Re: [tor-dev] [Discussion] 5 ^H 3 hops rendezvous circuit design

2014-02-12 Thread Qingping Hou
On 02/12/2014 01:20 AM, grarpamp wrote: > Note that Phantom allows both the service and the > client to choose the number of hops under their > respective control. I believe this applies in part to > I2P as well. There is thus no force to accept > any globally enforced maximum hopcount there. > Thi

Re: [tor-dev] Coordination of censorship analysis tool

2014-02-12 Thread Utsarga Sikder
http://whenisgood.net/nhhy5yt If you guys want to set up a meeting time, fill this out. If you want to see the results, go here - http://whenisgood.net/nhhy5yt/results/gqtpzak Best, Utsarga On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 3:37 AM, Philipp Winter wrote: > On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 12:32:27PM +0800, Deep

Re: [tor-dev] [Discussion] 5 ^H 3 hops rendezvous circuit design

2014-02-12 Thread Qingping Hou
On 02/12/2014 05:06 PM, Zack Weinberg wrote: > Do Tor clients actually have identity keys, as relays do? Perhaps not > *persistent* identity keys, and even if they did, an adversarial client > could just rotate them whenever it felt like, but still I'd like to know > if Fc is even a thing. I trie

Re: [tor-dev] [Discussion] 5 ^H 3 hops rendezvous circuit design

2014-02-12 Thread Zack Weinberg
On 02/11/2014 11:53 PM, Paul Syverson wrote: > The biggest concern is that no matter how you handle the commitment > and the size of the flexible set, you make it fairly easy for a HS > simply following this protocol precisely and with just the resource of > a handful of other nodes (n) in the netw

Re: [tor-dev] [Discussion] 5 ^H 3 hops rendezvous circuit design

2014-02-12 Thread Zack Weinberg
On 02/11/2014 10:42 PM, Nicholas Hopper wrote: > On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 9:07 PM, Zack Weinberg wrote: >> (3) Service transmits to Client: >> >> { E_b(Fs), E_b(Fg), E_b(F1), ..., E_b(Fn), F1, ..., Fn }_s >> >> where Fs is the fingerprint of the service itself, Fg the fingerprint >> of the serv

Re: [tor-dev] Coordination of censorship analysis tool

2014-02-12 Thread Yiwen Zhu
Hi all, I have to finish part of the project before May 2. And I am starting to implement Website Probing (section 3.1.3 in the paper). My plan is to implement 3.1.3 and then see how far I can go. Thanks, Yiwen On Feb 12, 2014, at 2:37 AM, Philipp Winter wrote: > On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 12:

[tor-dev] ScrambleSuit issue in old bridges

2014-02-12 Thread George Kadianakis
(Forwarding this mail to tor-dev, since I accidentally sent it to tor-assistants) Hey Philipp, another thing we should think about is what should happen when ScrambleSuit is run in bridges that don't support server-side PT parameters. In the past this was not a problem, because ScrambleSuit wou

Re: [tor-dev] (Draft) Proposal 224: Next-Generation Hidden Services in Tor

2014-02-12 Thread George Kadianakis
Nick Mathewson writes: > Hi, all! > > > > 3.2.3. Legacy formats [LEGACY-INTRODUCE1] > >When the ESTABLISH_INTRO cell format of [LEGACY_EST_INTRO] is used, >INTRODUCE1 cells are of the form: > > AUTH_KEYID_HASH [20 bytes] > ENC_KEYID[8 bytes] > Any number of times:

Re: [tor-dev] Coordination of censorship analysis tool

2014-02-12 Thread Philipp Winter
On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 12:32:27PM +0800, Deepak Kathayat wrote: > Also, would it be possible to have a chat over #tor-dev sometime, where each > of > us could discuss in length about how the work could be divided and the amount > of time one would be willing to put in for their part? Sounds like

Re: [tor-dev] Call for testing/review: obfsclient

2014-02-12 Thread Yawning Angel
obfsclient (https://github.com/yawning/obfsclient) now also supports the latest and greatest in pluggable transport technology in the form of ScrambleSuit. All 3 transports pass the "Can I watch youtube over it" test. My current TODO for this project is roughly: * Finish implementing the optiona