[tor-dev] Deadline Approaching: The Global Technology Management Conference 2015 - USA

2015-06-03 Thread Jackie Blanco
The Global Technology Management Conference (GTMC2015) Bemidji State University, Minnesota, USA July 15 - 17, 2015 http://sdiwc.net/conferences/gtmc2015/ [1] You are invited to participate in The Global Technology Management Conference (GTMC2015) that will be held at Bemidji State University, M

Re: [tor-dev] Dumb or-ctl-filter tricks (Was: [tor-talk] SOCKS proxy to sit between user and Tor?)

2015-06-03 Thread Jeremy Rand
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 06/03/2015 04:07 PM, Yawning Angel wrote: > Hello, > > I just pushed a fairly large update to or-ctl-filter, that lets you > do lots of interesting things, most of them probably unsafe. In > particular or-ctl-filter now ships with a SOCKS5 clie

[tor-dev] Dumb or-ctl-filter tricks (Was: [tor-talk] SOCKS proxy to sit between user and Tor?)

2015-06-03 Thread Yawning Angel
Hello, I just pushed a fairly large update to or-ctl-filter, that lets you do lots of interesting things, most of them probably unsafe. In particular or-ctl-filter now ships with a SOCKS5 client/server implementation and a stub control port implementation. A picture is worth a thousand words: ht

Re: [tor-dev] Researching Tor: Quantifying anonymity against a global passive adversary

2015-06-03 Thread Virgil Griffith
This is my favorite paper on quantifying anonymity: http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/Anonymous/bagai.pdf -V ___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev

Re: [tor-dev] Researching Tor: Quantifying anonymity against a global passive adversary

2015-06-03 Thread George Danezis
Hello Florian, I just saw your mail on tor-dev. The assumption a number of us have been using in our work, is that if the adversary observes a circuit at two different locations, then it can link it. This is a bit like assigning a unique ID to each circuit, and assuming that seeing the link / node

[tor-dev] Researching Tor: Quantifying anonymity against a global passive adversary

2015-06-03 Thread Florian RĂ¼chel
Hi there, I am currently writing my Master's thesis about Mix networks & Tor (was on list previously). I am currently at a point, where I'd like to practially quantify anonymity. That is, given a pcap, I want to anaylze how successful an adversary can determine whether a specific client talked to