To address a question from Mansour Moufid first: There aren't any
preserved access logs, unfortunately. I copied some of the access logs
from the August DoS to another directory but never bothered to scp them
to my box. Another regret is that pcaps weren't taken, but we both made
the mistake of ass
On Sat, Nov 08, 2014 at 10:10:23PM +, Fears No One wrote:
> If you have any questions/clarifications, just ask.
[...]
> All of these files are in the hands of the
> cops anyway (And I have no plans of bringing doxbin back), so there are
> 0 real-time opsec concerns.
Hello Mr. Supervillain,
C
On Sat, 08 Nov 2014 22:10:23 +
Fears No One wrote:
> BEGIN TINFOIL
>
> Upon scrolling through the .xz files (I personally use xzless), you'll
> find a bunch of stuff like:
>
> 1
> /%5C%22http://www.hackforums.net/code/fail/code/code/code/code/code/
> ...
>
> All of the requests were
Hello,
inspired by the recent discussions on guard discovery, I went ahead
and implemented a small patch for Tor that tries to help defend
against Hidden Service guard discovery attacks.
It basically allows the operator to specify a set of nodes that will
be pinned as middle nodes in Hidden Servi
> It seems to me that we want to defend against (at least) two different
> attacks here:
>
> Sybil attack:
...
> Coercion attack:
Yes, I also am currently thinking about the problem in this way.
> Unfortunately, it doesn't really make sense to add two '5 day
> guards' in a circuit, since a Syb
"A. Johnson" writes:
>> As I've suggested before, I really really think you should also analyze
>> an I2P-like scheme where HSs try really hard to maintain path
>> persistence to their RPs for some fixed time period on the order of an
>> hour (but which can be parameterized and analyzed to give t
