> On Aug 10, 2015, at 2:00 PM, Philipp Winter wrote:
>
> Vanity addresses encourage people to only verify the human-readable part
> of an address before clicking on it. That creates a false sense of
> security, which is already exploited by spoofed onion service addresses
> whose prefix and suf
On Mon, Aug 10, 2015 at 08:47:05AM +0100, bernard wrote:
> > On 9 Aug 2015, at 23:43, Philipp Winter wrote:
> >
> > Vanity onion addresses, for example, might have done more harm than good
>
> Why do you say that? What harm would human readable .onion addresses
> do? And to who?
Vanity addresse
Hello Core Tor folks!
Note: if you are not a contractor or full time you can ignore this
email, it is about paid deliverables.
Me and Nick have been working on documenting the current status of our
deliverables for the year to Sponsor S [project year ends on October]
and Sponsor U [project year e
On Mon, Aug 10, 2015 at 1:11 PM, nusenu wrote:
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>
> Hi,
>
> https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n2028
>
>> If 3 or more authorities provide a Measured= keyword for a router,
>> the authorities produce a consensus containing
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Hi,
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n2028
> If 3 or more authorities provide a Measured= keyword for a router,
> the authorities produce a consensus containing a "w" Bandwidth=
> keyword equal to the median of the Measur
Thanks Dr. Fu, I look forward to your comments.
From the server log, apparently so far no one has tested the client, though
someone has set up a server. I just want to highlight that I have servers up
and running so the client and the HS functionality should work out of the box.
For the client,
On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 6:26 PM, s7r wrote:
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> I am also sending the steps I imagine Tor should take when started as
> a relay. Apologies if I am missing something obvious.
>
> They are expressed as simple as possible, Tor's interpretation is way
teor writes:
>> On 4 Aug 2015, at 22:00 , George Kadianakis wrote:
>>
>> Hello,
>>
>>
>>
3.7. Shared Randomness Disaster Recovery [SRDISASTER]
If the consensus at 12:00UTC fails to be created, then there will be no new
shared random value for the day.
Directory
> On 9 Aug 2015, at 23:43, Philipp Winter wrote:
>
> Vanity onion addresses, for example, might have done more harm than good
Why do you say that? What harm would human readable .onion addresses do? And to
who?
> As a result, maybe we should make it intentionally
> *harder* to manage raw oni
