H,
Since the last status report, I've worked on a couple of things
- Refactored the fog client code
- worked on ticket #12614 [0]
This is my second to last GSOC report. For the last two weeks I'll be
working on getting a working version of #12614 in and cleaning/adding tests
to the fog cod
Hi all!
This is my fifth status update for the Revamp GetTor GSoC project. I'll try
summarize what I've done so far. If you have any comments, please tell me.
Achievements:
[*] New file structure of the current work. All modules now inside a gettor
package. Everything is cleaner now.
[*] Major
Hello everyone!
Sorry about the fact that I haven't made a report in a few weeks. It's
been a busy time for me. With that said, I have been getting quite a bit
of work done on my project to build a secure ruleset updating mechanism
for the HTTPS Everywhere Firefox browser extension.
In my last repo
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Status Report 5
August 1st, 2014.
Things I did the past couple of weeks:
1) Trying to fix leaks:
After finding out that the browser has a dns leak, I went ahead and
tried to look for the causes of this leak and came across
https://bugzilla.mozilla.or
On Fri, Aug 1, 2014 at 7:48 AM, Zack Weinberg wrote:
> If a node is an exit, maybe it shouldn't *ever* be used as a guard?
> This is just off the top of my head, but it seems like there might be
> some abuse possibilities in a node that sees both entering and exiting
> traffic, even if they're nev
Nicholas Hopper writes:
> On Thu, Jul 31, 2014 at 11:24 AM, George Kadianakis
> wrote:
>> - You can see that old guards (like RichardFeynman) see a shrinkage
>> both on their guard and on their middle probabilities. This happens
>> because both the total guard weight and the total middle wei
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Tyrano,
Thank you for your feedback. However, I'm not sure I fully understand your
questions.
Under my proposal, at least at this moment, if a domain ends with .tor (regex
match) it is the human-name for a Tor hidden service and requires transla
If a node is an exit, maybe it shouldn't *ever* be used as a guard?
This is just off the top of my head, but it seems like there might be
some abuse possibilities in a node that sees both entering and exiting
traffic, even if they're never for the same circuit (which I believe
is the current behavi
Into the OnionMail's federated network there are two exit/enter server
that forward the email messages between tor network and the internet.
These servers are:
onionmail.info and onionmail.zapto.org
The first is the mail exit server, the second is a server to do network
testing and security check.
is I
> dare say add a new level of anonymity in addition to the fact to hide
> you location and who you are: you hide the content of what you are
> doing.
>
> I would like to create this two kind of project having the
> copyright of the idea and becoming the owner of this two projects. Of
Nicholas Hopper writes:
> On Thu, Jul 31, 2014 at 11:24 AM, George Kadianakis
> wrote:
>> - You can see that old guards (like RichardFeynman) see a shrinkage
>> both on their guard and on their middle probabilities. This happens
>> because both the total guard weight and the total middle wei
Hi all,
my name is Omar, I am 33 years old and I am an Italian IT
Engineer, I have worked for more than 10 years in coding and now I am a
Portfolio Manager. I am quite interesting in TOR and in the application
related. I have these two following idea for new TOR related project
(obviously if
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