> On May 9, 2016, at 5:54 PM, David Fifield wrote:
>
> Well, an "HTTPS proxy" doesn't have to be a TLS interception device.
> When I think "HTTPS proxy", I think of an ordinary HTTP proxy using the
> CONNECT method to support TLS. In that case, the proxy does not get to
> see plaintext, which in
On Mon, May 09, 2016 at 09:23:20PM +, William Waites wrote:
>
> Blake Hadley writes:
> >
> > The environment requires an HTTPS proxy to reach the World Web Web.
> >
> > Do HTTP proxies inherently create a situation similar to MITM?
>
> Yes, that is exactly what they do. If your web browser i
Blake Hadley writes:
>
> The environment requires an HTTPS proxy to reach the World Web Web.
>
> Do HTTP proxies inherently create a situation similar to MITM?
Yes, that is exactly what they do. If your web browser isn't nagging you
all the time with "hey this certificate is untrusted" then a si
> The environment you're were in was mounting a MITM attack to break TLS,
> or has compromised your box, because the only component of the URL that
> is visible otherwise is the host in the SNI field.
>
> In such an environment, gettor in general isn't unblockable because
> there is no privacy/secu
On Mon, 9 May 2016 15:09:37 -0400
Blake Hadley wrote:
> Hey everyone,
>
> [How it's currently done]
>
> Distributed by get...@torproject.com, the URL makes it pretty clear
> what you're downloading.
> Dropbox:
> https://www.dropbox.com/s/mz9ug2rzvj85791/torbrowser-install-5.5.5_en-US.exe?dl
Hey everyone,
[How it's currently done]
Distributed by get...@torproject.com, the URL makes it pretty clear what
you're downloading.
Dropbox:
https://www.dropbox.com/s/mz9ug2rzvj85791/torbrowser-install-5.5.5_en-US.exe?dl=1
Google Drive:
https://docs.google.com/uc?id=0B76pDbk5No54VHowTEpr
Sorry, my bad. Please ignore my previous email. I just noticed that here A
is
not the public polynomial \hat{a} in the R-LWE setting, but the
concatenation
of a seed that generates \hat{a}, and client's side of secret \hat{b} =
\hat{a} s+e
Zhenfei
On Mon, May 9, 2016 at 2:04 PM, Zhenfei Zhang wr
Hi all,
If I understand it properly, in the proposal the client need to send the
whole
matrix A during the first initiation message. I draw this conclusion from
the
datagram:
| a, A := NEWHOPE_KEYGEN(SEED)
|
| CLIENT_HDATA := ID || Z || X || A
|
|
eik...@sigaint.org transcribed 0.6K bytes:
> isis wrote:
> > eik...@sigaint.org transcribed 1.1K bytes:
> >> Typos:
> >
> > Thanks! Fixed:
> >
> > https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/torspec.git/commit/?h=draft/newhope&id=5c115905
>
> You skipped 2:
>
> - public keys already being in includ
Tim Wilson-Brown - teor transcribed 3.7K bytes:
>
> > On 7 May 2016, at 05:17, isis wrote:
> >
> > ...
> >
> > Let `ID` be a router's identity key taken from the router microdescriptor.
> > In the case for relays possessing Ed25519 identity keys (c.f. Tor proposal
> > #220), this is a 32-byte s
Hello.
How it's currently done - The Tor Browser Bundle is dynamically linked
against glibc.
Security problem - The Tor Browser Bundle has the risk of information
about the host system's library ecosystem leaking out onto the
network.
Portability problem - The Tor Browser Bundle can't be run on
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