as
additional features are extracted to identify the hidden service. The
experimental results show that our identification framework F-ACCUMUL can
effectively identify Tor-Snowflake traffic and Tor-Snowflake hidden
service traffic
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/app13010622
Cheers,
Christian
On Thu
> but finding resolvers is probably one of the smaller issues when
> compared to getting
> everything implemented in firefox/tor browser. Current versions do
> not even allow
> to set more than one resolver URL.
>
I see. Are there any tickets or design proposals
On Mon, 2020-05-25 at 21:23 +0200, nusenu wrote:
> Christian Hofer:
> > The thread model is DNS hijacking. Yes, you can prevent DNS
> > hijacking
> > using DoH if you *trust* the resolver you connect to. However, if
> > you
> > want to verify authenticity and in
On Sun, 2020-05-24 at 19:01 +0200, nusenu wrote:
> Christian Hofer:
> > On Sat, 2020-05-16 at 01:37 +0200, nusenu wrote:
> > > Alexander Færøy:
> > > > I wonder if it would make more sense to have an onion-aware
> > > > DNSSEC-enabled resolver *outside
On Sat, 2020-05-16 at 01:37 +0200, nusenu wrote:
> Alexander Færøy:
> > I wonder if it would make more sense to have an onion-aware
> > DNSSEC-enabled resolver *outside* of the Tor binary and have a way
> > for
> > Tor to query an external tool for DNS lookups.
>
> I'm also in favor of this appro
On Sat, 2020-05-16 at 01:37 +0200, nusenu wrote:
> > I can not really say anything about how this design compares to
> > other
> > approaches, since I don't know how I can setup meaningful test
> > scenarios to compare them.
>
> Do we really need test setups to discuss protocol designs
> and com
On Sat, 2020-05-16 at 01:37 +0200, nusenu wrote:
> > Before we go further, can you walk me through the reasons (if you
> > had thought
> > of it of course) why you didn't use something like libunbound?
> >
> > There are side effects of adding DNSSEC client support (with our
> > own
> > implementat
On Fri, 2020-05-15 at 14:30 -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> On Fri, May 15, 2020 at 05:39:23PM +0200, Christian Hofer wrote:
> > Final remarks. When I started, I didn't expect it to get this big,
> > and
> > frankly, if I had known before, I might not have even started.
On Fri, 2020-05-15 at 15:29 +, Alexander Færøy wrote:
> Hello Christian,
>
Hi Alex!
> On 2020/04/26 19:37, Christian Hofer wrote:
> > I have a proposal regarding DNS name resolution.
> >
> > Ticket: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/340
On Thu, 2020-05-14 at 15:56 -0400, David Goulet wrote:
> On 26 Apr (19:37:56), Christian Hofer wrote:
> > Hi there,
>
> Greetings Christian!
>
Hi David!
> > I have a proposal regarding DNS name resolution.
> >
> > Ticket: https://trac.torproject.org/pr
test environments. For the server part I can
provide a DNS server that supports DoT, DoH, and DNSSEC.
Regarding stream isolation, see cypherpunks analysis in the ticket.
Please let me know if you think this approach is worthwhile. Then I
will try to answer the remaining questions.
BR
Christian
On Mon,
functioniality is behind the DNSResolver feature flag, so don't
forget to activate it before you start testing.
Please let me know what you think.
BR
Christian
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Dear Tor developers,
there is a new development in the area of Tor-friendly web archives:
On Wed, Jan 18, 2017 at 11:42:45AM +, Yawning Angel wrote:
> On Wed, 18 Jan 2017 12:15:05 +0100
> Christian Pietsch wrote:
> > Considering that cfc was created in order to evade th
used? I hear they are almost
done setting up an onion service for the Internet Archive.
Cheers,
C:
On Mon, Apr 18, 2016 at 10:16:31PM +, Yawning Angel wrote:
> Source: https://git.schwanenlied.me/yawning/cfc
--
Christian Pietsch, volunteering for Digitalcourage e.V., Bielefeld, Germ
On Thu, 15 Sep 2016, AKASH DAS wrote:
> Can I ask my doubts regarding https-everywhere and any bugs issue in this
> mailing list as I already posted one bug but I didn't get any reply
> regarding that error.
> So any help would be very helpful to me.
Please refer to these support channels for http
On 02/04/2016 10:07 AM, Christian Sturm wrote:
> Hello,
>
> a while ago I set up a BSD buildbot for tor[1]. It's actually not just
> for BSDs, but also for other systems, such as Solaris. I wanted to make
> it easier to notice when something breaks on non-popular systems, no
Hello,
a while ago I set up a BSD buildbot for tor[1]. It's actually not just
for BSDs, but also for other systems, such as Solaris. I wanted to make
it easier to notice when something breaks on non-popular systems, not
actively used by the developers.
There also is reporting through an IRC bot a
On 09/29/2015 12:19 AM, Jeff Burdges wrote:
> On Mon, 2015-09-28 at 16:26 -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote:
>> On Mon, Sep 28, 2015 at 03:20:47PM +0200, Jeff Burdges wrote:
>>> I proposed that Tor implement NameService rules using UNIX domain
>>> sockets, or ports, since that's how GNUNet works, but m
AP and then I won't submit the draft.
Happy hacking!
Christian
http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.1034.xml";>
http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.1035.xml";>
http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.1928.xml";>
h
s?
> Yes, I will look into it. Your description is helpful, but if you
> want to write up a protocol describing what you want on your end,
> I'll merge it into my protocol, and then we'll have a protocol that
> is compatible with both of our needs.
nt out that you define
>> it differently than GNS does (and we checked with Zooko about the
>> definition at the time). In particular, you assume that the
>> adversary has limited computational power and doesn't dominate the
>> consensus. For GNS, we assume that PoW is usel
and their opinions, not majorities.
(see also http://grothoff.org/christian/fps2013wachs.pdf). Thus, you
might want to make it clearer in your paper that you 'square' Zooko's
triangle under exactly the same conditions as Namecoin: a weaker
adversary model / definition of 'secure'
s
my attempt to fix this issue by declaring "dir" as "signed char". It
compiles now (4.6.3 and 4.9.1) for powerpc32 and Tor seems to work - but
please have a look if this is the Right Thing To Do.
Thanks,
Christian.
Declare "char dir" as signed, otherwise compi
scale.
You can find sources, binaries and a more elaborate description here:
https://gnunet.org/knock_nat_tester
Technical details about Knock and a (somewhat outdated) research paper
as well as kernel patches are provided here:
https://gnunet.org/knock
Best,
Julian & Christian
0x48426
On 01.04.2014 09:56, Karsten Loesing wrote:
>> Do you think it would be better to modify the graphs so all of them
>> start/end at the same time? (There is a small offset because the first
>> and last fields aren't always the same)
>
> I thought about this, but didn't bring it up yet, because it m
On 31.03.2014 19:54, Karsten Loesing wrote:
> On 31/03/14 18:38, Christian wrote:
>> On 31.03.2014 08:38, Karsten Loesing wrote:
>>> On 30/03/14 22:54, Christian wrote:
>>>> On 30.03.2014 12:44, Karsten Loesing wrote:
>>>>> And finally, you asked
On 31.03.2014 08:38, Karsten Loesing wrote:
> On 30/03/14 22:54, Christian wrote:
>> On 30.03.2014 12:44, Karsten Loesing wrote:
>>> Hi Christian,
>>>
>>> moving our private discussion to the public mailing list.
>>>
>>>
>>>
On 30.03.2014 12:44, Karsten Loesing wrote:
> Hi Christian,
>
> moving our private discussion to the public mailing list.
>
>
> You were asking about making graphs from Onionoo's new clients
> documents. Here's an example:
>
> "1_week":{"fir
for the gsoc?
Do you have other ideas on how to improve globe?
Thanks,
Christian
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; response contains a single bridge with the hashed fingerprint being the
> SHA-1 that Globe server computed. In this case the part that it
> was given was a non-hashed fingerprint. If so, Globe server includes a
> warning that users shouldn't put in their original fingerprint and
&
is unlikely
that we'll be doing any further major implementation work on this
in the near future. Naturally, the existing code is freely
available (and does work, if one is willing to go through the
pains to set it up properly).
Happy hacking!
Christian
signature.as
e pTLDs
involve Tor, we would be happy for feedback from the Tor developer
community.
Happy hacking!
Christian
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) C. Grothoff
IESG Approval document
On 14.08.2013 10:38, Karsten Loesing wrote:
On 8/13/13 10:43 PM, Christian wrote:
On 13.08.2013 09:20, Karsten Loesing wrote:
On 8/12/13 10:56 PM, Christian wrote:
I've seen that you've included the field parameter to limit the fields
that onionoo returns.
Do you think it would be
On 13.08.2013 09:20, Karsten Loesing wrote:
On 8/12/13 10:56 PM, Christian wrote:
I've seen that you've included the field parameter to limit the fields
that onionoo returns.
Do you think it would be better to use the field parameter and show a
limited amount of data or try to get
cified globe/atlas
page and can directly show visitors information about an relay/bridge.
I don't know if it would be useful for anyone. What's your opinion on that?
Cheers,
Christian
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he reachability
> test to the wrong place).
No, the address printed there was the correct one.
Thanks,
Christian.
[0] http://paste.debian.net/5094/
[1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-February/023363.html
--
BOFH excuse #251:
Processes r
Hm, an hour later it succeeded:
May 17 20:40:43.000 [warn] Your server (...:9001) has not managed to confirm
that its ORPort is reachable.
May 17 21:00:43.000 [warn] Your server (...:9001) has not managed to confirm
that its ORPort is reachable.
May 17 21:20:43.000 [warn] Your server (...:9001)
I'm not sure what "/etc/hosts" should have to do with
it, but I haven't modified this either. I'm strace'ing the tor process now
to see what it's doing but couldn't find anything suspicious so far.
Any thoughts?
Christian.
--
BOFH excuse #139:
UBN
As a late follow-up, for the archives...
Nick Mathewson wrote on 9/25/12 09:36:
> On Mon, Sep 24, 2012 at 4:13 AM, Christian Kujau
> wrote:
>> while trying to compile the latest git-checkout against openssl-1.0.2,
>> I've come across the following issues:
> [...]
On Mon, 26 Nov 2012 at 17:40, leez wrote:
> The lost document was actually this one:
> https://www.eff.org/document/dc-circuit-opinion-granting-verizons-motion-quash
>
> I've added a redirect from the broken link, so either will get you
> there now.
Thanks for fixing this!
address
of this document? Is this perhaps the following:
https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/RIAA_v_Verizon/20030121-riaa-v-verizon-order.pdf
I've cc'ed tor-dev, because the link is included in
contrib/tor-exit-notice.html for the Tor exit nodes to present.
Thanks,
Chri
due to inconsistently declared a return type (once
declared as 'enum', once as 'int').
Is there a better place for sending patches that do not really require
broad discussion?
Happy hacking!
Christian
diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c
index ec4ecfa..3851043 10
which
still ships openssl-0.9.8o and I wanted to get rid of this "use a more recent
OpenSSL" message during startup :-)
Otherwise, today's git-checkout of tor runs just fine when built against
openssl-0.9.8 (on powerpc) - yay!
Christian.
[0] http://rt.op
Hi,
these ever so long law.cornell.edu URLs are now automatically redirecting
to a shorter version - let's use that in our tor-exit-notice.html as well.
Christian.
diff --git a/contrib/tor-exit-notice.html b/contrib/tor-exit-notice.html
index de3be17..8cf5c29 100644
--- a/contrib/tor
n library to do so, but even there we never parse
DNS queries that did not originate from our own system.
In summary, I think begin_dns is a good idea, but I'm not sure you need
to then talk TCP to the nameserver -- UDP ought to suffice.
My 2 cents
Happy hacking!
Christian
__
Hi Karsten,
On Tue, Sep 6, 2011 at 10:44 AM, Karsten Loesing
wrote:
> First of all, thanks to the 13 people for taking part in the survey!
Thanks for your effort to make Trac life easier for everyone!
> [Suggestion: Backup and delete all reports with a component name in
> them. The current li
Hi Karsten,
things I didn't answer either don't apply to me for some reason, or I
don't use them (if they're Trac fields) or I have nothing to say for
other reasons.
On Mon, Aug 22, 2011 at 2:29 PM, Karsten Loesing
wrote:
> 1 Using Trac features
>
> 1.1 Which of the reports (stored ticket quer
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