On Sun, Mar 26, 2017 at 02:28:00PM +, anonym wrote:
> Tails uses the Tor Launcher shipped in Tor Browser, but it's run as a
> stand-alone XUL application (`firefox --app ...`), so the *web*
> browser isn't started as part of it.
Sorry to change the subject, but should we be running meek-http-h
On Mon, Mar 27, 2017 at 12:27:33AM +0200, Alec Muffett wrote:
> >
> > We could leave the version field outside the AONT, though, but commit to
> > changing the paramaters of the AONT (in particular, the domain
> > separation constant?) if we change the version number, so that an
> > adversary chang
NB: I'm personally not doing any circumvention related work at all and
I won't be the one implementing this regardless of what happens, so
feel free to disregard this.
On Sun, 26 Mar 2017 04:48:44 -0500
Brandon Wiley wrote:
> As was discussed in the Pluggable Transports session at TorDev
> Amster
On Sun, Mar 26, 2017 at 03:06:00PM -0400, Jesse V wrote:
> In other words, if I disable this flag and I open 127.0.0.1:8080 in the
> Tor Browser, will the browser or the tor binary attempt to connect to
> the client's 127.0.0.1:8080?
No, Tor Browser will pass the request to Tor, and Tor will try t
>
> We could leave the version field outside the AONT, though, but commit to
> changing the paramaters of the AONT (in particular, the domain
> separation constant?) if we change the version number, so that an
> adversary changing the version number to "2" would just cause the client
> to throw an
On Sun, Mar 26, 2017 at 04:19:58PM -0400, Ian Goldberg wrote:
> On Sun, Mar 26, 2017 at 02:24:41PM +0200, Alec Muffett wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > So: a bunch of us were discussing Prop224 Onion addresses, and their
> > UX-malleability.
> >
> > Specifically: that there are small bit fields in the curr
On Sun, Mar 26, 2017 at 10:39:08PM +1100, teor wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> Most onion service users expect that there is only one valid onion
> address for their private key. (For example, one address is listed in
> SSL certificates.)
>
> I spoke with Ian, and he said that as part of validating the onio
On Sun, Mar 26, 2017 at 02:24:41PM +0200, Alec Muffett wrote:
> Hi,
>
> So: a bunch of us were discussing Prop224 Onion addresses, and their
> UX-malleability.
>
> Specifically: that there are small bit fields in the current Prop224 Onion
> Address schema (eg: version, and other future structure?
Hi everyone,
I would like some clarification on ClientRejectInternalAddresses. The
manual says:
> "If true, Tor does not try to fulfill requests to connect to an
internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or 192.168.0.1) unless a exit node is
specifically requested (for example, via a .exit hostname, or a
c
Tom Ritter:
> Hi Nur-Magomed,
>
> Great to have you interested in this!
>
> So we would want to use the Crash Reporter that's built into Mozilla
> Firefox (which is called Breakpad, and is adapted from Chromium). At
> a high level, I would break down the project into the following
> sections:
T
irykoon:
> Currently, the Tor Launcher is shipped with the Tor Browser Bundle and
> heavily relies on the Tor Browser for its implementation. These facts
> cause using Tor Launcher without having the Tor Browser impossible. I
> agree with the whonix core developer Patrick Schleizer that "the Tor
>
Ivan Tham writes:
> George Kadianakis wrote:
>
>> Pickfire writes:
>>
>> > I am Ivan Tham. Currently studying in Computer Science in APIIT Malaysia.
>> > I am
>> > interested particapate in Google Summer of Code 2017 under tor
>> > organization. I
>> > am interested to see Proposal 224 comin
Hi,
So: a bunch of us were discussing Prop224 Onion addresses, and their
UX-malleability.
Specifically: that there are small bit fields in the current Prop224 Onion
Address schema (eg: version, and other future structure?) which can be
tweaked or amended without otherwise changing the functionali
Hi all,
Most onion service users expect that there is only one valid onion
address for their private key. (For example, one address is listed in
SSL certificates.)
I spoke with Ian, and he said that as part of validating the onion
address, we should check if it is a valid point.
He said we need
> On 26 Mar 2017, at 21:41, Ian Goldberg wrote:
>
> On Sun, Mar 26, 2017 at 09:27:37PM +1100, teor wrote:
>>
>>> On 26 Jan 2017, at 10:19, teor wrote:
>>>
> onion_address = base32(pubkey || checksum || version)
>>>
>>> Is the order in which the address is encoded once the checksum is
>>>
On Sun, Mar 26, 2017 at 09:27:37PM +1100, teor wrote:
>
> > On 26 Jan 2017, at 10:19, teor wrote:
> >
> >>> onion_address = base32(pubkey || checksum || version)
> >
> > Is the order in which the address is encoded once the checksum is
> > calculated. checksum represents (the first two bytes of
> On 26 Jan 2017, at 10:19, teor wrote:
>
>>> onion_address = base32(pubkey || checksum || version)
>
> Is the order in which the address is encoded once the checksum is
> calculated. checksum represents (the first two bytes of) the result of
> the SHA3 hash.
>
> We put pubkey first so that hu
> On 26 Mar 2017, at 20:58, Thierry Boibary wrote:
>
> hi,
> i'd like to collaborate to Tor, in the hidden services for example Tor2web,
> Torbirdy, metrics portal .
Here is some information about these projects:
https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/volunteer.html.en
Sorry, it is only i
As was discussed in the Pluggable Transports session at TorDev Amsterdam, the
Pluggable Transports 2.0, draft 1 specification [https://www.
pluggabletransports.info/spec/pt2draft1] was created by a committee of
censorship circumvention tool developers: Tor, Lantern, Psiphon, and
uProxy. It specifie
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