On Mon, Jul 21, 2014 at 9:00 AM, Tim wrote:
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/search?q=proposal+264
The search string is wrong, adjust to find this...
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12424
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On Mon, 2014-07-21 at 11:48 +0200, Mike Hearn wrote:
> One of my first concerns would be that this would build in a
> very easy
> way for a government (probably the US government) to compel
> Tor to add
> in a line of code that says "If it's this hidden servi
Tim:
> I've found a few typos in the first few sections of 224-rend-spec-ng.txt at
> https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt
Feel free to provide your fixes in the form of a patch.
`git format-patch` can help crafting an email.
--
Lunar
Hi All,
I've found a few typos in the first few sections of 224-rend-spec-ng.txt at
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt
I tried finding an existing bug or wiki entry on trac to log these against, but
I couldn't find anything relevant with:
https://
>
> > As I recall, you are also the person who raised the idea of coin
> > tinting or a similar concept in the bitcoin community to identify
> > "suspect" coins and that backfired spectacularly on you.
>
> Yes, that is the person. Though the term is known as 'taint'. One of
> many discussions from
On 07/21/2014 12:34 AM, Mike Hearn wrote:
> Tor provides exit policies to let exit relay operators restrict traffic
> they consider to be unwanted or abusive. In this way a kind of
> international group consensus emerges about what is and is not
> acceptable usage of Tor. For instance, SMTP out is
>
> This isn't about 'acceptable usage of Tor', this is necessary compromise
> to limit exit operators' exposure to ISP harrassment.
>
Even if we accept your premise that no exit operator cares about internet
abuse, it's still the same thing. ISP's define what is acceptable usage of
their internet
>
> One of my first concerns would be that this would build in a very easy
> way for a government (probably the US government) to compel Tor to add
> in a line of code that says "If it's this hidden service key, block
> access."
>
And people who run Tor could easily take it out again, what with it
