. Windows only so far.
>
> You can download at:
>
> http://www.onionroute.org/downloads/
A
On 2012-09-10 16:58 , Zack Weinberg wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 10, 2012 at 9:10 AM, Ian Goldberg wrote:
>> On Mon, Sep 10, 2012 at 02:33:30AM -0600, vmon wrote:
>>> 3) Thank you for telling me about fts. I'm going to replace boost code with
>>> fts soon.
>>
>> What is fts? This sounds potentially usef
On 2012-08-16 22:45, Linus Nordberg wrote:
> Hi,
>
> The roadmaps/Tor/IPv6 [1] wiki page has been started with the goal of
> communicating the status of the work with Tor on IPv6.
>
> Additionally, searching for Trac tickets with the keyword "ipv6" [2]
> might give a picture of what's going on.
>
On 2012-07-17 06:24, Linus Nordberg wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Can votes and consensuses have more than one "a" line? Prop 186 says, on
> one hand
>
> [...] votes should include a single "a" line for every relay that has
> an IPv6 address, to include the first IPv6 line in its
> descriptor. [...] The
On 2012-03-18 13:57 , Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote:
> On 3/18/12 1:09 PM, Jeroen Massar wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 18 Mar 2012, at 12:46, "Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)"
>> wrote:
>>
>>> - Security issue
>>>
>>> Looking at the server sei
On 18 Mar 2012, at 12:46, "Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)"
wrote:
> - Security issue
>
> Looking at the server seizure threat scenario, who seize the computer
> running TorHS will be able to know the identity of the TorHS itself by
> looking at the "hostname" file
Why not simply use Full Disk Encr
On 2012-03-17 10:52 , Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote:
[..]
> That way even in case of seizure of the server running the Tor HS
> it would not be possible to who seized the Tor HS Server to do actively
> Impersonation attacks of the Tor HS.
If you want to protect these files, use proper full disk c
On 2011-06-20 23:22 , Nick Mathewson wrote:
[..]
> Do you remember which git checkout it was? I can't find one that it
> applies cleanly to.
I am too much of a git noob, but:
git status reveals:
# On branch master
# Your branch is behind 'origin/master' by 142 commits, and can be
fast-forwarded.
On 2011-Jun-10 12:08, Karsten Loesing wrote:
[..]
> Here's my plan: I'd like to rename (possibly a lot of) wiki pages so
> that the naming scheme implies a kind of wiki structure. I'd also add a
> page saying where stuff should go, and we'll beat up everyone not
> adhering to the structure in a jo
On 2011-Jun-09 23:34, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
> For Tor itself doing some programmatic things... There are plenty
> of BGP looking glasses out there. But for the purposes of some
> script banging away at them (times the number of nodes doing so),
> yes, it is definitely considered pr
On 2011-Jun-09 20:07, Linus Nordberg wrote:
[..]
> I'm already running something[1] that is collecting a feed and storing
> it in an SQL database. I should tech it i) how to emit torrc Export
> lines and ii) the Tor control protocol ("exit-policy/default").
If you want an IPv6 dump (aka grh.sixxs
Hi,
As this is World IPv6 day, let me present the first big step to Tor
IPv6: the Address Family independence Patch ;)
https://unfix.org/projects/ipv6/tor/tor-af-independent.diff
it is diff against a recent git checkout and should apply more or less
cleanly.
Why AF independence[1,2] and not "IP
On 2011-May-15 23:53, Lucky Green wrote:
[..]
> In summary, outbound IPv6 Tor connections from end-users can wait until
> after Tor servers accept inbound IPv6 connections (and after exit nodes
> can make outbound IPv6 connections to other services).
Correct, but the bigger issue, which I have mos
On 2011-May-09 18:54, Nick Mathewson wrote:
[..]
> 117 IPv6 exits
Working on it, but due to the scope I am actually attacking it on most
of the networking stack inside Tor so it will not only cover 'exits'.
>118 Advertising multiple ORPorts at once
This is actually needed for IPv6, as most
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