Florentin Rochet:
> On 2018-03-20 04:57, Mike Perry wrote:
> >
> >Arguments for staying with just one guard:
> >
> >1. One guard means less observability.
> >
> >As Roger put it in the above blog post: "I think the analysis of the
> >network-level adversary in Aaron's paper is the strongest argumen
Mike Perry:
> David Goulet:
> > On 22 Mar (13:46:36), George Kadianakis wrote:
> > > Mike Perry writes:
> > >
> > > > Arguments in favor of switching to two entry guards:
> > > >
> > > > 1. One guard allows course-grained netflow confirmation attacks
> > > >
> > > > The counterargument based on #
I would like to add and advocate that, whatever a network protocol
upgrade will be done, Tor should starts supporting NAT traversal for
it's relay, enabling users to contribute also without a "public ip
address" .
Enabling NATted users to become Tor Relay would increase the baseline of
contributor
