Re: [tor-dev] Hidden Service Scaling

2014-05-07 Thread Michael Rogers
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 07/05/14 17:32, Christopher Baines wrote: >> What about the attack suggested by waldo, where a malicious IP >> repeatedly breaks the circuit until it's rebuilt through a >> malicious middle node? Are entry guards enough to protect the >> service'

Re: [tor-dev] Hidden Service Scaling

2014-05-07 Thread Christopher Baines
On 07/05/14 13:51, Michael Rogers wrote: > On 06/05/14 22:17, Christopher Baines wrote: >> If so, then yes. When I implemented the deterministic selection of >> introduction points, I had to implement a reconnection mechanism >> to ensure that the introduction point would only be changed if it >>

Re: [tor-dev] Hidden Service Scaling

2014-05-07 Thread Michael Rogers
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 06/05/14 22:07, Christopher Baines wrote: > On 06/05/14 15:29, Michael Rogers wrote: >> Does this mean that at present, the service builds a new IP >> circuit (to a new IP?) every time it receives a connection? If >> so, is it the IP or the servic

Re: [tor-dev] Hidden Service Scaling

2014-05-07 Thread Michael Rogers
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 06/05/14 22:17, Christopher Baines wrote: > On 06/05/14 22:07, Christopher Baines wrote: >> On 06/05/14 15:29, Michael Rogers wrote: >>> I'm interested in your work because the hidden service >>> protocol doesn't seem to perform very well for hidd