[tor-dev] Proposal xxx: Consensus Hash Chaining

Here's a proposal Nick Mathewson and I just wrote for ticket #11157. --- Begin proposal body --- Filename: xxx-consensus-hash-chaining.txt Title: Consensus Hash Chaining Author: Nick Mathewson, Andrea Shepard Created: 06-Jan-2015 Status: Draft 1. Introduction and overview To avoid

Re: [tor-dev] Hidden Service authorization UI

quot; a long time ago, or I wrote down an example URL. > > best, > Griffin I believe it's verifiable whether an authenticated HS exists anyway; you can get the descriptor, but the list of intro points is encrypted. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint (ECC): BDF5 F867 8A52 4E4A BECF

Re: [tor-dev] Hidden Service authorization UI

s reason for not being able to connect/ tell Tor the authentication info? This is starting to sound like wanting SOCKS5 extensions to indicate different causes for connection failures in #6031 did. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint (ECC): BDF5 F867 8A52 4E4A BECF DE79 A4FF BC34 F01D D536 PGP finge

Re: [tor-dev] Hidden Service authorization UI

fer on documentation, but 'hilarious' may actually be 'good', since for situations like this where an HS doesn't need to be open to the general public, it denies attackers the ability to cause the HS to produce traffic on demand and thus probably makes it more resistant to any HS

Re: [tor-dev] Sybil attack detection (was: Karsten's July 2014)

you can define any similarity metric that respects the triangle inequality. There's a lot of research on data structures for this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metric_tree -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint (ECC): BDF5 F867 8A52 4E4A BECF DE79 A4FF BC34 F01D D536 PGP

Re: [tor-dev] channel_t to IP Address

onical_remote_descr() (see code in channel.c for differences among them) on TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan. Note: only do this if you want a string to show the user or something like that. If you're going to parse it, it's very much brittle and not future- proof. -- Andrea Shepard P

Re: [tor-dev] channel_t to IP Address

it to a channel_tls_t using the BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS macro and then look at the or_connection_t pointer in that structure. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint (ECC): BDF5 F867 8A52 4E4A BECF DE79 A4FF BC34 F01D D536 PGP fingerprint (RSA): 3611 95A4 0740 ED1B 7EA5 DF7E 4191 13D9 D0CF BDA5 pgpD4i2EOymVx

[tor-dev] Crippled intro points

that would comprise an attack on the network and be good grounds for a !reject. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint (ECC): BDF5 F867 8A52 4E4A BECF DE79 A4FF BC34 F01D D536 PGP fingerprint (RSA): 3611 95A4 0740 ED1B 7EA5 DF7E 4191 13D9 D0CF BDA5 pgpxvFp86pD6r.pgp Description: PGP signature

Re: [tor-dev] Hidden service policies

recruiting > new relay operators. The ability to do this implies the ability for intro points to learn the identity public keys of hidden services they are introducing. Unfortunately, I believe this sort of enumeration attack is possible with the current HS protocol, but I think proposal 224 w

Re: [tor-dev] hidden service involvement in external program

thinking, including all the path selection and circuit building and everything. You should just connect through Tor's SOCKS5 port. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint (ECC): BDF5 F867 8A52 4E4A BECF DE79 A4FF BC34 F01D D536 PGP fingerprint (RSA): 3611 95A4 0740 ED1B 7EA5 DF7E 4191 13D9 D0C

Re: [tor-dev] Tor Browser Weekly IRC meetings moved to 15:00 UTC Fridays

On Thu, Apr 24, 2014 at 12:12:02PM -0700, Dave Huseby wrote: > Is this the main tor meeting or just the tor browser meeting? > > -dave The main Tor meeting is at 19:00 UTC on Wednesdays. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint (ECC): BDF5 F867 8A52 4E4A BECF DE79 A4FF BC34 F01D

[tor-dev] Request for comment: scheduler heuristics

width, or drops off exponentially. These are straightforward to implement, but I'm unsure what the best option is, so comment is invited. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint (ECC): BDF5 F867 8A52 4E4A BECF DE79 A4FF BC34 F01D D536 PGP fingerprint (RSA): 3611 95A4 0740 ED1B 7EA5 DF7E

Re: [tor-dev] IRC meeting to discuss sponsor F progress on Wed July 3, 16:00 to 17:00 UTC in #tor-dev

nd out another reminder by the end of next week that will > contain the definite date. Uh, sorry, but the odds of 9 AM happening in my time zone are not too good unless it's on the tail end of the previous day's period of consciousness. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerp

Re: [tor-dev] building from source in a 64-bit windows environment..

pendent on the target type of the pointer and (b) larger than any integer type. For examples of weird pointers: http://c-faq.com/null/machexamp.html -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint: 3611 95A4 0740 ED1B 7EA5 DF7E 4191 13D9 D0CF BDA5 pgpO1aU6Ly4h5.pgp Description: PGP signature ___

Re: [tor-dev] Channel incoming queue

might cause them to fill. None of these normally occur with channeltls.c, which is currently the only channel implementation layer, and at least the CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT one never occurs. Short version: you're seeing normal behavior, don't worry about it. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerpr

Re: [tor-dev] Iran

their routers tracking connections that don't even really exist. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint: 3611 95A4 0740 ED1B 7EA5 DF7E 4191 13D9 D0CF BDA5 pgpUmFVkGYq97.pgp Description: PGP signature ___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev

[tor-dev] Andrea's December 2012 status report

llel relay crypto * Implement some changes to the patch for bug 7590 needed for portability that I recommended when reviewing it. * Investigate reports that bug 7350 has risen from the grave -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint: 3611 95A4 0740 ED1B 7EA5 DF7E 4191 13D9 D0CF BDA5 pgp7UGHzURp_e.pgp D

Re: [tor-dev] Parallel relaycrypt data structures for review

it queue? Yeah - the non-thready version would just call whatever (possibly refactored) relay_crypt() that the worker thread calls and then the handler for crypted cells, all in the main thread, rather than queueing anything. > Thanks again! I'll let you know if I think of anything els

[tor-dev] Parallel relaycrypt data structures for review

Please review first draft proposed parallel relaycrypt structures in my parallel_relay_crypt branch. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint: 3611 95A4 0740 ED1B 7EA5 DF7E 4191 13D9 D0CF BDA5 pgpNKJ9L81i7A.pgp Description: PGP signature ___ tor-dev