> On 15 Jun 2018, at 09:16, nusenu wrote:
>
>
> Thanks for the replies.
>
>
> Does tor simply assume (try) that the exit policy allows the destination
> address (not the port) or does it check the exit policy before selecting
> the circuit?
> (in that case it would have to know the destinatio
Thanks for the replies.
Does tor simply assume (try) that the exit policy allows the destination
address (not the port) or does it check the exit policy before selecting
the circuit?
(in that case it would have to know the destination IP
before building or at least selecting the circuit to use)
Hello Everyone!
I’m Vafa and I’m happy to announce that I’m going to work on a project
related to Cross-Origin Fingerprinting Unlinkability in Tor Summer of
Privacy (late arrival!), this would be my first contribution to the great
Tor project and I will i will try my best to do it well.
In thi
> On 15 Jun 2018, at 02:22, nusenu wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> I haven't been able to answer this question by looking into the Tor Browser
> design document,
> maybe you have an answer:
>
> imagine you have two tabs in Tor Browser:
>
> 1: torproject.org (circuit A)
> embeds some youtube.com content
On Thu, Jun 14, 2018 at 04:22:00PM +, nusenu wrote:
> imagine you have two tabs in Tor Browser:
>
> 1: torproject.org (circuit A)
> embeds some youtube.com content
>
> 2: google.com (circuit B)
> embeds some youtube.com content
>
> it will route the TCP connection via two distinct circu
Hi,
I haven't been able to answer this question by looking into the Tor Browser
design document,
maybe you have an answer:
imagine you have two tabs in Tor Browser:
1: torproject.org (circuit A)
embeds some youtube.com content
2: google.com (circuit B)
embeds some youtube.com content
it
Hi,
https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#identifier-linkability
writes:
> While the vast majority of web requests adheres to the circuit and
> connection unlinkability requirement there are still corner cases we
> need to treat separately or that lack a fix altogether.
"lack
