Re: [tor-dev] [CRITICAL] DeepCorr Traffic Confirmation Attack

2023-02-28 Thread Syverson, Paul F CIV USN NRL (5543) Washington DC (USA) via tor-dev
I have not read this paper thoroughly, and it definitely seems to make a significant contribution. But the concerns that you raise are not what is new, and I hope this message will reduce your sense of alarm. If an attacker is interested in a given user or onion service and can watch both ends of

Re: [tor-dev] [CRITICAL] DeepCorr Traffic Confirmation Attack

2023-02-28 Thread Holmes Wilson
This attack looks especially bad for situations where both ends of the connection are controlled by the attacker, so it seems really bad for onionshare, ricochet refresh, Briar, and Quiet, at least when users are communicating with others in the same country. 96% correlation after 900k of data sent

[tor-dev] [CRITICAL] DeepCorr Traffic Confirmation Attack

2023-02-28 Thread Guard via tor-dev
Hi, I was just reading a paper on traffic confirmation attacks over here https://arxiv.org/pdf/1808.07285v1.pdf. This attack runs with the help of deep learning algorithm called DeepCorr. This attack can be run in a Five Eyes country or an authoritarian regime like Russia where companies are compe