Hi Damian, thanks for your feedback! I'm replying a few things inline.
On 05/09/15 17:02, Damian Johnson wrote:
> --
>
> 155 def _register_event(self, event):
> 156 output = { 'message': '', 'type': ''}
> 157
As an aside, we chatted briefly about the naming options for single
onion services or whatever at CCC camp. Amongst those present, there
was no strong love for any existing naming proposal. An interesting
naming idea surfaced however :
We do not want people using these anyways unless they know
George Kadianakis transcribed 1.4K bytes:
> Kevin P Dyer writes:
>
> > ...and it shouldn't.
> >
> > Fortunately, the dependency is isolated to a single file. See [1].
> >
> > My understanding is that pyptlib [2] is no longer maintained.
> >
> > wiley/asn/etc. - What's the proper way to remove thi
On 09/08/2015 05:04 PM, Damian Johnson wrote:
> Hi Micah, on first glance looks fine. For what it's worth here's the
> example I got working a while back...
>
> https://stem.torproject.org/tutorials/over_the_river.html#ephemeral-hidden-services
>
> Cheers! -Damian
Doh, I figured out what I did w
Hi Micah, on first glance looks fine. For what it's worth here's the
example I got working a while back...
https://stem.torproject.org/tutorials/over_the_river.html#ephemeral-hidden-services
Cheers! -Damian
On Tue, Sep 8, 2015 at 4:58 PM, Micah Lee wrote:
> I'm trying to add support for epheme
I'm trying to add support for ephemeral hidden services to OnionShare.
They'll solve a wide variety of problems related to OnionShare using a
system Tor instead of Tor browser, and running in environments like
Tails or Whonix. I'd rather never write the hidden service info to disk
anyway.
I notice
This proposal exists in my torspec remote here:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/mikeperry/torspec.git/tree/proposals/xxx-oob-hashmac.txt?h=oob_hmac
Including it in-line for ease of reply:
===
Filename: xxx-oob-hmac.txt
Title: Out of Band Circuit HMACs
Authors: Mike
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Hello list,
This is an announcement/reminder that there will be an IRC meeting of
the Measurement Team on
Wednesday, September 9, 2015, 14:00 UTC in #tor-project
https://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/fixedtime.html?iso=20150909T14
Talk to you to
Sometime i can find the wrong SSL certificate on my hidden service.
___
tor-dev mailing list
tor-dev@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
From: Damian Johnson
To: "tor-dev@lists.torproject.org"
Subject: Re: [tor-dev] Let's identify which measurement-related tools needwork
when relays switch from RSA identities to ed25519 identities
Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2015 09:16:15 -0700
> On a side note it would be nice to have a spec patch before
>> Hi Karsten. Quick question: with the switchover are relay fingerprints
>> going away? That is to say, server descriptors no longer have a...
>>
>> fingerprint D203 4DDF 1275 A234 4F66 9935 A3EF B908 FFC7 AE9A
>>
>> ... line, and router status entries don't have it on their dir-source?
If not, wh
On Tue, Sep 8, 2015 at 7:10 AM, David Goulet wrote:
> On 08 Sep (01:04:36), Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote:
>>
>> > On 7 Sep 2015, at 23:36, David Goulet wrote:
>> > ...
>> > Please review it, mostly format of the state (before the SR document)
>> > has changed. As well as a new "conflict" line is
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Hi everyone,
Sebastian suggested to me in one of our last measurement team 1-1-1
task exchange rounds [0] to think about the following question:
Which measurement-related tools need work when relays switch from RSA
identities to ed25519 identities?
On Tue, 8 Sep 2015 17:39:58 +1000
Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote:
>
> > On 8 Sep 2015, at 08:45, Yawning Angel
> > wrote:
> >
> > So, we currently have a Pluggable Transport (PT) spec, and it
> > kind-of sort-of works (The documentation is a mess that I'm working
> > on cleaning up, but it's an
On 08 Sep (01:04:36), Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote:
>
> > On 7 Sep 2015, at 23:36, David Goulet wrote:
> > ...
> > Please review it, mostly format of the state (before the SR document)
> > has changed. As well as a new "conflict" line is added to the vote.
> > …
>
>
> > If an authority sees tw
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
I disagree. can you describe how exactly? What exactly can be gamed,
if we use the protection described by me? It will provide the same
security as directory authorities already have for voting about
relays. It's true that ultimately anything can be
> On 8 Sep 2015, at 08:45, Yawning Angel wrote:
>
> So, we currently have a Pluggable Transport (PT) spec, and it kind-of
> sort-of works (The documentation is a mess that I'm working on
> cleaning up, but it's an orthogonal issue for how well it works).
>
> There are a number of problems with
17 matches
Mail list logo
