On Mon, Apr 04, 2016 at 12:04:45AM -0400, Mike Tigas wrote:
> [again, cross-posted to tor-dev and guardian-dev.]
>
> A quick status report on this: it works! Hit a big epiphany, figured out
> how to get `gomobile` to emit the necessary bits, then went wild.
>
> Some example stdout from Onion Brow
[again, cross-posted to tor-dev and guardian-dev.]
A quick status report on this: it works! Hit a big epiphany, figured out
how to get `gomobile` to emit the necessary bits, then went wild.
Some example stdout from Onion Browser connecting to Tor via obfs4,
meek_lite (google), and scramblesuit:
h
On 3/29/16, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote:
> /** Private networks. This list is used in two places, once to expand the
> So I think we should keep [::]/8 in the list of private addresses.
> That said, the list of IPv4 and IPv6 private addresses in tor is incomplete,
> https://www.iana.org/assi
On Sun, 03 Apr 2016 19:08:38 +0200
Jeff Burdges wrote:
> Should we try to organize some public chat about web caching at PETs
> or HotPETs this summer?
Might be neat, though I'm not much one for conferences. CFC is just a
proof of concept/tech demo, and all the real cleverness/scary stuff
goes
On 4/3/16, Griffin Boyce wrote:
> How do you transmit an elephant? One byte at a time...
>
> But on a serious note, it's possible to transfer 2.6TB over Tor in small
> pieces (such as file by file or via torrent). Given the size, however, I'd
> suspect they mailed hard drives after establishing co
NB: Sorry for breaking the threading. Replying to the right message.
dawuud:
> Alice and Bob can share lots of files and they can do so with their
> Tor onion services. They should be able to exchange files without
> requiring them to be online at the same time. Are you sure you've
> choosen the
On 4/04/2016 10:31 AM, Griffin Boyce wrote:
How do you transmit an elephant? One byte at a time...
rsync is a beautiful thing. Have different clients / nodes accessing
separate file paths. If the transfer drops out / is too slow, start up
rsync again..
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I've never seen anything download faster than ten megabits per second on
Tor. Presumably the inverse is true if you have upload.
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Hi.
My general feeling here is that it's more useful for me to tell you how I think
people should share files than it would be for me to answer your questions;
sorry, not sorry.
Alice and Bob can share lots of files and they can do so with their Tor onion
services.
They should be able to excha
Recently someone leaked enormous amount of docs (2.6 TiB) to the
journalists [1]. It's still hard to do such thing even over plain old
Internet. Highly possible that these docs were transfered on a physical
hard drive despite doing so is really *risky*.
Anyways, in the framework of anonymous whist
How do you transmit an elephant? One byte at a time...
But on a serious note, it's possible to transfer 2.6TB over Tor in small
pieces (such as file by file or via torrent). Given the size, however, I'd
suspect they mailed hard drives after establishing contact with
journalists. Even on a fair
Recently someone leaked enormous amount of docs (2.6 TiB) to the
journalists [1]. It's still hard to do such thing even over plain old
Internet. Highly possible that these docs were transfered on a physical
hard drive despite doing so is really *risky*.
Anyways, in the framework of anonymous whist
Nick Mathewson writes:
> ZeroMQ and its competitors are pretty good, but overkill. They're
> designed to work in a distributed environment where with unreliable
> network connections, whereas for this application I'm only thinking
> about splitting a single Tor instance across multiple processes
On Mon, Mar 28, 2016 at 6:49 AM, Rob van der Hoeven
wrote:
>> 2. Add backend abstractions as needed to minimize module coupling. These
>>should be abstractions that are friendly to in- and multi-process
>>implementations. We will need at least:
>>
>>- publish/subscribe{,/acknowledge}.
Should we try to organize some public chat about web caching at PETs or
HotPETs this summer?
By that I mean, a discussion with anonymity researchers on security and
anonymity concerns around making tools like Yawning's CFC a long-term
solution to the CloudFlare problem?
Aside from our not know
On 04/03/2016 10:37 AM, Jeff Burdges wrote:
> I should read up on this compression business since I'd no idea they
> were so small. At first blush, these SIDH schemes must communicate
> curve parameters of the curve the isogeny maps to and two curve points
> to help the other party compute the iso
On Sat, 2 Apr 2016 18:14:26 -0400
Ian Goldberg wrote:
> On Sat, Apr 02, 2016 at 07:19:30PM +, Yawning Angel wrote:
> > It's not a request header set by the browser. archive.is is acting
> > like a HTTP proxy and explicitly setting X-F-F.
>
> I wonder what would happen if the browser *also
On Sun, 03 Apr 2016 16:37:45 +0200
Jeff Burdges wrote:
> On Sun, 2016-04-03 at 06:52 +, Yawning Angel wrote:
> > Your definition of "reasonably fast" doesn't match mine. The
> > number for SIDH (key exchange, when the thread was going off on a
> > tangent about signatures) is ~200ms.
>
>
On Sat, 2016-04-02 at 18:48 -0400, Jesse V wrote:
> I just wanted to resurrect this old thread to point out that
> supersingular isogeny key exchange (SIDH) is the isogeny scheme that
> that you're referring to. Using a clever compression algorithm, SIDH
> only needs to exchange 3072 bits (384 byt
On 04/03/2016 02:52 AM, Yawning Angel wrote:
> Your definition of "reasonably fast" doesn't match mine. The number
> for SIDH (key exchange, when the thread was going off on a tangent
> about signatures) is ~200ms.
>
> A portable newhope (Ring-LWE) implementation[0] on my laptop can do one
> side
On Sun, Apr 3, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Yawning Angel wrote:
> Well, I did write an addon that just fetches content from archive.is
> whenever I get a Captcha. Does that count?
That's cool Yawning. Got a link to that? I'd like to try it.
-V
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On Sun, 3 Apr 2016 00:37:45 -0700
Ryan Carboni wrote:> >
> > (as opposed to the people that seem to think that Exits
> > should actively combat abuse by having the capability for
> > censorship).
> >
> >
> Well, a large number of exit nodes already have the capability for a
> man-in-the-middle att
>
> (as opposed to the people that seem to think that Exits
> should actively combat abuse by having the capability for censorship).
>
>
Well, a large number of exit nodes already have the capability for a
man-in-the-middle attack. This capability could very well be a default
option.
b) In your m
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