> On 3 Jan 2016, at 14:12, Jesse V wrote:
>
> On 01/02/2016 05:42 PM, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote:
>> And if we can't use the reference implementation, we have some decent
>> programmers…
>> (On the other hand, if there's no reference implementation, then that
>> makes it hard to recommend tha
On Sat, 2 Jan 2016 17:18:56 -0800
Ryan Carboni wrote:
> And yet the NSA is moving to prime numbers.
So? In terms of prioritization, ensuring all existing traffic isn't
subject to later decryption is far more important that defending against
targeted active attacks that require hardware that doe
On 01/02/2016 05:42 PM, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote:
> And if we can't use the reference implementation, we have some decent
> programmers…
> (On the other hand, if there's no reference implementation, then that
> makes it hard to recommend that particular crypto scheme.)
That sounds pretty clos
> On 3 Jan 2016, at 12:18, Ryan Carboni wrote:
>
> And yet the NSA is moving to prime numbers.
>
> A large public key isn't a very good reason to not adopt quantum-safe crypto,
> it just means that it requires having the Tor project to be able to scale to
> a larger degree. I suggest hash tab
> On 3 Jan 2016, at 11:11, Jesse V wrote:
>
> On 01/02/2016 01:49 PM, Flipchan wrote:
>> How would u add quantum-safe
>> crypto? I havent seen anyone puttin a pub lib that anyone can import
>
> Here's a webpage, a paper, and software from djb:
> http://sphincs.cr.yp.to/ This is of course one ex
And yet the NSA is moving to prime numbers.
A large public key isn't a very good reason to not adopt quantum-safe
crypto, it just means that it requires having the Tor project to be able to
scale to a larger degree. I suggest hash tables, a percentage of which are
pseudorandomly downloaded. Otherw
On 01/02/2016 01:49 PM, Flipchan wrote:
> How would u add quantum-safe
> crypto? I havent seen anyone puttin a pub lib that anyone can import
Here's a webpage, a paper, and software from djb:
http://sphincs.cr.yp.to/ This is of course one example, there are other
works on post-quantum cryptography
ta being
>generated right now will be protected from bulk decryption later, in
>the event of a Curve25519 break (probably by a large enough Quantum
>Computer), which is a far more realistic threat to be concerned about.
>
>--
>Yawning Angel
>-- next part --
>
Patrick Schleizer transcribed 0.9K bytes:
> Hi,
>
> I've learned that using the trac account 'proper' [1] has lead to some
> confusion and/or curiosity. That account name is really old, it's been
> created while I was still anonymous.
>
> Tickets created by the trac account are created by me, Pat
Hi,
I've learned that using the trac account 'proper' [1] has lead to some
confusion and/or curiosity. That account name is really old, it's been
created while I was still anonymous.
Tickets created by the trac account are created by me, Patrick
Schleizer, nickname adrelanos. The arguments made i
On 12/28/2015 11:34 PM, Zhenfei Zhang wrote:
1.2 Motivation: Disaster resilience
We are really trying to protect against the disastrous situation of one key
being entirely compromised. By introducing a second cryptographic
primitive,
namely, NTRUEncrypt, we ensure that the sys
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