Hello,
DirAuth's can cache multiple versions of the descriptor and serve
what appears to be the newest in a given consensus interval. This
coupled with routers publishing descriptors at least every 18 hours,
but potentially sooner. What you describe doesn't appear to be a bug
in Onionoo becaus
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https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16276
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OJwDq33EbQiTk/ed3DLQdQpbrt7fqaAzZi3
Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2015 16:52:00 +
From: nusenu
>
> teor:
> > MyFamily requires bidirectional declarations to be effective.
>
> I'm aware of that fact ;)
>
> > In this case: OnionOO appears to correctly implement the
> > bidirectional MyFamily logic
>
> Apparently it doesn't.
>
> Since oni
As noted recently, OS X comes with OpenSSL 0.9.8 by default, which is too old
to build Tor.
During the Tor patch workshop today, rl1987 and Yawning were testing the
OpenSSL and Tor builds on OS X.
I've put the OS X build steps they used on the Tor Wiki, along with the
alternative method of obt
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> What's to stop a sybil attack where the malicious relays try to occupy likely
> site(s) for the next Quorum?
>
> Is the consensus unpredictable enough to thwart this attack?
> Even during quiet times? (Does Tor have quiet times?)
As you can see
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I have received messages from Tor Weather about earning a t-shirt in
the past several months to last week. The grab-your-shirt e-mails seem
to be send out correctly.
On 6/2/15 9:03 PM, Abhiram Chintangal wrote:
> Hello,
>
> Is the tshirt email syst
Hello,
Is the tshirt email system currently working? I have been running a relay
since December and I haven't seen one.
Btw, I did register my relay using tor weather.
Thanks!
--
Abhiram Chintangal
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teor:
> MyFamily requires bidirectional declarations to be effective.
I'm aware of that fact ;)
> In this case: OnionOO appears to correctly implement the
> bidirectional MyFamily logic
Apparently it doesn't.
Since onionoo says there is a bidir
> On 3 Jun 2015, at 02:07 , teor wrote:
>
>
>> Date: Mon, 18 May 2015 15:48:50 -0800
>> From: OnioNS Dev
>>
>> ...
>>
>> I introduce several data structures, but the most important one is the
>> Pagechain, a distributed structure of linked Pages. Pages contain Records,
>> Records contain .
> Date: Mon, 18 May 2015 15:48:50 -0800
> From: OnioNS Dev
>
> ...
>
> I introduce several data structures, but the most important one is the
> Pagechain, a distributed structure of linked Pages. Pages contain Records,
> Records contain .tor -> onion associations. Anyone who is familiar with
Filename: 245-tap-out.txt
Title: Deprecating and removing the TAP circuit extension protocol
Author: Nick Mathewson
Created: 2015-06-02
Status: Draft
0. Introduction
This proposal describes a series of steps necessary for deprecating
TAP without breaking functionality.
TAP is the original
> Date: Mon, 01 Jun 2015 19:20:32 +
> From: nusenu
>
> Hi,
>
> by comparing different methodologies of "parsing" myfamily data I
> stumbled upon differences between onionoo and compass.
>
> After manual review I assume there is a bug in onionoo (or onionoo has
> a different opinion on what
> Date: Fri, 29 May 2015 14:24:33 +0300
> From: s7r
>
> Signed PGP part
> Hi Matt,
>
> Nice to hear there's ongoing work for this proposal.
>
> I also see the NotDir flag as useful for migration, because for quite
> some time after prop 237 is implemented we will still have relays in
> the con
On Wed, 3 Jun 2015 00:43:50 +1000
teor wrote:
> (Mac) OS X Yosemite 10.10 and earlier ship with OpenSSL 0.9.8 and
> 0.9.7.
>
> [snip]
>
> While it's possible to build or install OpenSSL 1.0 or 1.1 on OS X,
> it's not the default.
>
> How does this affect Tor and/or Tor Browser on OS X?
Tor Brows
> Date: Tue, 26 May 2015 09:25:22 -0400
> From: Nick Mathewson
>
> I posted this on a blog comment, but others may be interested too.
>
>
> As near as I can tell, the "logjam"/"weakdh" attacks should not affect
> current Tor software very much, for a few reasons:
>
> * All currently supporte
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