Re: [tor-dev] Information on the handling of relays churn

2018-09-27 Thread Roger Dingledine
On Thu, Sep 27, 2018 at 06:49:37PM +, alex_y...@yahoo.ca wrote: > It seems that your idea can basically be summarized as "implement > circuit resumption". This is likely not inherently difficult to > implement, except for the problem of knowing when to expire old > sessions. If you just use the

Re: [tor-dev] Temporary hidden services

2018-09-27 Thread meejah
In this realm, perhaps https://github.com/warner/magic-wormhole could be used to construct a solution? Some person has to "initiate" the wormhole and pass the (short) code to the other person -- this could be via some established channel, like "over the phone" (the codes exchanged are only usable

Re: [tor-dev] Temporary hidden services

2018-09-27 Thread Nick Mathewson
On Thu, Sep 27, 2018 at 9:26 AM Michael Rogers wrote: > > Hi all, > > The Briar team is working on a way for users to add each other as > contacts by exchanging links without having to meet in person. > > We don't want to include the address of the user's long-term Tor hidden > service in the link

Re: [tor-dev] Temporary hidden services

2018-09-27 Thread Chad Retz
I am no expert here, but I'm confused by "the client connecting to the service knows the service's private key". Why not just create an onion service (per contact) and then use the client authentication feature to ensure they share the same secret? Client auth is built in to discovery and from what

Re: [tor-dev] Information on the handling of relays churn

2018-09-27 Thread alex_y_xu
Quoting Adrien Luxey (2018-09-27 18:21:06) > Dear Tor developers, > > As a PhD student in distributed systems, I am studying onion routing. > > We would like to investigate an onion routing system that would run on users > devices, i.e. a lot of nodes with crappy bandwidth and intermittent > con

Re: [tor-dev] Information on the handling of relays churn

2018-09-27 Thread David Fifield
On Thu, Sep 27, 2018 at 08:21:06PM +0200, Adrien Luxey wrote: > • To which extent would you say that Tor is resilient to churn? What would > be > the effects of a massive churn of relays? Where would be the bottleneck? About churn specifically, the Sybil research of Winter, Ensafi, Loesing,

[tor-dev] Information on the handling of relays churn

2018-09-27 Thread Adrien Luxey
Dear Tor developers, As a PhD student in distributed systems, I am studying onion routing. We would like to investigate an onion routing system that would run on users devices, i.e. a lot of nodes with crappy bandwidth and intermittent connection. To compare against Tor, I have been looking for i

[tor-dev] Temporary hidden services

2018-09-27 Thread Michael Rogers
Hi all, The Briar team is working on a way for users to add each other as contacts by exchanging links without having to meet in person. We don't want to include the address of the user's long-term Tor hidden service in the link, as we assume the link may be observed by an adversary, who would th