Re: [tor-dev] Listen to Tor

2015-05-26 Thread Kenneth Freeman
On 05/26/2015 07:08 AM, Paul Syverson wrote: > Safe data gathering nonwithstanding, it would be interesting if there > were actually diagnostic or other information that became salient when > rendered in an auditory modality: higher fraction of highly > interactive (e.g. IRC) traffic?, sudden DD

Re: [tor-dev] Quick logjam/Tor analysis.

2015-05-26 Thread sid77
On the browser side, while waiting for vendor updates, Mozilla released https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/disable-dhe/ which does something very similar to https://addons.mozilla.org/en-us/firefox/addon/strict-ssl3-configuration/ (shameless plug) which disables broken or weak ciphe

[tor-dev] Quick logjam/Tor analysis.

2015-05-26 Thread Nick Mathewson
I posted this on a blog comment, but others may be interested too. As near as I can tell, the "logjam"/"weakdh" attacks should not affect current Tor software very much, for a few reasons: * All currently supported Tor versions, when built with OpenSSL 1.0 or later, prefer 256-bit elliptic

Re: [tor-dev] Listen to Tor

2015-05-26 Thread Paul Syverson
On Fri, May 22, 2015 at 04:33:39PM -0600, Kenneth Freeman wrote: > > > On 05/22/2015 04:27 PM, l.m wrote: > > > > So...wouldn't the torified traffic sound like...white noise? I can > > fall asleep to that. > > In and of itself a sufficient condition. > Safe data gathering nonwithstanding, it