Re: [tor-dev] What happens to my hidden service?

Liste writes: > Hidden service is unavailable, but tor is running. > Hello, thanks for this info. We need more feedback from HS operators who are encountering bugs or having problems. Here is a short email with some comments. Not very revealing unfortunately, but that's all I have for now. >

Re: [tor-dev] Internet-wide scanning for bridges

I'm not against keeping some around, but this warning is unlikely to turn around the thousands that currently match this configuration--hopefully it'll just encourage future bridge operators to use a 'safer' configuration. The obfs4proxy README shows users how to set-up obfs4 running over port 443

Re: [tor-dev] Internet-wide scanning for bridges

On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 08:54:29AM -0500, A. Johnson wrote: > There are even better solutions than this: > 1. Port knocking: > 2. Single-packet authorization: > > > ScrambleSuit has

Re: [tor-dev] Internet-wide scanning for bridges

On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 04:33:05PM -0800, Vlad Tsyrklevich wrote: > I've attached a patch to warn bridge operators running with ORPort set to > 443 or 9001 as a stop-gap measure. You are raising good points here but keep in mind that we also want at least *some* (vanilla) bridges which run on port

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal draft: Better hidden service stats from Tor relays

George Kadianakis writes: > George Kadianakis writes: > >> Hello there, >> >> I inline a copy of a proposal we've been working on lately. Discussion >> can be found in the "Feedback on obfuscating hidden-service statistics" >> thread. >> >> The proposal suggests that Tor relays add some stats ab