On 27 Oct 2015, at 05:41, Conrad Kramer wrote:
>> On Oct 26, 2015, at 11:22 AM, Spencer wrote:
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>>> Conrad Kramer:
>>> All resources in a bundle (e.g. an app or framework) are
>>> signed and the signatures are stored in a file named "CodeResources”:
>>
>> Then what is in 'CodeSig
> On Oct 26, 2015, at 11:22 AM, Spencer wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
>> Conrad Kramer:
>> All resources in a bundle (e.g. an app or framework) are
>> signed and the signatures are stored in a file named "CodeResources”:
>
> Then what is in 'CodeSignature', Apple's signing stuff?
The `_CodeSignature` folde
Hi,
Conrad Kramer:
All resources in a bundle (e.g. an app or framework) are
signed and the signatures are stored in a file named "CodeResources”:
Then what is in 'CodeSignature', Apple's signing stuff?
Wordlife,
Spencer
___
tor-dev mailing list
t
> On Oct 26, 2015, at 10:23 AM, Ian Goldberg wrote:
>
> On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 06:06:36AM -0700, Mike Perry wrote:
>> Essentially, codesign only touches executable binaries in the .app (see
>> that second link for info on how the binary's segments get moved around)
>> and also adds an SC_Info d
On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 06:06:36AM -0700, Mike Perry wrote:
> Essentially, codesign only touches executable binaries in the .app (see
> that second link for info on how the binary's segments get moved around)
> and also adds an SC_Info directory for codesign/DRM metadata.
Wait; does that mean that
On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 03:44:59PM +0800, Da Feng wrote:
> Hi:
>I've discovered that the GFW normally doesn't block https
> protocols. We can use a https front tier to distribute connections to
> actual bridges.
This is a good idea. HTTPS is a good cover protocol.
> The front tier encrypts an
Hello good people of Tor. As you know, your client side applications
like Tor browser are unmatched by anything out there. They are the
natural choice for other anonymous networks. Freenet is considering ways
to interface with Tor browser for better privacy.
Disclaimer: I am not an official sp
Here is some info about OSX codesigning, courtesy of Mike Tigas. It
sounds like undoing the codesigning to verify build (and signing
machine) integrity will be tricky. If anyone has more info on how to do
that, it would be appreciated.
- Forwarded message from Mike Tigas -
Date: Fri, 10
> On Oct 26, 2015, at 11:34, Alec Muffett wrote:
>> Of course. All the cases where you set up a hidden service
>> exactly because your host is behing a NAT.
>> Like the webcam raspi I'm just booting up.
>
> We run our tor daemons in a enclave network which can only connect outbound
> to the Int
> On Oct 1, 2015, at 06:15, Andreas Krey wrote:
>
>> Are there any use cases that:
>> * need NAT punching,
>> * don't need service location anonymity, and
>> * would benefit from lower latency?
>
> Of course. All the cases where you set up a hidden service
> exactly because your host is behing
On Mon, 26 Oct 2015 15:44:59 +0800
Da Feng wrote:
> Hi:
>I've discovered that the GFW normally doesn't block https
> protocols. We can use a https front tier to distribute connections to
> actual bridges. The front tier encrypts an internal address identifier
> with its private key (no matchin
wait... what?
What is this front tier?
Why would we want to use cryptographic protocols for bridges that
violate the end to end principal?
On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 8:44 AM, Da Feng wrote:
> Hi:
>I've discovered that the GFW normally doesn't block https
> protocols. We can use a https front ti
Hi:
I've discovered that the GFW normally doesn't block https
protocols. We can use a https front tier to distribute connections to
actual bridges. The front tier encrypts an internal address identifier
with its private key (no matching public key or public algorithm) and
returns to user the enc
13 matches
Mail list logo
