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Hello,
I think the solution to change the consensus format - section 3.3 is
by far superior vs changing the ports on directory authorities or
disabling old link protocols at relays side.
Changing the consensus format is the cleanest way to do it an
On Thu, Jan 7, 2016 at 12:12 PM, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> [This is a significantly revised version of the last version of this
> proposal draft, sent here for comment.
>
> The last version of this draft was
> https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-September/009587.html
> . This is mor
On 14 Jan (11:18:26), Nick Mathewson wrote:
> So, one of the longstanding problems with Tor's (change) proposal
> system has been that proposals sit around for a long time without
> sufficient discussion or approval. When they're about to be
> implemented, we do an informal "hey did anybody look a
Hi,
Nick Mathewson:
proposals sit around for a long time
Is there a summarized visualization of these, or is it sifting through
emails and tickets?
contribute usefully to discussions, I will prioritize
your nominations [for proposals] more
Sounds fair and balanced.
Wordlife,
Spencer
> What you could try, though, is extend Zoossh to parse tarballs rather
> than directories. This is more than 2 times faster in metrics-lib,
> and it doesn't clutter your hard disk with thousands or millions of
> tiny files.
For what it's worth processing tarballs rather than flat files made a
hu
On 14 Jan (08:07:47), Mike Perry wrote:
> Tim Wilson-Brown - teor:
> > > On 13 Jan 2016, at 00:53, Mike Perry wrote:
> > > 1. Overview
> > >
> > > For padding overhead due to Proposals 251 and 254, and changes to hidden
> > > service path selection in Proposal 247, it will be useful to be able to
Oh, forgot to talk about compression. You can run the stem script
against compressed tarballs but python didn't add lzma support until
python 3.3...
https://stem.torproject.org/faq.html#how-do-i-read-tar-xz-descriptor-archives
I suppose we could run over bz2 or gz tarballs, or upgrade python. But
On Tue, Jan 12, 2016 at 8:53 AM, Mike Perry wrote:
> This proposal aims to allow us to load balance properly between Guard,
> Middle, and Exit nodes with the addition of padding traffic to the
> network.
>
> Canonical proposal current lives in my load_balancing-squashed branch:
> https://gitweb.to
So, one of the longstanding problems with Tor's (change) proposal
system has been that proposals sit around for a long time without
sufficient discussion or approval. When they're about to be
implemented, we do an informal "hey did anybody look at that?" check,
but that's not really good enough.
Tim Wilson-Brown - teor:
> > On 13 Jan 2016, at 00:53, Mike Perry wrote:
> > 1. Overview
> >
> > For padding overhead due to Proposals 251 and 254, and changes to hidden
> > service path selection in Proposal 247, it will be useful to be able to
> > specify a pair of parameters that represents th
Hi,
Georg Koppen:
how do you convey the problem that all the other users
of the Tor network could be affected
You can always say that and link to the relevant documentation.
You can also visualize the affect their participation in the network
has, inherently addressing this issue as a resu
Nathan Freitas:
> On Tue, Jan 12, 2016, at 10:48 AM, Georg Koppen wrote:
>> Nathan Freitas:
>>> - Overall improved configuration / settings UI to make tuning Orbot a
>>> better, simpler experience... this is an expansion of the new exit
>>> country selector in Orbot v15.1, but also includes managin
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On 13/01/16 21:01, Philipp Winter wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 05:47:03PM +0100, Karsten Loesing wrote:
>> Do the Zoossh results there look plausible?
>
> I'm surprised that descriptor parsing is so slow, but I think the
> results are plausible,
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On 13/01/16 20:42, Damian Johnson wrote:
>> This was Stem commit c01a9cda4e7699c7f4bd642c8e81ed45aab7a29b
>> and Python version 2.7.10.
>
> Great, thanks! Also what was the metrics-lib and zoossh commits?
metrics-lib: 8767f3e3bb8f6c9aa8cdb4c9fb0e9f2b
On 13/01/16 20:42, s7r wrote:
> After prop 250, a malicious HSDir can not do so much, but a merged
> HSDir + IP can for example kill the circuit and force the hidden
> service to rebuild it. Under the current design, we retry for some
> times and give up if an introduction point is unreliable, but
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