Andrew Lewman transcribed 1.8K bytes:
> The last research paper I see directly addressing scalability is Torsk
> (http://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/bibtex.html#ccs09-torsk) or PIR-Tor
> (http://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/bibtex.html#usenix11-pirtor)
Using Private Information Retrieval (PIR) to retr
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if we would get multithread support, this would boost the bandwith
that is avaible, there i'm sure.
All my relays run in CPU limit because i don't think wasting even more
ipv4 addresses is great, today you get more and more cpu cores that is
not lini
On Mon, Sep 29, 2014 at 7:12 PM, Ryan Carboni wrote:
> You're missing the point. It would be trivial for a multibillion dollar
> organization to sybil attack Tor if you add excessive restrictions.
If you look at the numbers isis posted, all relays below the median
contribute less than 3% of the o
It would be trivial for a multimillion dollar organisation to sybil
attack Tor even as it stands right now.
On 30/09/2014 01:12, Ryan Carboni wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 29, 2014 at 4:36 PM, isis wrote:
>
>> Ryan Carboni transcribed 1.1K bytes:
>>> There's one issue if you remove all the small relays,
On Mon, Sep 29, 2014 at 4:36 PM, isis wrote:
> Ryan Carboni transcribed 1.1K bytes:
> > There's one issue if you remove all the small relays, only relays run by
> > the NSA will be around. Not many people have access to multi-megabit
> upload
> > speeds. And those that do might also be using bitt
Ryan Carboni transcribed 1.1K bytes:
> There's one issue if you remove all the small relays, only relays run by
> the NSA will be around. Not many people have access to multi-megabit upload
> speeds. And those that do might also be using bittorrent.
I'm quite certain that I'm definitely not the NS
isis transcribed 14K bytes:
> [...]
Oopsie daisies. Forgot my footnotes and references! Voilá:
[0]: https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-relay-debian.html.en
[1]:
https://metrics.torproject.org/bandwidth.html?graph=dirbytes&start=2014-06-27&end=2014-09-25#dirbytes
[2]:
https://metrics.torproject
Griffin Boyce transcribed 2.7K bytes:
> I'd say that the idea to 'downgrade' people into being bridges is a good
> one, if done without requiring user input. 'Everyone run a relay' might
> only be useful because so many of the people we say it to have fast
> connections. It seems reasonable to
Mike Perry transcribed 9.3K bytes:
> Andrew Lewman:
> > I had a conversation with a vendor yesterday. They are
> > interested in including Tor as their "private browsing mode" and
> > basically shipping a re-branded tor browser which lets people toggle the
> > connectivity to the Tor network on and
Hi, all!
You probably know that we do our regular meetings for tor (the
program) development on Wednesdays at 1330 UTC on the #tor-dev IRC
channel on irc.oftc.net.
But did you know everybody who's interested in doing anything with tor
is welcome to attend? And did you know that anybody who's inte
reply-to: tor-dev
On Monday 29 September 2014 15:00:29 tor-admin wrote:
> since upgrading torland to 0.2.5.8-rc I see the below warnings. Is this
> something to worry about?
IMHO this might be due to a programming error in the circuit ID selection code
or possibly indicate a DoS attack.
>
I'd say that the idea to 'downgrade' people into being bridges is a
good one, if done without requiring user input. 'Everyone run a relay'
might only be useful because so many of the people we say it to have
fast connections. It seems reasonable to filter out persistently low
connections (a
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