On 22 June 2015 at 14:55, l.m wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Last I heard NIST groups are rubbish. You're better off without them for
> security. Am I wrong?
With regards to security, no one[0] who generates curves or implements
ECC (as evidenced by the recent CFRG discussions or ECC Conference)
seriously beli
>
> People can use the Tor network to download Tor Browser, with the aid of a
> bootstrapping program. (Which can be much simpler than Tor Browser itself -
> see below.)
>
> If people can't use the Tor network to download a file, then it's unlikely
> that Tor Browser will work for them.
>
>
> Hi,
>
Hi!
> Maybe an important difference here is that GetTor is a way to circumvent
> censorship (if I understand correctly), while our extension works to
> provide authentication only. I think it's a good idea to rely on browser
> stores not to be censored in the same way as your website. B
On 19/06/15 17:17, Adam Pritchard wrote:
>>
>> Oh, nice! Although for some reason ./testssl.sh --mx torproject.org does
>> not work for me, it says torproject.org has no mx records.
>>
>
> Weird. I just ran it and put the output into a gist -- pretty[1], plain[2].
> And the CheckTLS sender test[
On Mon, 22 Jun 2015 15:55:59 -0400
"l.m" wrote:
> Last I heard NIST groups are rubbish. You're better off without them
> for security. Am I wrong?
DHE is worse (logjam being a recent high profile example), and is
far slower. It's important to remember that TLS being broken while far
from ideal i
Hi,
Last I heard NIST groups are rubbish. You're better off without them
for security. Am I wrong?
--leeroy
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On Mon, 22 Jun 2015 18:36:19 +0200
nusenu wrote:
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA512
>
> Hi,
>
> since enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 is
> disabled by default on OpenBSD due to compiler bugs [1]
> I wanted to ask how bad is it (in relay context) to ignore the usual
> tor log entry:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi,
since enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 is
disabled by default on OpenBSD due to compiler bugs [1]
I wanted to ask how bad is it (in relay context) to ignore the usual
tor log entry:
> We were built to run on a 64-bit CPU, with OpenSSL 1.0.1 or later,
Dear all,
Following
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-grothoff-iesg-special-use-p2p-names/
and the separation of .onion in
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-appelbaum-dnsop-onion-tld-01
to satisfy the IETF's desire to have lots of documents, I've now split
off ".exit" as well to create
d