Re: [tor-dev] Testing Network Node Availability

2016-05-08 Thread Xiaofan Li
Hi, We'll be looking into the configurations soon. Thanks for the advice! Today we handed in our project report on QUIC + TOR, which concluded our semester-long project as well as our journey as undergrads here at CMU. I just want to thank everyone who helped us during this time, since I've asked

Re: [tor-dev] [proposal] Post-Quantum Secure Hybrid Handshake Based on NewHope

2016-05-08 Thread eikovi
isis wrote: > eik...@sigaint.org transcribed 1.1K bytes: >> Typos: > > Thanks! Fixed: > > https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/torspec.git/commit/?h=draft/newhope&id=5c115905 You skipped 2: - public keys already being in included within the "ntor-onion-key" entry. + public keys already bein

Re: [tor-dev] Exit relay proportions for test network

2016-05-08 Thread Tim Wilson-Brown - teor
> On 8 May 2016, at 19:06, Nicholas R. Parker (RIT Student) > wrote: > > Quick question for all of you. > At this stage of construction on a private tor network, I've reached the > point where I can't quite figure out how many of our relays ought to be exit > relays. I know that a 25 node net

[tor-dev] Exit relay proportions for test network

2016-05-08 Thread Nicholas R. Parker (RIT Student)
Quick question for all of you. At this stage of construction on a private tor network, I've reached the point where I can't quite figure out how many of our relays ought to be exit relays. I know that a 25 node network ought to have 4 authorities, 16 relays, and 5 clients, but is there a minimum re

Re: [tor-dev] Revisiting prop224 time periods and HS descriptor upload/downloads

2016-05-08 Thread George Kadianakis
George Kadianakis writes: > [ text/plain ] > David Goulet writes: > >> [ text/plain ] >> On 13 Apr (15:34:54), George Kadianakis wrote: >>> David Goulet writes: >>> >>> > [ text/plain ] >>> > On 12 Apr (16:01:32), George Kadianakis wrote: >>> >> David Goulet writes: >>> >> >>> >> > [ text/pl

Re: [tor-dev] [proposal] Post-Quantum Secure Hybrid Handshake Based on NewHope

2016-05-08 Thread Jeff Burdges
On Sun, 2016-05-08 at 13:15 +, isis wrote: > Also, deriving `a` "somehow" from the shared X25519 secret is a bit > scary > (c.f. the §3 "Backdoors" part of the NewHope paper, Oh wow. That one is nasty. > or Yawning's PoC of a > backdoored NewHope handshake [0]). > > [0]: > https://git.sch

Re: [tor-dev] [proposal] Post-Quantum Secure Hybrid Handshake Based on NewHope

2016-05-08 Thread isis
Yawning Angel transcribed 2.2K bytes: > On Fri, 6 May 2016 19:17:11 + > isis wrote: > > Both parties check that none of the EXP() operations produced the > > point at infinity. [NOTE: This is an adequate replacement for > > checking Y for group membership, if the group is Curve25519.] > > >

Re: [tor-dev] [proposal] Post-Quantum Secure Hybrid Handshake Based on NewHope

2016-05-08 Thread Peter Schwabe
isis wrote: Hi all, > Nope, it would still not work to fix the timing attack. Although, luckily, we > already wrote some constant time code for my sorting-network idea, and then, > with some coffee, Peter made it faster. (Give us something stronger to drink, > and we'll probably come up with a

Re: [tor-dev] [proposal] Post-Quantum Secure Hybrid Handshake Based on NewHope

2016-05-08 Thread isis
eik...@sigaint.org transcribed 1.1K bytes: > Typos: Thanks! Fixed: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/torspec.git/commit/?h=draft/newhope&id=5c115905 -- ♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft _ OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B

Re: [tor-dev] [proposal] Post-Quantum Secure Hybrid Handshake Based on NewHope

2016-05-08 Thread isis
Yawning Angel transcribed 4.3K bytes: > On Sat, 7 May 2016 19:41:59 + (UTC) lukep wrote: > > Thanks isis for this, it looks really good, I look forward to seeing a > > similar protocol for SIDH! (and X25519+NEWHOPE+SIDH !) > > When there is a sufficiently fast SIDH implementation, it might be

Re: [tor-dev] [proposal] Post-Quantum Secure Hybrid Handshake Based on NewHope

2016-05-08 Thread isis
Jeff Burdges transcribed 2.6K bytes: > On Sat, 2016-05-07 at 19:41 +, lukep wrote: > > It's hard to guarantee that any fixed, finite amount of SHAKE > > output will be sufficient for any rejection sampling method > > like gen_a. > > Isn't some small multiple usually enough? I think 1024 is l

Re: [tor-dev] [proposal] Post-Quantum Secure Hybrid Handshake Based on NewHope

2016-05-08 Thread isis
lukep transcribed 3.1K bytes: > I look forward to seeing a similar protocol for SIDH! (and > X25519+NEWHOPE+SIDH !) What benefit would SIDH be providing in an X25519+NewHope+SIDH construction which is not already part of the X25519+NewHope construction? (Other than putting us pretty solidly aboar

Re: [tor-dev] Testing Network Node Availability

2016-05-08 Thread Tim Wilson-Brown - teor
> On 8 May 2016, at 02:46, Roger Dingledine wrote: > > On Sun, May 08, 2016 at 02:04:23AM -0400, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote: >>> ??? Each client will have a cache-microdesc-consensus file with 4 >>> relays in it. relay 0, 1 and 2 will always be there and the last one >>> changes each ti

Re: [tor-dev] [proposal] Post-Quantum Secure Hybrid Handshake Based on NewHope

2016-05-08 Thread Peter Schwabe
isis wrote: Hi all, > I haven't given it much thought yet, but the performance cost to making > polynomial initialisation constant time may not actually be so bad. My naïve, > I'm-still-finishing-my-breakfast solution would be to oversample (say 2048 > uint16_ts) from SHAKE-128, shove them into

Re: [tor-dev] [proposal] Post-Quantum Secure Hybrid Handshake Based on NewHope

2016-05-08 Thread isis
Jeff Burdges transcribed 3.1K bytes: > On Fri, 2016-05-06 at 19:17 +, isis wrote: > > > --- Description of the Newhope internal functions --- > > > > gen_a(SEED seed) receives as input a 32-byte (public) seed. It expands > > this seed through SHAKE-128 from the FIPS202 standard. The ou

Re: [tor-dev] exitmap modules that make *lots* of connections

2016-05-08 Thread Roger Dingledine
On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 04:22:48PM -0400, Zack Weinberg wrote: > I'm working on an exitmap module that wants to feed order of 5000 > short-lived streams through each exit relay. I think this is running > foul of some sort of upper limit (in STEM, or in Tor itself, not sure) > on the number of stre