[tor-dev] Fwd: Orbot 16.1.0-BETA-1-tor-0.4.0.4-rc

2019-05-31 Thread Nathan Freitas
Tor 0.4.0.4 working well on Android. We've updated the tor-android library to 0.4.0.4-rc, and included it in the latest Orbot beta. It is available via Gradle at the usual spot (see below): https://github.com/guardianproject/tor-android/releases/tag/tor-android-binary-tor-0.4.0.4-rc maven { url "

Re: [tor-dev] Onion Service - Intropoint DoS Defenses

2019-05-31 Thread George Kadianakis
George Kadianakis writes: > juanjo writes: > >> Ok, thanks, I was actually thinking about PoW on the Introduction Point >> itself, but it would need to add a round trip, like some sort of >> "authentication based PoW" before allowing to send the INTRODUCE1 cell. >> At least it would make the

Re: [tor-dev] Onion Service - Intropoint DoS Defenses

2019-05-31 Thread George Kadianakis
juanjo writes: > Ok, thanks, I was actually thinking about PoW on the Introduction Point > itself, but it would need to add a round trip, like some sort of > "authentication based PoW" before allowing to send the INTRODUCE1 cell. > At least it would make the overhead of clients higher than I.P

Re: [tor-dev] Onion Service - Intropoint DoS Defenses

2019-05-31 Thread juanjo
Ok, thanks, I was actually thinking about PoW on the Introduction Point itself, but it would need to add a round trip, like some sort of "authentication based PoW" before allowing to send the INTRODUCE1 cell. At least it would make the overhead of clients higher than I.P. as the clients would n

Re: [tor-dev] Onion Service - Intropoint DoS Defenses

2019-05-31 Thread Roger Dingledine
On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 09:03:40PM +0200, juanjo wrote: > And just came to my mind reading this, that to stop these attacks we could > implement some authentication based on Proof of Work or something like that. > This means that to launch such an attack the attacker (client level) should > compute

Re: [tor-dev] Onion Service - Intropoint DoS Defenses

2019-05-31 Thread Roger Dingledine
On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 08:15:16PM +0200, juanjo wrote: > As far as I understand INTRODUCE2 cells are sent by Introduction Points > directly to the Hidden Service. But this only happens after a Client sends > the INTRODUCE1 cell to the Introduction Point. > > Now the question is, do we allow more

Re: [tor-dev] Onion Service - Intropoint DoS Defenses

2019-05-31 Thread juanjo
Hello, can someone answer some questions I have about how this attacks work? As far as I understand INTRODUCE2 cells are sent by Introduction Points directly to the Hidden Service. But this only happens after a Client sends the INTRODUCE1 cell to the Introduction Point. Now the question is, d

Re: [tor-dev] Onion Service - Intropoint DoS Defenses

2019-05-31 Thread David Goulet
On 31 May (00:46:56), teor wrote: > Hi, > > > On 30 May 2019, at 23:49, David Goulet wrote: > > > > Over the normal 3 intro points a service has, it means 150 introduction > > per-second are allowed with a burst of 600 in total. Or in other words, 150 > > clients can reach the service every seco