> I think that there are some details to work out, but the general
> approach you describe sounds reasonable. IMO it doesn't need to be
> directory authorities who are StatsAuths, and we could use a "blinded
> token once per relay per period" scheme for other stuff too down the
> line.
I wonder w
Thanks It worked.
Durgesh Pandey.
On Wed, Jan 7, 2015 at 1:17 AM, JT Allison wrote:
> It's because your username ends in 21. Try using something else and you
> should be ok. The IRC network was getting spam bots with nicks ending in 21.
>
> ---
> GPG/PGP Fingerprint
> E129 722B A512 105C E8BE
>
It's because your username ends in 21. Try using something else and you
should be ok. The IRC network was getting spam bots with nicks ending in 21.
---
GPG/PGP Fingerprint
E129 722B A512 105C E8BE
4705 8046 EA48 2C82 1339
https://arlen.io/key
On Jan 6, 2015 2:31 PM, "dp docs" wrote:
> Dear Dev
Dear Developers,
this may seem you to be a spam but I have this problem constantly from a
long time period approximately 15 days. I have mailed twice to this list as
well as tried to fix this problem myself by using Google. But I am not
being able to remove the problem.
Once again I am stating the
HI,
I need to simulate TOR network in minimal case [1 ENTRY,1 RELAY,1 EXIT]
node.
how can i do that use chutney? how to setup exit node on my localhost and
how to make circuit with that exit node?
following are my config file with generated (slightly modified) torc files
i use basic-min for co
06.01.2015, 18:51 Andrea Shepard:
> Here's a proposal Nick Mathewson and I just wrote for ticket #11157.
>
> [...]
> 1. Introduction and overview
>
> To avoid some categories of attacks against directory authorities and their
> keys, it would be handy to have an explicit hash chain in consensuse
On Tue, Jan 6, 2015 at 12:14 PM, A. Johnson
wrote:
> Hello tor-dev,
>
> While helping design ways to publish statistics about hidden services in a
> privacy-preserving
> manner, it has become clear to me that certain statistics cannot be safely
> reported using the
> current method of having ea
On Tue, Jan 6, 2015 at 12:51 PM, Andrea Shepard wrote:
> Here's a proposal Nick Mathewson and I just wrote for ticket #11157.
>
Thanks for writing this up! Added as proposal 239.
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Thanks; applied!
On Mon, Jan 5, 2015 at 1:08 PM, Justin Findlay wrote:
> On 01/05/2015 09:26 AM, Gisle Vanem wrote:
>> Gisle Vanem wrote:
>>
>>> I only get 2 errors in that script. The others like:
>>>self.assertTrue(out_verif.endswith("Configuration was valid\n"))
>>>
>>> needs another patch
Hi,
Nick Mathewson:
> Some of the project ideas towards the bottom of
> https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/volunteer are easy, and some
> have research. Maybe there's something there?
>
> (Check before embarking on anything complicated there; that list
> hasn't got a thorough cleaning in a wh
Here's a proposal Nick Mathewson and I just wrote for ticket #11157.
--- Begin proposal body ---
Filename: xxx-consensus-hash-chaining.txt
Title: Consensus Hash Chaining
Author: Nick Mathewson, Andrea Shepard
Created: 06-Jan-2015
Status: Draft
1. Introduction and overview
To avoid some categorie
Hello tor-dev,
While helping design ways to publish statistics about hidden services in a
privacy-preserving
manner, it has become clear to me that certain statistics cannot be safely
reported using the
current method of having each relay collect and report measurements. I am
going to describe
On Tue, Jan 6, 2015 at 9:14 AM, spriver wrote:
> Hi,
> thanks for your reply.
> What about this one: "Repeat Murdoch and Danezis's attack from Oakland 05 on
> the current Tor network"
> Is it still relevant? Should I dig into this task?
You should have a look at
http://www.cs.okstate.edu/~chantin
Hi,
thanks for your reply.
What about this one: "Repeat Murdoch and Danezis's attack from Oakland
05 on the current Tor network"
Is it still relevant? Should I dig into this task?
Cheers,
spriver
Am 2015-01-02 15:34, schrieb Nick Mathewson:
On Fri, Jan 2, 2015 at 6:31 AM, spriver wrote:
Hey
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