Re: [tor-dev] How bad is not having 'enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128' really? (OpenBSD)

2015-06-22 Thread Tom Ritter
On 22 June 2015 at 14:55, l.m wrote: > Hi, > > Last I heard NIST groups are rubbish. You're better off without them for > security. Am I wrong? With regards to security, no one[0] who generates curves or implements ECC (as evidenced by the recent CFRG discussions or ECC Conference) seriously beli

Re: [tor-dev] The future of GetTor

2015-06-22 Thread ilv
> > People can use the Tor network to download Tor Browser, with the aid of a > bootstrapping program. (Which can be much simpler than Tor Browser itself - > see below.) > > If people can't use the Tor network to download a file, then it's unlikely > that Tor Browser will work for them. > >

Re: [tor-dev] The future of GetTor

2015-06-22 Thread ilv
> Hi, > Hi! > Maybe an important difference here is that GetTor is a way to circumvent > censorship (if I understand correctly), while our extension works to > provide authentication only. I think it's a good idea to rely on browser > stores not to be censored in the same way as your website. B

Re: [tor-dev] The future of GetTor

2015-06-22 Thread ilv
On 19/06/15 17:17, Adam Pritchard wrote: >> >> Oh, nice! Although for some reason ./testssl.sh --mx torproject.org does >> not work for me, it says torproject.org has no mx records. >> > > Weird. I just ran it and put the output into a gist -- pretty[1], plain[2]. > And the CheckTLS sender test[

Re: [tor-dev] How bad is not having 'enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128' really? (OpenBSD)

2015-06-22 Thread Yawning Angel
On Mon, 22 Jun 2015 15:55:59 -0400 "l.m" wrote: > Last I heard NIST groups are rubbish. You're better off without them > for security. Am I wrong? DHE is worse (logjam being a recent high profile example), and is far slower. It's important to remember that TLS being broken while far from ideal i

Re: [tor-dev] How bad is not having 'enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128' really? (OpenBSD)

2015-06-22 Thread l.m
Hi, Last I heard NIST groups are rubbish. You're better off without them for security. Am I wrong? --leeroy ___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev

Re: [tor-dev] How bad is not having 'enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128' really? (OpenBSD)

2015-06-22 Thread Yawning Angel
On Mon, 22 Jun 2015 18:36:19 +0200 nusenu wrote: > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA512 > > Hi, > > since enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 is > disabled by default on OpenBSD due to compiler bugs [1] > I wanted to ask how bad is it (in relay context) to ignore the usual > tor log entry:

[tor-dev] How bad is not having 'enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128' really? (OpenBSD)

2015-06-22 Thread nusenu
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi, since enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 is disabled by default on OpenBSD due to compiler bugs [1] I wanted to ask how bad is it (in relay context) to ignore the usual tor log entry: > We were built to run on a 64-bit CPU, with OpenSSL 1.0.1 or later,

[tor-dev] draft-grothoff-iesg-special-use-p2p-exit-00.xml

2015-06-22 Thread Christian Grothoff
Dear all, Following https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-grothoff-iesg-special-use-p2p-names/ and the separation of .onion in https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-appelbaum-dnsop-onion-tld-01 to satisfy the IETF's desire to have lots of documents, I've now split off ".exit" as well to create d