t
understand from the motivation section
a) exactly what attacks exit pinning is meant to address; or
b) why those attacks can't be addressed by HTTPS or onion services.
Cheers,
Henry de Valence
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each other so what's the process for
> deciding between them?
Cheers,
Henry de Valence
[0]:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/diff/proposals/proposal-status.txt?id=875fdaecd544bd477edfa3ee98ec7458f53583ed
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tor-de
s keeping
track of how the distribution is configuring their system, wouldn't it be
better to find a way to work with the existing distro maintainers so that, for
instance, the current Fedora RPMs could be the officially-endorsed Tor Project
RPMs?
Cheers,
Henry de Valence
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cryptosystems, and the goal is that the handshake
should be no weaker than either.
Cheers,
Henry de Valence
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ock Tor, or just to governments in liberal societies
(say, France, where Taler is developed), who would never block Tor?
Thanks,
Henry de Valence
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