Re: [tor-dev] design for a Tor router without anonymity compromises

2015-05-04 Thread coderman
On 5/4/15, Mike Perry wrote: > ... > In my opinion, the most interesting use case for these devices is where > Tor Launcher implements a peering mechanism whereby the user can click a > button at some point in the initial connection wizard that says "My > Router Knows My Tor Configuration." > > Wh

Re: [tor-dev] design for a Tor router without anonymity compromises

2015-05-04 Thread Mike Perry
coderman: > On 5/3/15, intrigeri wrote: > > ... > > Just to clarify, the threat model explicitly doesn't include "Attacker > > is able to reconfigure Tor on a client system to use an arbitrary set > > of bridges", right? > > correct. > > neither bridges nor pluggable transports are supported. i

Re: [tor-dev] design for a Tor router without anonymity compromises

2015-05-04 Thread coderman
On 5/4/15, coderman wrote: > ... > this deserves a longer answer, but you're right. if the attacker is > using Tor itself a Tor enforcing gateway can't protect against those > attacks. i have updated the document to make this more clear. it is hard to express the nuance of vulnerability here. fo

Re: [tor-dev] design for a Tor router without anonymity compromises

2015-05-04 Thread coderman
On 5/4/15, Leif Ryge wrote: > ... > So, unlike a transparent tor router, this system is not intended to prevent > malicious software on client computers from being able to learn the client > computer's location, right? hello Leif! this deserves a longer answer, but you're right. if the attacker

Re: [tor-dev] working back to socks_request_t

2015-05-04 Thread CJ Ess
Thanks for going into so much detail, you've given me a lot to think about. The real solution is probably the one that nobody wants to take on - having an application HTTP port that could take direct input from HTTP aware stuff and utilize a richer set of information then SOCKS allows for. I've spe

Re: [tor-dev] design for a Tor router without anonymity compromises

2015-05-04 Thread Leif Ryge
On Sat, May 02, 2015 at 08:37:17PM -0700, coderman wrote: > a friend and i are working on a Tor router design that doesn't > compromise anonymity for convenience. [0][1][2][3][4] So, unlike a transparent tor router, this system is not intended to prevent malicious software on client computers from

Re: [tor-dev] design for a Tor router without anonymity compromises

2015-05-04 Thread coderman
On 5/3/15, teor wrote: > ... > Some users will want as little logging as possible, as it can lead to > privacy leaks if the device is compromised - may I suggest you turn it off > by default? you are correct; the default should be no logging. i have updated the document, and noted that any loggin