Well onioncat is not "arbitrary node" but is a set up one.
Yet some timing differentiations can be divined by
selectively constructing the "circuit" to test,
looking at setup timings, pushing characterizing
traffic through them and your own nodes,
polling existing services, etc.
Please publish your
> Right now we're exploring latency-based attacks but are having trouble
> achieving a particular goal: a way to “ping” an arbitrary node in a
> client’s already-built (“live”) circuit. One-way timing is ideal but round
> trip time would suffice. We can glean this information during circuit
> const
Hello Tor-Dev,
My name is Alex Mages, and I have been doing pluggable transport research
with Eugene Vasserman (CC) at Kansas State University.
Right now we're exploring latency-based attacks but are having trouble
achieving a particular goal: a way to “ping” an arbitrary node in a
client’s alrea