Hi,
Here's more info on how the server side currently works. When the
ServerPTCombiner starts, it opens up a port to listen for incoming
connections and reports it to tor like a normal PT. It then builds the
chains of PTs by having each PT forward its output to the next PT with the
final PT having
On 06/18/2014 04:38 AM, JP Wulf wrote:
> This geolocation could perhaps be used to validate the integrity of the
> nodes (how I dont know, maybe by establishing TOR honeypots that can only
> be compromised through traffic through a compromised (owned) exit node).
The Tor client does not trust the
Hi Steven, Nikita, I was told that you two are interested in the idea of
composing multiple PTs together. Here are our ideas on it. We have a GSoC
student, Quinn also at Illinois, working on turning this into reality.
## Concepts
On the most abstract level, pt-spec.txt defines an "input interfa
If your goal is to choose an exit specially to minimize risk of it being
run by a malicious actor, it seems choosing exits run by orgs you trust
would be better than choosing based on where someone is hosting a server.
But yes, you can choose exits by country. I'm not saying it's a good idea
or t
So Griffin Boyce is canvasing for some input to improve Tor, specifially
for Journalists.
https://twitter.com/abditum/status/479052228138119168
1. It is known that various actors are trying to compromise Tor comms by
establishing
own exit nodes. With enough nodes, they can break Tor (see slides).
